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I. INTRODUCTION
Most law is aimed at shaping human behavior, encouraging
that which is good for society and discouraging that which is bad.'
1. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 52 (2002) ("[T]he legal system is fundamentally based on assumptions
about human behavior."); Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, & the Law, 97 NW. U.
L. REV. 1115, 1115 (2003) ("Only with an understanding of how people are likely to respond to
legal rules can legal scholars, judges, legislators, and regulators craft rules that encourage
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Nonetheless, for most of the history of our legal system, laws were
passed, cases were decided, and academics pontificated about the law
based on nothing more than common sense assumptions about how
people make decisions. 2 A quarter century or more ago, the law and
economics movement 3 replaced these common sense assumptions with
a well-considered and expressly stated assumption-that man is a
rational maximizer of his expected utilities.4 Based on this premise,
desirable behavior and discourage undesirable behavior."); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral
Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1499, 1499 (1998) ("Nearly all interesting legal issues require accurate predictions about
human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily.").
2. See HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 10-11 (1908) (complaining that "[tihe
lawyer and the judge and the juryman are sure that they do not need the experimental
psychologist.... They go on thinking that their legal instinct and their common sense supplies
[sic] them with all that is needed and somewhat more.").
3. The importance of economic analysis to law is usually traced to two seminal articles by
Calabresi and Coase. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (analyzing the economic logic of tort law); Ronald Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (using economic principles to analyze nuisance
law). However, the true founder of the law and economics movement is Judge Richard Posner.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1973).
4. POSNER, supra note 3, at 2-6; see also PAUL HEYNE, THE ECONOMIC WAY OF THINKING 2
(2d ed. 1976) (noting that the rational man model is "basically a way of thinking" and that
economics assumes that everyone "acts in accordance with that rule: miser or spendthrift, saint
or sinner, consumer or seller, politician or business executive, cautious calculator or spontaneous
improviser"); Gregory S. Crespi, Does the Chicago School Need to Expand Its Curriculum?, 22
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 149, 150-51 (1997) (observing that the two core assumptions of law and
economics are that decision makers are rational actors and that the appropriate goal of policy is
wealth maximization); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 750-51 (1990) (summarizing core
assumptions of the standard model); Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An
Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 189,
191 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) ("Most economic analysis consists of tracing out the consequences
of assuming that people are more or less rational in their social interactions."); W. Kip Viscusi,
Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
625, 636 (1996) (noting that the "foundation of economic analysis of choice is based on the
rationality of individual decision making").
According to this viewpoint:
Individuals are assumed to act as if they maximize expected utility. That is, an
individual's preferences are taken as given, consistent, and representable in the form
of a utility function. An individual knows a priori the set of alternative actions and
chooses the action with the highest utility or expectation thereof. When uncertainty
exists as to the actions' consequences, an individual can assess the probability
distribution corresponding to his or her knowledge. When new information may be
collected from the environment, an individual knows the information's possible
content and can assess, in accord with Bayes' theorem, the probability distribution
conditioned on the conjunction of such content and his or her prior knowledge.
William S. Waller, Decision-Making Research in Managerial Accounting: Return to Behavioral-
Economics Foundations, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND
AUDITING 29, 32 (Robert H. Ashton & Alison H. Ashton eds., 1995); see also Thomas S. Ulen,
Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385, 386 (1989)
(providing a similar summary).
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law and economics has dominated interdisciplinary thought in the
legal academy for the past thirty years.5
In the past decade it has become clear, however, that people
simply do not make decisions as modeled by traditional law and
economics. 6  A "mountain of experiments"7 performed in psychology
5. See Anne C. Dailey, The Hidden Economy of the Unconscious, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1599, 1600 (1999) ("Economic analysis has without question enjoyed a powerful and widespread
influence within the legal academy over the last few decades."); W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed
Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND.
L.J. 1, 8 (2002) ("[T]he rational-choice vision of the human predicament has achieved
unparalleled dominance in the legal academy in thinking about individual and social
behavior .... ).
This simplifying approach has produced useful insights in other fields as well. See Bruno S.
Frey & Matthias Benz, From Imperialism to Inspiration: A Survey of Economics and Psychology
3 (Univ. of Zurich, Inst. For Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 118, May 2002)
("Often termed 'economic imperialism,' the economic approach has produced fruitful insights in
such areas as politics ('Public Choice'), law ('Law and Economics'), history ('New Economic
History'), the arts ('Cultural Economics'), or family ('Economics of the Family')"),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=316681.
6. See HERBERT SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 13 (1983) ("Conceptually, the SEU
[Subjective Expected Utility] Model is a beautiful object deserving a prominent place in Plato's
heaven of ideas. But vast difficulties make it impossible to employ it in any literal way in
making actual human decisions."); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The
Prospects for an Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 389, 397 ("The
assumptions of the neoclassical model are clearly unrealistic, and the importance of this lack of
realism has been a matter of some debate both within and outside the discipline."); R. Duncan
Luce & Detlof von Winderfeldt, What Common Ground Exists for Descriptive, Prescriptive, and
Normative Utility Theories?, 40 MGMT. Sci. 263, 263 (1994) (defending the normative properties
of the classic view, but admitting that "[t]here is no doubt that [subjective utility theory] is
descriptively wrong"); Daniel McFadden, Rationality for Economists?, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
73, 97 (1999) ("Confronted with the accumulated evidence, economists must recognize that the
Chicago-man model does not apply universally, or even regularly, to choices made in non-market
contexts."); Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in the
Regulation of the Financial Profession, 26 VT. L. REV. 263, 264 (2002) ("Economic rationality as it
is currently deployed is a grossly inadequate approximation of the factors motivating human
conduct."); Paul J. H. Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence,
and Limitations, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 529, 530 (1982) ("[M]ost of the empirical evidence is
difficult to reconcile with the principle of [expected utility] maximization."); Frey & Benz, supra
note 5, at 11 ("Over the last two decades, however, a large literature has accumulated that shows
both experimentally and theoretically that the theory of expected utility maximization can
explain only a limited part of observed behavior.").
7. Conlisk notes:
There is a mountain of experiments in which people: display intransitivity;
misunderstand statistical independence; mistake random data for patterned data and
vice versa; fail to appreciate law of large number effects; fail to recognize statistical
dominance; make errors in updating probabilities on the basis of new information;
understate the significance of given sample sizes; fail to understand covariation for
even the simplest 2X2 contingency tables; make false inferences about causality;
ignore relevant information; use irrelevant information (as in sunk cost fallacies);
exaggerate the importance of vivid over pallid evidence; exaggerate the importance of
fallible predictors; exaggerate the ex ante probability of a random event which has
already occurred; display overconfidence in judgment relative to evidence; exaggerate
confirming over disconfirming evidence relative to initial beliefs; give answers that
are highly sensitive to logically irrelevant changes in questions; do redundant and
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and related disciplines, much of it in the "heuristics and biases"
tradition founded by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky,8 demonstrate that people tend to deviate systematically from
rational norms when they make decisions.
The implications of a fundamental inaccuracy in a foundational
pillar of the legal academy's leading theoretical construct are
obviously substantial. The essential inaccuracy of the rational man
model has minimized the capacity of law and economics to generate
useful insights in many areas of the law. 9
Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs gave rise to a
movement, variously called Behavioral Law and Economics (BLE),
Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT), and Legal Decision Theory (LDT),
that seeks to provide a more descriptively and predictively accurate
account of human behavior; this is done by replacing the law and
economics movement's stylized rational man model with a more
accurate model based on empirical research arising from psychology,
cognitive science, behavioral biology, decision theory, and related
fields.
In a relatively brief period, a raft of legal decision theorists
have authored scores of articles that make up a growing body of
behavioralist literature.' 0 The new movement's momentum has not
ambiguous tests to confirm an hypothesis at the expense of decisive tests to
disconfirm; make frequent errors in deductive reasoning tasks such as syllogisms;
place higher value on an opportunity if an experimenter rigs it to be the "status quo"
opportunity; fail to discount the future consistently; fail to adjust repeated choices to
accommodate intertemporal connections; and more.
John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669, 670 (1996); see also
Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U.
COLO. L. REV. 71, 145 (1998) ("Cognitive psychology and experimental economics have found a
smorgasbord of cognitive errors, which collectively falsify most of the axioms of rational choice
theory."); Schoemaker, supra note 6, at 552 ("[Alt the individual level EU [expected utility]
maximization is more the exception than the rule.").
8. Heuristics are mental shortcuts, rules of thumb that often depart from normative
standards of rationality. See Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, Heuristic and Analytic Processes in
Reasoning, 75 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 451, 462 (1984) (noting that a bias is "a source of error which is
systematic rather than random, and consists of either failure to take account of a normatively
relevant feature or else a tendency to respond to a normatively irrelevant feature"). See
generally THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT (2002) [hereinafter PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT]; DANIEL KAHNEMAN &
AMOS TVERSKY, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (2000) [hereinafter CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES]; DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
9. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Cindy Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994) (studying the psychology
literature's hindsight bias regarding the contrasting rules for reviewing decisions of doctors and
directors); Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated
Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633 (2001) (analyzing the liquidated damages doctrine through a
behavioral lens); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
20031 1667
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been blunted by various published critiques,1' but in two new articles
STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (arguing that psychological constrains on cognition explain many
aspects of contract law); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989) (suggesting
that insights about actual human behavior can improve economic analysis of law); Garvin, supra
note 7 (arguing that the behavioral literature's puncturing of the rational economic actor myth
should affect the content of specified provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code); Chris Guthrie
et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (reporting the results of a study
indicating that judges are subject to various heuristics and biases inconsistent with the rational
man model); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (noting significant
flaws in law and economics' theory's core behavioral assumption that people act rationally while
suggesting a more nuanced approach); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers
to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) (arguing that
economics-based rational-actor models, used to analyze why parties fail to settle litigation, be
replaced with richer behavioral-based models); Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The
Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71 (2002)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Behavioral Economics] (analyzing corporate governance issues through
a behavioral lens); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 101 (1997) [hereinafter Langevoort, Organized Illusions] (using behavioral analysis to
discuss why corporations commit securities fraud); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal
Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
135 (2002) [hereinafter Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits] (providing behavioral insights
useful to securities market regulation); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A
Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993)
(providing an analysis of why securities lawyers sometimes get involved in their clients' fraud);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
571 (1998) (arguing that the law is already coping well with the hindsight bias); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61
(2000) (analyzing how courts variously ignore or adapt to behavioral considerations) [hereinafter
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the
Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1998) (presenting behavioral evidence with
implications for damage and liability rules); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic
and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 675 (2002) (using both behavioral and economic analysis to defend the controversial holding
in Smith v. Van Gorkom); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998) (reporting the results of a
behavioral study with implications for punitive damages doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997) [hereinafter Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis]
(providing an introduction to the behavioral field and its relevance to law); Cass R. Sunstein et
al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2002) (giving a behavioral
explanation for the wide variance in jury verdicts); Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1119 (2000) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIc, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)).
11. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1765 (1998) (arguing that behavioral research is still too messy to offer a neat basis for
resolving problems and that law and economics, with its simplifying assumptions, should remain
the dominant interdisciplinary paradigm); Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a
Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1998) (noting
limitations on behavioral theory's contributions to law); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice,
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (criticizing, on several
dimensions, the application of behavioral theory to legal analysis); Tanina Rostain, Educating
Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 973 (2000) (noting difficulties in using laboratory-based psychology
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Professor Gregory Mitchell seeks to change that.12 Because Mitchell
has a Ph.D in psychology and uses controversies within the psychology
discipline itself to launch a broadside attack on what he terms the
Legal Decision Theory movement, his articles pose a credible threat to
this new interdisciplinary scholarship. 13 In other words, Mitchell
presents the proverbial "threat from within."
In both articles, Mitchell challenges the competence, motives,
methods and claims of legal decision theorists. In his first article, he
focuses his attacks on the legitimacy of most social science research,
especially the heuristics and biases literature launched by Kahneman
and Tversky that many legal decision theorists favor. 14 In his second
article, Mitchell argues that there is much greater variation in human
reasoning than legal decision theorists have allowed and that this
variability prevents legal decision theory from offering useful policy
prescriptions. 15
experiments as the basis for legal reform); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of
Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000) (noting the difficulty of generalizing
appropriate legal norms from particular behavioral studies).
12. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted
Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002)
[hereinafter Mitchell, Pessimism]; Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect
Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91
GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) [hereinafter Mitchell, Incompetence].
13. Although I do not necessarily prefer LDT as a label for the new movement, I adopt it for
purposes of this article since I am responding to two articles in which Mitchell uses the term and
believe that Mitchell makes a credible case for use of the term. See Mitchell, Incompetence,
supra note 12, at 78-83.
Like Mitchell, I think that the following quotation from Dawes captures the field in a general
way:
Basically, behavioral decision making is the field that studies how people make
decisions. Because all types of people are making all sorts of decisions all the time,
the field is potentially very broad. What has characterized the field both historically
and theoretically is the comparison of actual decision making with certain principles
of rationality in decision making-for example, that increasing the number of options
available to a decision maker should not increase the probability that a particular
option from the more restricted set is chosen, or that the way in which identical
choices are described ("framed") should not affect choice. When actual decisions
violate such principles systematically (not just as a result of unreliability or "error"),
this deviation is termed an anomaly-if the people who violate these principles
simultaneously accept them as ones that they believe should govern their decision
making.
Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 497, 497 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
14. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12.
15. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12. In arguing that legal decision theorists have
ignored controversies within the psychology establishment regarding the validity and
consistency of the Kahneman and Tversky heuristics and biases literature, Mitchell mirrors
earlier criticisms of the law and economics scholarship. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed
Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1197, 1197 (1997) (noting that the law and economics "movement has virtually ignored criticisms
of its foundations that are increasingly influential in mainstream economics").
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In some sense, Mitchell reframes the debate between two
leading views of how people make decisions. On the one hand is the
law and economics movement's rational man model-what Nobel
Prize-winning economist Daniel McFadden terms "Chicago Man."
1 6
On the other hand is the leading model for decision making research,
17
the behavioral model described in the Kahneman and Tversky
heuristics and biases line of research that McFadden terms "K-T
Man."1" Hence, my title.
If Mitchell is correct, the new field of legal decision theory (or
behavioral law and economics or behavioral decision theory) holds
very little promise. Believing that Mitchell is wrong, in Part II of this
article, I briefly compare and contrast the relatively mature law and
economics field with its more youthful counterpart, legal decision
theory, in order to give to any readers unfamiliar with this new
scholarship a flavor for what it seeks to accomplish.19
In Part III, I assess the attack Mitchell makes on the validity
of social science research.20 I shall show that there is substance to his
arguments, but that he has failed to significantly undermine that body
of research.
In Part IV, I address Mitchell's claim that individual and
situational factors cause great variation in decision making, thereby
destroying any uniformity needed to predict human behavior under
the K-T Man model. 2' I will demonstrate that a large number of straw
men were born and killed in the construction of Mitchell's arguments.
In defending most legal decision theorists against Mitchell's claims, I
will make clear that I believe the pretensions of such theorists to be
not nearly so grandiose as those Mitchell ascribes to them.
In Part V, I briefly assess the future of legal decision theory in
the aftermath of Mitchell's attacks. 22 I argue that the movement
retains great potential to add valuable insights to legal scholarship,
despite Mitchell's withering attack.
16. McFadden, supra note 6, at 76.
17. Anton Kuhberger et al., Framing Decisions: Hypothetical and Real, 89 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1162, 1162 (2002) (noting that Kahneman and Tversky's
"heuristics and biases approach is probably the dominant tradition in decision research").
18. McFadden, supra note 6, at 83. K-T Man's dimensions are shaped by both Kahneman
and Tverksy's heuristics and biases literature dealing with mental shortcuts under conditions of
uncertainty and their prospect theory literature, focusing on the nature of people's utility
functions under conditions of risk. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MORAL HEURISTICS 2 n.2 (Univ. of
Chi., Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 180, Mar. 2003, http://ssrn.com/abstractid=387941.
19. See infra notes 23-59 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 60-307 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 308-528 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 529-578 and accompanying text.
1670 [Vol. 56:1663
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LEGAL DECISION THEORY
Despite its dominance, law and economics has been
controversial. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) arose, in large part, as a
response to the methods and values of law and economics, 23 but it has
since largely died away. Dissatisfaction with law and economics has
remained, however, because efficiency simply does not explain why
the law is as it is,24 despite the redoubtable Judge Posner's claims to
the contrary.25 Although economic analysis has improved the rigor of
some legal analysis and has shed valuable light on some topics, such
23. See Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic
Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 194 (1998) (noting that the Critical Legal
Studies movement began "at least in part, as an attack on the perceived short-comings of the
method and values of" law and economics).
24. It is difficult to accept the law and economics position that the common law is best
explained by efficiency criteria when judges (and jurors for that matter) do not typically
emphasize efficiency grounds when making decisions, as Baron and Ritov discovered in empirical
tests.
Our results create a puzzle for positive economic theories of law, particularly that of
Landes and Posner (1987). If the system can be understood in terms of the
consequentialist rationale, as they claim it can, what human judgments maintain it?
Note that our main findings held even for judges, and most of our other subjects are
potential jury members. Perhaps the present system is not so close to be[ing] the
"best of all possible consequentialist worlds," as Landes and Posner would suggest.
Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the Context of
Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 32 (1993); see also Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and
Biases in Equity Judgments: A Utilitarian Approach, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE 109, 111 (Barbara Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993) ("Utilitarianism often conflicts
with our intuitive beliefs about what is morally right."); Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We
Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 284, 295 (2002) (finding, inconsistent with economic reasoning, that "despite strongly
stated preferences for deterrence theory, [subjects'] individual sentencing decisions seemed
driven exclusively by just deserts cor. rns"); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just
Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) (finding that a
person's desire to punish is based primarily upon a just deserts motive rather than a deterrence
rationale); Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort
Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1434 (2000) ("Lay jurors possess no particular expertise in
economic analysis... [and c]ivil negligence actions do not ask jurors to apply a standard of care
that even refers to these matters."); Jonathan J. Koehler & Andrew D. Gershoff, Betrayal
Aversion: When Agents Cause the Very Harm They Are Supposed to Prevent, ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES (forthcoming 2004) (finding, contrary to economic theory,
that mock jurors did not assign greater punishment to a thief whose crime was harder to detect);
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 248 (2000)
(finding that an economic approach to deterrence in the legal system is broadly rejected by the
public).
25. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1
(1987) (arguing that the common law of torts is best explained as if the judges were trying to
promote efficient resource allocation); see Wendel, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that law and
economics "adherents claimed it explains everything from nuisance remedies (which it probably
does) to sexual idiosyncracies [sic], to racial discrimination, to holiday customs, to the whole
universe of social norms...").
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as antitrust, 26 the rational man model, with no room for cognitive
limitations, emotion, or altruism, describes neither how man does act
nor how man should act.27 Therefore, as noted earlier, law and
economics has provided relatively few useful insights in most areas of
the law.
* Contract law. As Eric Posner recently noted, thirty
years of economic analysis of contract law "has failed to
produce an 'economic theory' of contract law, and does
not seem likely to be able to do so,"28 and has not had
any particular impact on judicial decision making,
26. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from
Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1999) ("Whole bodies of law are now exclusively within
[law and economics'] domain, including antitrust, economic regulation, and major portions of
corporate law.").
Even in these areas, psychological evidence can add helpful insights. Gerla has observed
that "[tihe nature of human information processing makes the dissemination of false information
an almost ideal strategic tool for raising rivals' costs." Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and
the Flow of Consumer Information, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1063 (1991); see also Harry S.
Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39 Sw. L.J. 755, 779
(1985) ("[P]sychology, as the science of human behavior, has relevance to any aspect of antitrust
analysis that involves assumptions with respect to human behavior, whether the assumptions
relate to the behavior of humans as consumers or as managers of business enterprises.").
Professor Langevoort has penned several behavioral articles that lend insight to corporate
governance issues. See, e.g., Langevoort, Behavioral Economics, supra note 10, at 71 (analyzing
corporate governance issues through a behavioral lens); Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra
note 10, at 101 (using behavioral analysis to discuss question of why corporations commit
securities fraud).
And several authors have shown that psychological research can give us a deeper
understanding of regulatory issues than mere law and economics. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld,
Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 486, 547-48 (2002) (using psychological principles to examine the interplay of judicial review
and agency decision making); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1059, 1096 (2000) (suggesting cost-benefit analysis of regulations as a reasonable response
to citizens' psychological misperceptions of risk).
27. Law and economics has been accused of having "an almost pathological aversion to
explanations that appeal to values, commitments, loyalties, relationships, or emotions." Wendel,
supra note 5, at 3. It has also been accused of crowding out considerations of law and morality.
See David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and
Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 339, 420 (2002) (noting that "legal economists have generally
proceeded without a well-articulated moral basis" and expressing doubts that the question posed
in their title can be answered affirmatively); Pouncy, supra note 6, at 264, 281 ("[E]conomic
rationality acts as a cultural contaminant, devaluing other moral and cultural considerations
and obscuring the mechanisms through which business organizations create and exercise
economic power.... The decisional structure envisioned by neoclassical economic theory leaves
little room for the operation of ethics and morality in its model-building project.").
28. Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003). Posner also argues that "[s]cholarship influenced by
cognitive psychology has so far produced few insights." Id. at 829. I disagree with that
assessment but, in any event, behavioral research still has twenty years or so before it can match
law and economics' record of futility.
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statutory law, or regulatory law in the contract field. 29
The failure can be traced in large part to the false
premise that man is a rational actor.
3 0
* Tort law. Izhak Englard notes that "the law and
economics movement has had little but a rhetorical
effect upon contemporary processes of tort
adjudication."31 Courts and legislatures seldom cite law
and economics scholars, and infrequently adopt their
positions.3 2 The reason, it has been suggested, is that
the theory is inaccurate.
33
* Criminal law. Empirical studies demonstrate that the
conventional economic model's assumption that
"[i]ndividuals will comply with a legal prohibition if the
expected penalty-the expected cost to them of the
violation-will exceed the gain they expect to derive
from the violation"34 is typically inaccurate and the
theories it generates unhelpful. 35 As I have suggested
29. Id. at 870.
30. As Posner notes:
Fundamental assumptions, common to nearly all efforts at economic analysis, are that
individuals have preferences over outcomes; these preferences obey basic consistency
conditions; and individuals satisfy these preferences subject to an exogenous budget
constraint. Contract scholars usually assume that individuals do not have
preferences regarding the consumption or well-being of other individuals, nor
regarding contract doctrine itself-there is no preference of expectation damages, for
example.
Id. at 832.
31. William E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in New
York, 1920-1980, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 117, 121 (1999) (citing Izhak Englard, Law and Economics in
American Tort Cases: A Critical Assessment of the Theory's Impact on Courts, 41 U. TORONTO L.J.
359 (1991)).
32. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Actual Practice: Legal Phenomena,
Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683,
690-93 (2002).
33. Id. at 694 (criticizing law and economics and other "top-down" theories of tort law).
34. David Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110
YALE L.J. 733, 740 (2001); see also Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1477 (1999) [hereinafter Posner, Evidence] (applying this
simplifying presumption to an analysis of rules of evidence). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 164 (2d ed. 1977) ("A person commits a crime because the expected
benefits of the crime to him exceed the expected costs.").
35. George A. Akerlof, Proscrastination and Obedience, AM. ECON. REV., May 1991, at 1, 2
("Economic theories of crime..., are deficient and yield misleading conclusions when
[psychological limitations on rational behavior] are ignored."). Economists who specialize in
criminal law have tended to jettison the Chicago Man model. See Ronald L. Akers, Rational
Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning in Criminology: The Path Not Taken, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 653, 665 (1990) ("[R]ational choice theory [as developed in criminology] does not
assume that all or even most criminal acts result from well-informed calculated choices. The
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elsewhere, a psychological explanation is much more
descriptive of reality. 36 A failure to take into account
psychological evidence explains why "[r]esearch on the
deterrent effect of law enforcement activities shows the
extremely limited value of economic analyses for policy
purposes .... "37
By seeking to base policy prescriptions upon actual evidence
regarding how people make decisions, rather than a simplified and
consistently inaccurate model, legal decision theorists have already
made many contributions to legal scholarship. In fact, the
contributions have been so numerous that even the slightest attempt
at a comprehensive summary would take this article on a detour so
lengthy that I would soon lose sight of my goal, which is to respond to
Professor Mitchell's specific arguments. Therefore, I offer just a few
examples to introduce the uninitiated.
A mainstay of law and economics is the Coase Theorem, which
provides that the initial assignment of legal rights does not determine
which use will ultimately prevail because the parties will bargain to
the most efficient state of affairs. 38 Unfortunately, when he wrote in
1960, Coase did not have the benefit of exposure to the literature on
loss aversion and the endowment effect. Kahneman and Tversky have
demonstrated that people are loss averse in that they fear losses
roughly twice as much as they enjoy gains. 39 Relatedly, Kahneman
rational choice models in the literature leave room for all levels of rationality, except the most
mindless, pathological, and irrational.").
36. In exploring why people commit cimes, I wrote:
[T]he reality is that people usually slide into crime not as the result of a single
rationally-weighed cost-benefit decision, but because of a series of small irrational
decisions to experiment with drugs, join a gang, or the like. Numerous limitations on
economist-defined rationality ... (including overoptimism) ... prevent potential
criminals from acting as economists predict. One of the most significant factors in
criminal behavior may well be time-delay traps. Criminal acts tend to involve short-
term pleasures and benefits, but long-term costs. The criminal is unable to fully
appreciate the long-term costs because of the tendency to disproportionately discount
future consequences. This phenomenon causes additional years of imprisonment to
carry less deterrent impact for the average person than for the hypothetical rational
actor.
Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud
Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133, 177-78 (2000) (citations omitted).
37. MICHAEL R. G07TFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 73, 119
(1990); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2412 (1997)
("[T]he standard law and economics view that reducing the probability of detection can be
compensated by increasing [the sentence) may not be realistic.").
38. Coase, supri note 3.
39. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES, supra note 8, at 143, 154; see also Richard
Coughlan & Terry Connolly, Predicting Affective Responses to Unexpected Outcomes, 85
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 211, 217 (2001) (finding that "losses loom
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and Tversky have shown that people tend to perceive the value of
items as much greater when those items become part of their
endowment. 40 Therefore, people generally demand more to part with
what they have than they would be willing to pay to acquire it in the
first place. 41 Loss aversion and the endowment effect combine to
undermine the Coase Theorem in this regard. 42 If a statute provides
that employees will presumptively have certain types of benefits
unless they agree to forfeit them, a much different world will result
than from a regime where the statute presumes that such benefits will
not be available unless the employer agrees to provide them.
43
Contrary to the Coase theorem, the initial endowment matters and it
matters substantially.
Another doctrine economists commonly cite 44 derives from
Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action45 and assumes that
people, being wealth-maximizing, will, in the absence of externally
imposed incentives, almost always "free ride" on the contributions of
other group members. Kahan has clearly demonstrated that "Olson's
larger than gains" to study's subjects); Janet Landman, Regret and Elation Following Action and
Inaction: Affective Responses to Positive Versus Negative Outcomes, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 524, 527 (1988) ("[W]hen people are making real decisions in betting or life
dilemma situations, they weigh potential losses more heavily than potential gains.").
40. See generally Daniel L. Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (discussing the endowment effect
generally); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded:
Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507, 512-
13 (1984) (reporting results of one of the most famous studies of the endowment effect).
41. This large disparity between willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP)
is well documented in both laboratory and real world settings. See Raymond S. Hartman et al.,
Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J. ECON. 141, 158-60 (1991) (finding 3-to-1
WTP/WTA disparity in surveys of consumers of residential electrical service); Jack Knetsch, The
Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, in CHOICES, VALUES AND
FRAMES, supra note 8, at 171, 171 ("The minimum compensation people demand to give up a
good has been found to be several times larger than the maximum amount they are willing to
pay for a commensurate entitlement. For example, when questioned about the possible
destruction of a duck habitat, hunters responded that they would be willing to pay an average of
$247 to prevent its loss but would demand $1044 to accept it."); JOHN K. HOROWITZ & KENNETH
E. MCCONNELL, A REVIEW OF WTAIWTP STUDIES 2-3 (Univ. of Md., Dep't of Agric. & Res. Econ.,
Oct 2000) (finding in meta study of forty-five willing to accept/willing to pay studies the average
WTA/WTP ratio was approximately seven and that this held over a wide variety of experimental
designs, subjects, and products), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=257336.
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Looking Forward: Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1179 (1997) ("The theorem is wrong because the allocation of the legal entitlement may
well matter, in the sense that those who are initially allocated an entitlement are likely to value
it more than those without the legal entitlement.").
43. See Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 112 (2002).
44. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Law and Economics of Federalism: Valuing Federalism,
82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 406 n.373 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an
Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 507 n. 140 (1987).
45. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
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Logic is false"46 in that, in collective settings, people are often more
influenced by their relations to others than by wealth maximization.
Thus, to give just one of several examples that Kahan explores,
economic theory suggests that the way to induce people to pay their
taxes more regularly is to impose heavier penalties for
noncompliance.4 7 Yet, penalties turn out to have relatively little to do
with levels of tax compliance. 48  A more nuanced psychological
accounting tells us that people are more likely to pay their taxes if
they believe that others are paying theirs.49 "Auditing crack downs
and other high-profile modes of enforcement risk backfiring, the
evidence suggests, because they function as a cue that evasion is
widespread."
50
Another conventional law and economics argument is that
legislatures and courts should eliminate products liability law and
allow consumers to bargain for their desired level of risk, and thereby
pay more if they want safer products and accept more risk if they
want cheaper products. 5' Similarly, if workers are injured on the job,
it is simply because they voluntarily chose to accept the risk of injury
in exchange for higher wages. 52  In response to this argument,
Roszkowski and I pointed out that a large number of the heuristics
and biases identified by Kahneman and Tversky make it unlikely that
workers rationally bargain for their accepted level of risk when taking
jobs, or that consumers do so when buying products.53
Among these biases is the overconfidence bias. Ninety-four
percent of college professors think that they are better than average
46. DAN M. KAHAN, THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY: TRUST, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND LAW
1(Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 31, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=361400.
47. Id. at 10-11.
48. See, e.g., FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION
74 (1990); James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 855 (1998)
(noting that the "most significant discrepancy that has been documented between the standard
economic model of compliance and real-world compliance behavior is that the theoretical model
greatly overpredicts noncompliance" and calling for incorporation of psychological factors into
economic models to increase accuracy of models); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Criminal
Deterrence Literature: Implications for Research on Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 TAXPAYER
COMPLIANCE 126, 142 (J. Roth & J.T. Scholz eds., 1989).
49. See Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions
and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 193, 194-95 (J. Slemrod ed.,
1992).
50. KAHAN, supra note 46, at 16.
51. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 7 (1988).
52. Id. at 8.
53. Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution"
Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 251, 286-87 (1992);
Mark E. Roszkowski & Robert A. Prentice, Reconciling Comparative Negligence and Strict
Liability: A Public Policy Analysis, 33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19, 94-96 (1988).
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teachers, 54 and a majority of consumers believe that they will be safer
with machines than others will. 55 Whereas people thinking about
marriage know that half of all couples divorce, virtually none of them
think that they will.56 This overoptimism bias also leads workers and
consumers to believe that the accidents that happen to other people
will not happen to them. Irrationally, people who throw dice wanting
a low number tend to throw the dice softly; those who want a high
number tend to throw the dice much more vigorously.57 This illusion
of control58 leads people to conclude that their chances of avoiding
injury are "inappropriately higher than the objective probability would
warrant."59 Overconfidence, overoptimism, and the illusion of control
are just three reasons why it is inaccurate to characterize consumer
purchases and employer-employee negotiations as involving a rational
bargaining for a desired level of risk.
This survey could continue for many pages, but these examples
should serve to indicate that it is at least arguable that K-T Man
provides a more descriptive model of human behavior upon which to
base legal policy prescriptions than does Chicago Man. People simply
are not unboundedly rational. Their decision-making efficacy is often
constrained by a variety of biases, guided by non-normative heuristics,
and affected by non-rational factors such as emotion and altruism.
III. LIMITATIONS ON BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY: ARE SOCIAL
SCIENTISTS SCIENTIFIC?
The essential point of Mitchell's first article is that legal
decision theorists have failed to fully disclose huge flaws in the
psychological research on which they rely, and thus paint what
Mitchell calls an unwarrantedly pessimistic view of human decision
making. 60  He suggests that legal decision theorists puff and
exaggerate their portrait of human irrationality in order to produce
54. K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching be Improved?, 17 NEW DIR. FOR
HIGHER ED.: RENEWING AND EVALUATING TEACHING, Spring 1977, at 1, 10.
55. PETER ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION 76 (1988).
56. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439,
443 (1993).
57. See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra
note 8, at 231, 238.
58. MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 95-96 (4th ed. 1998)
(discussing the "illusion of control").
59. ASCH, supra note 55, at 76.
60. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 2017 ("Behavioral decision theory does not
support the bold claim of legal decision theorists that all legal actors systematically fall prey to
cognitive illusions when forming judgments and making decisions.").
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more marketable articles, 61 and that student editors at law reviews
are ill-equipped to regulate such blatant flackery.
62
Before examining Mitchell's individual indictments, it is
important to concede that psychology research is not perfect and is not
likely to be so any time soon. Like all other sciences, psychology
studies complex phenomena through imperfect tests run by fallible
human scientists. But, as Bronowski has noted, it is the checks and
balances system of scientists critiquing and replicating the work of
other scientists that provides the power that scientific research has to
reveal truths about our world.63 Indeed, it is "not so much the critical
attitude that individual scientists have taken with respect to their
own ideas that has given science its success ... but more the fact that
individual scientists have been highly motivated to demonstrate that
hypotheses that are held by some other scientists are false."
64
In his second article, Mitchell illustrates Bronowski's point by
citing much of the literature aimed at pointing out the limitations of
and problems with the widely accepted Kahneman and Tversky
heuristics and biases research.65 The rich literature of heuristics and
biases does not consist of only twenty or thirty studies by Kahneman
and Tversky, but rather includes thousands of studies seeking to
confirm, rebut, and/or determine the limits and conditions of the K-T
findings. These studies, and Mitchell's articles, help provide the
checks and balances that Bronowski notes will help reveal the
scientific truth about how people make judgments and decisions.
Not only is the psychology literature upon which legal decision
theorists rely constantly tested in the psychology journals, but the
legal decision theorists' own work is also constantly critiqued by
articles such as Mitchell's and those of other leading legal scholars.
66
61. See id. at 1925.
62. Id. at 1929-31.
63. JACOB BRONOWKSI, THE ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION 112, 117-22 (1978).
64. KEITH E. STANOVICH, HOW TO THINK STRAIGHT ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY 33 (6th ed. 2001)
(quoting Raymond S. Nickerson).
65. See MASSIMO PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS: How MISTAKES OF REASON
RULE OUR MINDS 40 (1994) (noting that the heuristics and biases discoveries "rank in importance
alongside the discovery of the subconscious in psycholanalysis").
66. Mitchell notes articles already published which critique not only the general application
of psychological research to the legal arena, see, e.g., Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12 at 1938-
45, but also critique specific articles. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive
Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867 (1999)
(critiquing Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as
a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998)); Robert J. MacCoun, The Costs and Benefits of
Letting Juries Punish Corporations: Comment on Viscusi, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2000)
(critiquing W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN L. REV. 547, 547
(2000)); see also Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis:
The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 737-38 (2000) (suggesting that in its
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The good news, from my perspective, is that Mitchell's article shows
how the debate has shifted. Instead of simply accepting the rational
man assumption, many scholars now recognize its inaccuracy and
seek to explore the validity and the limitations of alternative
explanations of human behavior. The shift in focus from the
traditional Chicago Man assumption to the behavioral literature is a
laudable development. While the critiques of psychological research
that Mitchell raises are substantive and important to address, they do
not, as we shall see, counsel that we go back to ignoring the
psychological and cognitive literature or its implications for legal
analysis.
67
A. Does Behavioral Decision Theory Mask Individual and Situational
Differences in Rational Behavior and Distort Perceptions of the
Prevalence of Irrational Behavior?
Mitchell's first attack on psychology research claims that the
methodology used by psychologists allows them to claim findings that
support the heuristics and biases camp, even though some or perhaps
a majority of subjects in a study answered normatively. 6  His
argument has several prongs.
1. Between-Subjects Designs
Mitchell begins by criticizing psychology's use of between-
subjects designs 69 in empirical experiments on grounds that it tends to
current state of development, behavioral decision theory can offer some insights into proper
judicial treatment of liquidated damage clauses, but cannot provide definite answers); Philip G.
Peters, Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1277, 1313-14 (1999) (concluding that behavioralists had done a service by bringing the hindsight
bias to the attention of the legal community, but arguing that there are reasons to study the
issues further before making any major reforms).
67. Certainly the methodology of the harder sciences is not beyond reproach either. A
recent article criticized reports of clinical trials on grounds that they often fail to report absolute
risk reduction, and thereby mislead readers. See Jim Nuovo et al., Reporting Number Needed to
Treat and Absolute Risk Reduction in Randomized Controlled Trials, 287 JAMA 2813, 2813-14
(2002). In other words, a new drug might be reported as twice as effective as an existing drug,
but the report will not note that the new drug is only 20% effective (versus 10% efficacy for the
old drug).
68. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1945-70.
69. In a between-subjects design, each subject is exposed to only one of the experimental
treatments, so that each condition of the experiment is made up of a different group of
individuals. See J. MERRILL CARLSMITH ET AL., METHODS OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
266 (1976). In a within-subjects design, each subject is exposed to all experimental treatments, so
that each condition of the experiment is made up of the same individuals. Id.
As Mitchell notes,
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produce insight only into statistically average decisions rather than
the decisions of particular individuals. 70  In between-subjects
experiments, some subjects are tested under condition A and their
responses are compared to those of subjects tested under condition B.
Mitchell prefers the within-subjects experimental design, where the
same subject is tested under different conditions. 71 Both designs have
strengths and weaknesses.
Within-subjects tests, for example, often suffer from demand
effects, 72 where features of the experiment itself allow the subjects to
surmise the goals of the experimenter, an occurrence that results in
the skewing of the subjects' responses.
73
[Plarticipants in a within-participants design see more than one condition and thus are
in a better position to guess at the experimental hypotheses. The resulting demand
characteristics are an important potential source of bias, as participants start wondering
In a between-subjects design, the experimenter examines whether the mean, or
average, response of one group of subjects exposed to one experimental condition
differs significantly (in a statistical sense, where the likelihood of a difference being
due to chance is estimated) from the mean response of a different group of subjects
exposed to a different experimental condition.
Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1948 n.76.
70. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1946-54.
71. See CARLSMITH ET AL., supra note 69, at 266 (discussing how in a within-subjects design,
"individual subjects participate in each of the experimental conditions (or, less commonly, repeat
trials within conditions) and then variations in behavior across conditions are examined").
72. Mitchell himself notes that demand characteristics are a problem that researchers must
deal with, yet he criticizes use of the experimental form that is best suited to minimize its effects.
See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1979-984; see also Daniel Kahneman & Shane
Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 49, 70 ('The message that the [within-
subjects] design conveys to the participants is that the experimenter expects to find effects of
every factor that is manipulated.").
73. See, e.g., Marilynn B. Brewer, Research Design and Issues of Validity, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 3, 8 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M.
Judd eds., 2000) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS] (explaining and illustrating
demand effects); Gary Charness & David I. Levine, When are Layoffs Acceptable? Evidence from
a Quasi-Experiment, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 381, 384 (2000) (noting that in a within-subjects
design, "it sometimes happens that respondents, guessing that the experimenter expects certain
treatments to matter, conform their responses to those perceived demands," so authors used a
between-subjects design to reduce the "demand effect"); Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical
Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Study, 48 FLA. L. REV. 197, 227 n.206 (1996)
(explaining that author used between-subjects design in comparing what lawyers thought they
should do to what they would do because previous studies using within-subjects design
automatically alerted subjects to the possibility of a potential discrepancy between the two);
Norman J. Finkel, But It's Not Fair!: Commonsense Notions of Fairness, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 898, 923 (2000) ("Although the within-subject design reduces more error variance than the
between-subjects design, it also may introduce inadvertently a demand characteristic-making
the key contrasts (i.e., unfairness vs. misfortune vs. injustice) too salient, which may suggest to
the participants that they make sharper differentiations than they might have otherwise done.").
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"what are they getting at here" or "what am I supposed to do in this experiment" rather
than simply performing the task.
74
Within-subjects tests can also create carryover effects where "a
participant's response in a given condition depends on conditions that
participant experienced previously within the experiment. ' 75 Those
effects can create bias by serving to anchor a subject's judgment,
"create fatigue, prime specific cognitive representations, or influence
participants' mood.
76
For these and other reasons, 77 between-subjects designs "are
more appropriate for the study of heuristics of judgment.178 As
mentioned above, a within-subjects model often allows subjects to play
several rounds and slowly learn from their mistakes in ways that
often are not available in real life. 79 "The between-subjects design in
contrast, mimics the haphazard encounters in which most judgments
are made and is more likely to evoke the casually intuitive mode of
judgment that governs much of mental life in routine situations.
°80
Mitchell concedes that others agree that within-subjects designs are
often suboptimal for examining the validity of the theory that people
are rational maximizers of their expected utilities.81 As Daniel
Kahneman has noted in comparing these two approaches:
The between-subjects test of coherence is much stricter. It requires respondents to be
disposed to produce the same judgments of probability, regardless of whether the
questions ... are asked together or separately. Furthermore, coherence requires choices
and beliefs to be immune to variations of framing and context. This is a lot to ask for,
but an inability to pass between-subjects tests of coherence is indeed a significant flaw.
74. Eliot R. Smith, Research Design, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS, supra note 73,
at 17, 23 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 23; see also CARLSMITH ET AL, supra note 69, at 267 (discussing carryover effects).
76. Smith, supra note 74, at 23.
77. CARLSMITH ET AL., supra note 69, at 266-67 (comparing within-subjects designs with
between-subjects designs).
78. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 72, at 70.
79. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 587 (1996) (noting that one-shot decision tests in between-subjects
experiments can provide "a clean test of the hypothesis that subjects rely on a given heuristic").
In many studies heuristics survived several rounds of practice by subjects. See, e.g., GEORGE
LOEWENSTEIN ET AL., PAYING $1 TO LOSE $2: MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN
PREDICTING THE PERFORMANCE OF OTHERS 26 (Carnegie Mellon Behavioral Decision Research,
Working Paper No. 301, 2002) (finding that a substantial percentage of subjects remained
subject to the curse of knowledge even after several rounds of experience),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=323221.
80. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 72, at 72-73.
81. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1949, n.78 (citing Gideon B. Keren & Jeroen
G.W. Raaijmakers, On Between-Subjects Versus Within-Subjects Comparisons in Testing Utility
Theory, 41 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 233, 244 (1988), which argues
that within-subjects tests are often not the best approach for testing utility theory, especially
when subjects are presented with the same stimuli more than once).
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Knowing rules and being able to apply them is good, but not sufficient, because much of
life resembles a between-subjects experiment. Questions about preferences and beliefs
arise one at a time, in variable frames and contexts, and without the information needed
to apply relevant rules. A perfect reasoner whose judgments and choices are susceptible
to framing and context will make many errors in the game of life.
8 2
Despite the fact that a between-subjects design is generally
preferable to a within-subjects design in testing for heuristics and
biases, it is not without its limitations.8 3 As Mitchell points out, after
testing separate groups, results are typically reported in terms of
percentages and averages.8 4 Mitchell suggests that this makes it
possible for psychologists to report that they have found irrational
behavior "largely without documenting that any particular individuals
actually acted irrationally in the experiments.
'8 5
Mitchell's point is misdirected. We know from studies of large
groups (smokers versus nonsmokers) that cigarettes kill, even if the
82. Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Point of View: Violations of Rational Rules as a
Diagnostic of Mental Processes, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 681, 682 (2000) (emphasis added).
83. In a clever experiment, Birnbaum asked two different groups whether a number seemed
large or small (on a 10-point scale). Michael H. Birnbaum, How to Show that 9 > 221: Collect
Judgments in a Between-Subjects Design, 4 PSYCHOL. METHODS 243, 245 (1999). One group was
asked about the number 9. Id. The question apparently evoked thoughts of small numbers and
among such numbers, 9 is large. Id. at 246. The other group was asked about the number 221,
which apparently evoked thoughts of a range of larger numbers and they rated 221 to be
"smaller" on the 10-point scale than the other group had rated 9. Id. Although no individual
concluded that 9 is larger than 221, that was the apparent result of the between-subjects design.
Id. "The key to the result is that when judges are 'free' to choose their own contexts, they choose
different contexts for different stimuli." Id. at 249. Birnbaum admits that there are methods of
avoiding the problems that his study makes obvious, id. at 247-49, but it is unlikely that
researchers always use them.
84. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1946; see Keith E. Stanovich, Individual
Differences in Cognitive Biases: Commentary on Krueger on Social-Bias, 9 PSYCOLOQUY 11, 7
(1998) ("[P]roponents of the heuristics and biases approach (and equally their critics) have
focused entirely on the central tendency of responses (usually the mean or modal performance
tendency)."), at http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000624/#html.
One worry with between-subjects studies is that differences between the responses of
subjects under condition A and subjects under condition B may result simply from variations in
how they perceive the numerical scale upon which they are to base their answers (a variation
that would not arise in a within-subjects test). See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1946-
48 (citing Earl Hunt & Marcy Lansman, Cognitive Theory Applied to Individual Differences, in 1
HANDBOOK OF LEARNING AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES 81, 107 (W.K. Estes ed., 1975)). However,
there are mechanisms for coping with this problem, and many studies use them. See, e.g.,
Brenda Inman Rowe, Note, A Possible Solution for the Problem of Juries Slighting Nonscientific
Evidence: A Bayesian-Like Judicial Instruction, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 541, 549 (1997) ("One criticism
of experiments that employ between-subjects designs is that between-subjects designs may yield
results that suggest the subjects were insensitive to variations in the evidence when the results
are actually due to random variation in use of numerical response scales, differences in how
people attach numerical values to subjective beliefs. The present experiment defuses this
criticism by using a verdict as one of the response measures.").
85. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1946. Mitchell also argues that because
between-subjects tests concentrate on averages, individual variations are ignored or minimized.
See infra Part IV.
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studies do not give us the names of individual smokers who died of
cancer.8 6 Broad conclusions can be established statistically without
naming individual names. For example, when a particular feature
was offered as part of the default automobile insurance package in
Pennsylvania but not in New Jersey (where it could easily be opted
into), 75% of Pennsylvania residents chose it but only 20% of New
Jersey residents did so. These results illustrate a healthy status quo
bias.8 7 We do not need to know the names of the Pennsylvania and
New Jersey residents to detect a significant impact of the status quo
bias.
Furthermore, many of the heuristics and biases have been
shown in studies that were not between-subject studies. Rather, they
were studies where every subject was given a task or problem, and a
substantial majority acted in a manner inconsistent with an objective
standard of rationality. There are numerous examples of such
studies, including some that demonstrate that subjects violate rational
standards of dominance88 and of intransitivity.8 9  And, as noted
earlier, 94% of college professors believe that they do above average
work, 90 most consumers believe that they possess either average or
above average ability to avoid accidents from bicycles and power
mowers, 91 and between 85% and 90% of individuals surveyed believe
that their future will be better than the future of an average peer.92
86. See Morton L. Levin, Smoking and Cancer: Retrospective Studies and Epidemiological
Evaluation, in TOBACCO AND HEALTH 163, 164-66 (George James & Theodore Rosenthal eds.,
1962) (reporting studies).
87. Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 48 (1993). The status quo bias is an irrational preference for the
current state of affairs. See generally William F. Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo
Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 26-33 (1988) (reporting evidence from one
of the most influential studies of this bias).
88. A principle of rational choice is dominance, in that if choice A is at least as good as
choice B in every respect and better than B in at least one respect, then choice A should
dominate choice B. However, when presented with certain pairs of choices, most individuals
prefer B, the rationally less desirable option. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 344 (1984).
89. Another principle of rational choice is intransitivity, in that if Mr. X prefers A to B and
B to C, then Mr. X should also prefer A to C. However, again, when faced with certain pairs of
choices Mr. X will often prefer C to A. See id.
90. Cross, supra note 54, at 10. (finding that 94% of college professors rate themselves as
above average teachers and fully 68% rank themselves in the top quarter of effective teachers).
But see David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait
Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT,
supra note 8, at 324, 332-33 (suggesting that peoples' apparently over-confident self-assessments
may be a product of idiosyncratic definitions of the traits under assessment).
91. ASCH, supra note 55, at 76.
92. David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic
Optimism, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 334, 336.
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In one set of studies, ninety-one percent of subjects, including
those with substantive expertise, were induced by the
representativeness heuristic to commit the conjunction fallacy. 93
Ninety-five of ninety-seven professional toxicologists showed the affect
heuristic in rating the benefits and risks of exposures to various
chemicals. 94 Ninety-one percent of basketball fans believed that a
player has a better chance of making a shot after having just made his
last few shots than having just missed his last few shots, although
statistical studies conclusively disprove the "hot hand" theory.95 Such
studies demonstrate mathematically the existence of these effects,
biases, and cognitive limitations, even though no single individual is
identified.
In his critiques, Mitchell suggests that there are too many
between-subjects studies and too few within-subjects studies. 96 While
conducting as many studies as possible using both methodologies is
likely a good idea,97 psychologists are aware of the competing
93. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 8, at 19, 30 ("The incidence of violations of the conjunction rule in direct tests ranged from
73% to 100%, with an average of 91%.").
When using the representativeness heuristic, people tend to judge probabilities by flouting
numerous rules of statistics and focusing instead upon the degree of similarity that an item
seems to bear to a category or parent population. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective
Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note
8, at 32. If "Linda" is described with adjectives that seem to fit a common stereotype of a feminist
(including being single, outspoken, and concerned with issues of discrimination and social
justice), almost 90% of people queried will answer that it is more likely that Linda is a bank
teller and active in the feminist movement than that she is simply a bank teller. Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 8, at 84, 91-96. The similarity of the description to the stereotype of a
feminist overwhelms the statistical fact that it must be more likely that Linda is only "a" than
that she is "a" and "b." Id. This statistical error is called the conjunction fallacy.
94. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 8, at 397, 412 (citing a 1999 survey of members of the British Toxicological Society). When
they rely on the affect heuristic, people make decisions rapidly and automatically based upon
feelings of "goodness" or "badness." Id. at 410-13. Thus, scientists who perceive that the benefits
of nuclear power are high are likely to rate its risks as low, whereas those who perceive its
benefits as low are likely, based on the same evidence, to rate its risks as high. Id. at 411-12.
95. Thomas Gilovich et al., The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random
Sequences, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 601, 602, 613; Jonathan J.
Koehler & C.A. Conley, The Hot Hand Myth in Professional Basketball, 26 J. SPORT & EXERCISE
PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2004).
96. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1948.
97. For example, Birnbaum and Mellers found little evidence for the base-rate fallacy (the
tendency to ignore the relative frequency with which an event occurs) when they repeated classic
experiments using, not the typical one problem scenario, but a scenario involving several
judgments. Michael H. Birnbaum & Barbara A. Mellers, Bayesian Inference: Combining Base
Rates with Opinions of Sources Who Vary in Credibility, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
792, 801 (1983). Without a doubt, the supposed base-rate fallacy is one of the most controversial
1684
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strengths of between-subjects and within-subjects tests and often plan
lines of research accordingly. 98  For example, in a study of
counterfactual thinking, 99 Shepperd and McNulty began with a survey
that examined between-subjects differences, followed with a within-
subjects survey, and concluded with a study of actual behavior. 100 In a
study of jury decision making in sexual harassment cases, Wiener and
his colleagues performed a between-subjects experiment10 1 that
Schoenfelt and colleagues followed with a within-subjects study of the
same question 10 2 (finding similar results). In short, psychologists
often study the same phenomena with both between-subjects and
within-subjects studies and usually (but not invariably) find similar
results. 103
of the heuristics and biases identified to date. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy
Reconsidered: Descriptive, Normative, and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1,
1 (1996) (arguing that researchers "have been oversold on the base rate fallacy from an
empirical, normative, and methodological standpoint").
98. See generally Gideon Keren, Between- or Within-Subjects Design: A Methodological
Dilemma, in A HANDBOOK FOR DATA ANALYSIS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: METHODOLOGICAL
ISSUES 257, 271 (Gideon Keren & Charles Lewis eds., 1993) [hereinafter HANDBOOK FOR DATA
ANALYSIS] (discussing advantages and disadvantages in use of the different experimental
designs for different purposes, and recommending that use of both designs be considered where
practicable).
99. Counterfactual thinking is "what if' thinking. See Vittorio Girotto et al., Event
Controllability in Counterfactual Thinking, 78 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 111, 112 (1991) (defining
counterfactual thinking as "the mental construction of alternatives to factual events").
100. James A. Shepperd & James K. McNulty, The Affective Consequences of Expected and
Unexpected Outcomes, 13 PSYCHOL. Sci. 85, 86 (2002). (concluding that "[b]ad outcomes felt
worse when unexpected than when expected, whereas good outcomes felt better when
unexpected than when expected").
101. Richard L. Wiener et al., Social Analytic Investigation of Hostile Work Environments: A
Test of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 263, 266-67 (1995) (finding in a
between-subjects study that differences in stated judicial standard did not affect mock jurors'
findings of sexual harassment).
102. Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable Woman: Does It
Matter?, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 633, 666 (2002) (finding in a within-subjects study
that differences in the stated judicial standard did not affect mock jurors' findings of sexual
harassment).
103. See, e.g., CARLSMITH ET AL., supra note 69, at 269-70 (giving examples of studies
combining between-subjects designs with within-subjects designs); Norman J. Finkel & Jennifer
L. Groscup, When Mistakes Happen: Commonsense Rules of Culpability, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 65, 93 (1997) (in study of how people assign culpability, finding "general consistency
whether we tested using the between-subjects design or the within-subject design"); Peter K.
Isquith et al., Blaming the Child: Attribution of Responsibility to Victims of Child Sexual Abuse,
in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES 203, 204-05 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds.,
1993) (finding in both within-subjects and between-subjects designs that subjects were more
likely to assess some causality to older victims of child molestation than to younger victims);
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 79, at 582 (studying the conjunction effect with between-
subjects and within-subject studies and finding little effect in within-subjects studies which they
attribute to the fact that participants are more likely to detect set inclusion in that design).
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In studies where within-subjects experiments do yield different
results than between-subjects experiments, it is often because subjects
can learn from mistakes if their errors are pointed out to them or they
get several chances at the task.10 4 These within-subjects experiments
must be conducted, because it is important to know which heuristics
and biases can be minimized by repeated trials. However, it is also
important to remember that in the real world decision makers often do
not have anyone to correct their errors and have only once chance to
make a rational decision.
2. Null Hypothesis Significance Testing
Mitchell's second attack on psychology research focuses on the
weaknesses of its statistical methodology.10 5 Statistical analysis is
very important in the psychology discipline. 106 As in the field of
psychology in general, most studies in the heuristics and biases vein
use null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) in their research
design. 10 7 Mitchell points out that many people believe that use of
NHST has a tendency to exaggerate the irrationality of study subjects.
For example, Reid Hastie writes:
Many researchers also exhibit a detrimental tendency to plan empirical research to test
the null hypothesis that human behavior is optimally rational, which frequently diverts
research from the most important psychological issues. After all, precise null
hypotheses are almost always refutable, with large enough samples of subjects or
detailed enough measures of single subjects' behavior. The obsession with the rational
104. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1951 n.81 ("When attention is drawn to
independent variables or when subjects are given a chance to detect and correct possible errors,
performance often moves toward the normative response.").
105. Id. at 1954-65.
106. Zeno G. Swijtink, A Plea for Popperian Significance Testing, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SC.
220, 220 (1998) ("Of all the human sciences, psychology must have the closest interest in
statistics. This is no doubt because psychology has enough experimental control to stabilize
variability, but not enough control to eliminate variability altogether.").
107. According to De Long and Lang:
In classical hypothesis testing, a null hypothesis is posed against an alternative, and
the null hypothesis is considered "rejected" or "not rejected" on the basis of whether a
single test statistic exceeds some critical value (e.g., whether a large-sample t-statistic
exceeds 1.96) .... [11f the null is "rejected," our confidence in it is reduced; if the null
hypothesis "fails to be rejected," our confidence in the correctness of the null
hypothesis is increased because the data do not speak strongly against it.
J. Bradford De Long & Kevin Lang, Are All Economic Hypotheses False?, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1257,
1257-58 (1992).
The purpose of NHST is "to provide a procedure for deciding whether the probability of
getting sample results as extreme or more so than the null hypothesized value was small enough
that it was less likely that it could be attributed to mere chance." Lisa Harlow, Significance
Testing Introduction and Overview, in WHAT IF THERE WERE No SIGNIFICANCE TESTS? 1, 1-2
(Lisa L. Harlow et al. eds., 1997).
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null hypothesis has yielded a large harvest of "significant," but unimportant "proofs"
that humans are irrational.1 08
This argument that a null hypothesis is always judged false is
itself wrong,1 °9  and, more importantly, misses the point. 10
Researchers in psychology are well aware that a large N (number of
subjects) increases the power of a hypothesis test, making it easier to
reject a false null hypothesis. However, they are also aware that
others will call into question the scientific importance of tiny
differences between populations, differences that are detectable only
with very large sample sizes. The effects reported in most psychology
journals, and the effects that Kahneman and Tversky have generally
reported, are not miniscule."'
108. Reid Hastie, A Review from a High Place: The Field of Judgment and Decision Making
as Revealed in its Current Textbooks, 2 PSYCHOL. SCI. 135, 138 (1991). Some critics are even more
vocal. See Paul E. Meehl, Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the
Slow Progress of Soft Psychology, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 806, 817 (1978)
(arguing that NHST "is a terrible mistake, is basically unsound, poor scientific strategy, and one
of the worst things that ever happened in the history of psychology").
109. See e.g., William F. Oakes, On the Alleged Falsity of the Null Hypothesis, 25 PSYCHOL.
REC. 265, 265 (1975) (pointing to a federal government study with 23,000 subjects that failed to
disprove the null hypothesis). Oakes made several other arguments, concluding "it shouldn't be
assumed that the null hypothesis is generally false in an experiment." Id. at 272; see also Robert
W. Frick, Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 23 MEMORY & COGNITION 132, 132 (1995) (giving
examples to illustrate his argument that "the null hypothesis is possibly correct, as examples
easily demonstrate"); Richard L. Hagen, In Praise of the Null Hypothesis Statistical Test, 52 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 15, 21 (1997) (arguing that the claim that the null hypothesis is always false "has
never been sustained by either statistical or logical arguments"); Joseph S. Rossi, Meta-analysis,
Power Analysis, and the Null-Hypothesis Significance-Test Procedure, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI.
216, 216 (1998) ("[Als I am frequently engaged in the conduct of large randomized clinical trials
of behavioral interventions for health promotion and disease prevention, I could only wish that
the null hypothesis was, in fact, never true!").
110. As Mulaik points out:
The point is that it doesn't matter if the null hypothesis is always judged false at some
sample size, as long as we regard this as an empirical phenomenon. What matters is
whether at the sample size we have we can distinguish observed deviations from our
hypothesized values to be sufficiently large and improbable under a hypothesis of
chance that we can treat them reasonably but provisionally as not due to chance
error. There is no a priori reason to believe that one will always reject the null
hypothesis at any given sample size. On the other hand, accepting the null hypothesis
does not mean the hypothesized value is true, but rather than the evidence observed
is not distinguishable from what we would regard as due to chance if the null
hypothesis were true and thus is not sufficient to disprove it. The remaining
uncertainty regarding the truth of our null hypothesis is measured by the width of the
region of acceptance or a function of the standard error. And this will be closely
related to the power of the test, which also provides us with information about our
uncertainty.
Stanley A. Mulaik et al., There Is a Time and a Place for Significance Testing, in WHAT IF THERE
WERE No SIGNIFICANCE TESTS?, supra note 107, at 65, 80-81.
111. In some of the famous studies in the K-T tradition, the researchers did not even bother
to run significance tests because the proportional differences were so dramatic. My thanks to
Jonathan Koehler for pointing this out to me.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Hastie's other point, that statistical significance does not
automatically translate into practical significance, is well taken.
However, many believe that the error rates NHST generates are
typically not out of line with reality.112  Mitchell argues that
behavioral decision theory must be moved into the real world in order
to focus on the actual impact of cognitive biases on behavior, 113 but as
noted elsewhere in this article, many of the heuristics and biases
noted in laboratory experiments have also been identified in the real
world and can carry very real practical implications. 114
Not only are laboratory findings often replicated in studies in
the outside world, observed phenomena in the outside world are
usually the inspiration for laboratory studies that can be performed
under controlled conditions. For example, researchers noted that
people in the real world make predictions that tend to resemble too
strongly the previous year's results.11 5  In the real world, it is
generally impossible to control for other factors that might be causing
the phenomenon. By setting up laboratory conditions to control for
these other factors, researchers were able to identify the anchoring
and adjustment phenomenon, and then study its features in a number
of follow-up studies.116 Others then exported those findings to the real
world and found similar results in real world decision making.
11 7
Mitchell also argues that one shortcoming of NHST is that
"when comparing group means in a between-subjects experiment, the
ostensibly biased behavior of a fairly small number of participants
may be the difference between the rejection of, and the failure to
112. W.K. Estes, Significance Testing in Psychological Research: Some Persisting Issues, 8
PSYCHOL. SCI. 18, 18 (1997) ("Are error rates out of line with reality? Historically, most attention
has been given to Type I errors (inappropriate rejections of null hypotheses) because the primary
purpose of significance testing is avoidance of excessive rates of those errors. True rates can
never be known for empirical situations, but for simulated data, rates specified in significance
tests have been found to be quite well approximated even when there are appreciable deviations
from the assumptions of the statistical model.").
113. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1959.
114. See infra notes 169-195 and accompanying text.
115. I once suggested that the anchoring and adjustment phenomenon-the tendency to
anchor upon a given number and then adjust insufficiently to new information-underlay the
typical "same as last year" plan for audits. Prentice, supra note 36, at 165.
116. See generally Jeffery R. Boyll, Psychological, Cognitive, Personality, and Interpersonal
Factors in Jury Verdicts, 15 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 163, 170 (1991) (citing studies indicating that
juries anchor on ad damnum clauses in making damage awards); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 8, at 3, 14-18 (reporting early study).
117. See, e.g., Jean C. Bedard, An Archival Investigation of Audit Program Planning,
AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Fall 1989, at 57, 57 (finding evidence of anchoring and adjusting
by auditors in study of workpapers of actual audits).
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reject, the null hypothesis."118 Mitchell cites as an example a study
where inconsistent conduct by only 15% of the subjects led to a
rejection of the null hypothesis of rational decision making. 119
Nonetheless, as also noted earlier, many of the landmark studies in
the heuristics and biases literature involve "irrational" actions not by
15% of the subjects (although errors by 15% of a population could be
very important and have a large practical effect), but often by 85% or
90% of the population.
120
Surely the NHST has many severe critics;' 21 even its defenders
concede its limitations, 22 and the psychology discipline is continually
searching for methods to improve, supplement,' 23 or replace it. For
example, several critics of NHST have supported greater use of
confidence intervals, 124  model fitting, 25  and meta-analyses,126
although these statistical methods have their own limitations. 27 The
118. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1955.
119. Id. at 1951-52, 1955 (citing Dawes, supra note 13, at 503-04).
120. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., John E. Hunter, Needed: A Ban on the Significance Test, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 6
(1997) (proposing that NHST be abandoned); Roger E. Kirk, Practical Significance: A Concept
Whose Time Has Come, 56 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 746 (1996) (arguing that scientists
should replace the objective, mechanical NHST with more subjective assessments of practical,
rather than statistical, significance); Leonard G. Rorer, Some Myths of Science in Psychology, in
2 THINKING CLEARLY ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY 61, 61 (D. Cicchetti & W.M. Grove eds., 1991) (arguing
that both theory testing and null-hypothesis significance testing should be abandoned in favor of
Bayesian formulations).
122. Kathleen M. Dillon, I Am 95% Confident That the Earth Is Round: An Interview About
Statistics with Chris Spatz, 26 TEACHING PSYCHOL. 232, 232 (1999) (quoting psychology Professor
Chris Spatz as stating that all defenders of the NHST admit that objectors have several valid
points).
123. See, e.g., Richard J. Harris, Reforming Significance Testing via Three-Valued Logic, in
WHAT IF THERE WERE No SIGNIFICANCE TESTS?, supra note 107, at 145, 171 (recommending that
NHST be used to test three-alternatives rather than the typical two-alternative presentation
currently used).
124. See, e.g., De Long & Lang, supra note 107, at 1269 (suggesting that economists rely less
on NHST and more on confidence intervals); Hunter, supra note 121, at 6 (suggesting that social
sciences use confidence intervals, the dominant technique used in the quantitative sciences).
125. See, e.g., Michael M. Granaas, Model Fitting: A Better Approach, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
800, 800-01 (1998) (suggesting this method as preferable to NHST).
126. See, e.g., Mark W. Lipsey & David B. Wilson, The Efficacy of Psychological, Educational,
and Behavioral Treatment: Confirmation from Meta-analysis, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1181, 1200
(1993) (performing a meta-analysis and touting its advantages); Frank L. Schmidt, What Do
Data Really Mean?, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1173, 1180 (1992) (suggesting that meta-analyses can
remedy the problems critics perceive with NHST).
127. See, e.g., Robert P. Abelson, On the Surprising Longevity of Flogged Horses: Why There
Is a Case for the Significance Test, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. 12, 12 (1997) (arguing that "all the
foolishness associated with the null hypothesis might also infect confidence limits"); Siu L. Chow,
A Precis of "Statistical Significance: Rationale, Validity, and Utility," 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI.
169, 190 (1998) (noting several difficulties with meta-analysis, including especially a lack of
commensurability among the studies included in the meta-analysis); Domenic V. Cicchetti, Role
of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) in the Design of Neuropsychologic Research, 20
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debate in psychology is mirrored in economics and other fields that
often use NHST.
128
Notwithstanding this debate, NHST is by far the most widely
used statistical tool in psychology.' 29 NHST is a valuable tool that
many respected researchers strongly support, 130 although it is one
J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 293, 294 (1998) (quoting leading NHST critic
Jacob Cohen as advising, "don't look for a magic alternative to NHST, some other objective
mechanical ritual to replace it. It doesn't exist."); Edward Erwin, The Logic of Null Hypothesis
Testing, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 197, 198 (1998) (arguing that epistemological reviews of meta-
analytic reviews have found them to be flawed); Richard J. Harris, Significance Tests Have Their
Place, 8 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 8, 9-10 (1997) (noting that confidence intervals often demonstrate the
same limitations as NHST and arguing that meta-analyses also have more limitations than
generally recognized).
128. See, e.g., De Long & Lang, supra note 107, at 1257 (examining use of the null hypothesis
in economics); Jonathan A.C. Sterne & George D. Smith, Sifting the Evidence-What's Wrong
with Significance Tests?, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 226, 226 (2001) (criticizing use of NHST in medical
research); see also De Long & Lang, supra note 107, at 1258 n.1 (noting that any "distinction
between the 'standard' approach to testing in 'science' and that used in economics should not be
exaggerated"); Stanley A. Mulaik et al., supra note 110, at 94 ("[Pjhysicists do use procedures
that are comparable to significance tests.").
129. Raymond S. Nickerson, Null Hypothesis Significance Testing: A Review of an Old and
Continuing Controversy, 5 PSYCHOL. METHODS 241, 241 (2000) (noting that NHST "is arguably
the most widely used method of analysis of data collected in psychological experiments and has
been so for about 70 years").
130. See, e.g., Abelson, supra note 127, at 14 ("Null-hypothesis tests are cogent in
scrutinizing surprising results that critics doubt."); Robert P. Abelson, A Retrospective on the
Significance Test Ban of 1999 (If There Were No Significance Tests, They Would Be Invented), in
WHAT IF THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANCE TESTS?, supra note 107, at 117, 129 ("Realistically, if the
null hypothesis test did not exist, it would have to be (re)invented."); Galen L. Baril & J. Timothy
Cannon, What Is the Probability That Null Hypothesis Testing Is Meaningless?, 50 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1098, 1099 (1995) (disputing major arguments against use of NHST); Chow,
supra note 127, at 170 (arguing that "the resiliency of [NHST] is warranted" and criticisms
against it are "debatable"); Jose M. Cortina & William P. Dunlap, On the Logic and Purpose of
Significance Testing, 2 PSYCHOL. METHODS 161, 170 (1997) (noting that "the arguments against
the use of NHST are built on faulty premises, misleading examples, and misunderstanding of
certain critical concepts" and that "there are many cases in which drawing conclusions about
hypotheses based on p values is perfectly reasonable"); Robert W. Frick, Chow's Defense of Null-
Hypothesis Testing: Too Traditional?, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 199, 199 (1998) (agreeing with
Chow that NHST "plays an essential and irreplaceable role in science"); Anthony G. Greenwald
et al., Effect Sizes and p Values: What Should Be Reported and What Should Be Replicated?, 33
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 175, 182 (1996) (noting that despite its limitations, NHST continues to be
widely used because of its value in providing results in the form of a dichotomous hypothesis
evaluation and providing an index that has (p values) that is informative and indicative
regarding the likelihood of replicability); Hagen, supra note 109, at 22 (arguing that the NHST
has been "unfairly maligned," and claiming that "[tihe logic of the NHST is elegant,
extraordinarily creative, and deeply embedded in our methods of statistical inference"); Harlow,
supra note 107, at 11 (noting that when properly used and supplemented, the NHST "can be very
effective in highlighting hypotheses that are worthy of further investigation, as well as those
that do not merit such efforts"); Harris, supra note 127, at 8 ("[A]s applied by most researchers
and journal editors, NHST provides a very useful form of social control over researchers'
understandable tendency to squander analytic effort 'explaining' effects whose sign in a given
sample may not match the sign of the corresponding population effect."); John F. Kihlstrom, If
You've Got an Effect, Test Its Significance; If You've Got a Weak Effect, Do a Meta-analysis, 21
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with limitations that researchers must keep in mind. If they do not do
so, journal editors will likely refresh their memories.
31
Mitchell is right to remind psychologists of NHST's limitations.
It can provide confidence that results did not stem from sampling
errors; it cannot prove the validity of a theory.132 But with or without
Mitchell's reminder, psychologists already know that NHST is only a
tool; a p of .05 is not the Holy Grail, and a p of .06 is still quite
interesting even if it falls short of the traditional .05 threshhold of
statistical significance. They know this just as baseball managers
know that a .300 batting average is a magical number, but if the
player can't run or field you'd be better off signing a shortstop with
range who hits .294.
BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 205, 206 (1998) (concluding that significance tests "constitute a principled
way for researchers to claim that their experimental results are worth knowing about, and for
consumers to evaluate researchers' claims" and that "significance testing has kept the
behavioral, cognitive, and social sciences from lapsing into solipsism"); Lester E. Krueger, The
Ego Has Landed! The .05 Level of Statistical Significance is Soft (Fisher) Rather than Hard
(Neyman/Pearson), 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 207, 207 (1998) (arguing that NHST "has a highly
circumscribed yet vital role as the initial gatekeeper in scientific research"); Joel R. Levin,
Statistical Significance Testing from Three Perspectives, 61 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 378, 382
(1993) (arguing that researchers fully understand NHST's limitations and that alleged problems
with NHST are "more apparent than real"); Mulaik et al., supra note 110, at 73 (noting that
whatever its limitations, "significance testing contributes to the cumulative research enterprise
in allowing one to assess whether differences from predicted values under an integrative
hypothesis are more reasonably regarded as due to random measurement errors and sampling
errors or not"); Nickerson, supra note 129, at 291 (noting that NHST can be applied
inappropriately, but "can also be an effective aid to data interpretation when used appropriately
as an adjunct to good experimental design and in conjunction with other methods of extracting
information from noisy data"); Swijtink, supra note 106, at 221 ("[Tlhere remains an important
role for significance testing .. "); John R. Vokey, Statistics Without Probability: Significance
Testing as Typicality and Exchangeability in Data Analysis, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 225, 225
(1998) (noting that many criticisms of NHST are "either irrelevant or misplaced").
131. Estes notes:
In the course of some 20 years of editing psychological journals, I found reports of
significance levels and effect sizes to be useful aids in the task of screening out from
an enormous input of manuscripts those whose results were not likely to prove robust
or replicable. However, the use of these indicators by me and my consultants was not
mechanical or constrained by rigid criteria. When results of a study were
accompanied by recommendations for changes of public policy (not an infrequent
occurrence in the case of Psychological Science), we required significance levels to be
stricter than the norm and effects sizes larger. But when studies involved large
amounts of data collected on very few individuals, often from special populations (an
increasingly common occurrence in research on long-term memory in natural
environments, extremely deviant abilities, and effects of specific kinds of brain
damage on mental functions), we often advised contributors to dispense with reports
of statistical tests and concentrate on other kinds of evidence bearing on the
soundness of conclusions
Estes, supra note 112, at 19.
132. Robert W. Frick, The Appropriate Use of Null Hypothesis Testing, 1 PSYCHOL. METHODS
379, 380 (1996) ("It is well agreed that null hypothesis testing by itself does not provide sufficient
evidence for accepting the null hypothesis.").
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Ultimately, we must rely on the research design and execution
of the psychologists. Fortunately, perhaps the most extreme critic of
NHST, Professor Hunter, reminds us:
I have served on hundreds of graduate student committees, I am close friends with
several hundred other researchers, and I have reviewed hundreds of manuscripts for
publication. Every person that I have ever known worked hard to make his or her study
the best study it could be. Although scientists do make errors, they work very hard and
very intelligently at their research. There are almost no "garbage studies."
133
Mitchell's discussion of the limits of NHST leads him to tout
the benefits of meta-analyses.' 34 Beginning with framing effects, 13 5
Mitchell argues that meta-analyses by Kuhberger minimize the
impact of such effects.1 36 One of Kuhberger's studies concludes that
research has done just what Mitchell called for-taken the concept
outside the laboratory. According to Kuhberger, "framing research
has stepped outside the lab to a considerable degree.' 31 7 Furthermore,
Kuhberger reports, "experts are also influenced by framing, but maybe
to a lesser degree than students.1' 38 After surveying 136 studies
involving 30,000 participants, Kuhberger concludes that "framing is a
phenomenon now in its teenage years,"11 9 although the effect, as
Mitchell points out, is in the small to moderate range in most
studies. 1
40
In another meta-analysis, Kuhberger, writing with colleagues,
found that Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory (with attendant
133. Hunter, supra note 121, at 4 (using this point to argue that the variation in results
among studies performed in psychology is not due to the fact that some studies are well designed
and others are poorly designed); see also Chow, supra note 127, at 178 (stating that
"experimental psychologists are meticulous about the internal validity of experiments" and "are
aware that a statistically significant result may be ambiguous at the conceptual level as a result
of various features found in the data collection procedure or situation").
134. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1959-60.
135. Framing effects are a family of complex effects, but the essential notion is that, contrary
to the Chicago Man model, people's preferences for risk and other choices are not invariant; they
often change with how a problem is presented or framed. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453 (1981). Thus,
in one scenario a decision maker might choose Alternative A over Alternative B, whereas in
another scenario the same decision maker might choose a mathematically identical version of
Alternative B over a mathematically identical version of Alternative A. See id. at 455-56.
Whether the alternatives are framed as gains or losses can make a definitive difference. Id. at
456. See generally SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 69-76
(1993) (providing an accessible explanation of the basics of framing effects).
136. See Anton Kuhberger, The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis, 75
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 23, 42, 47 (1998) (discussing "small to
moderate size" framing effects across 136 studies); see also Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at
1960-63.
137. Id. at 45.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 47.
140. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1962.
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framing effects) was "supported by our meta-analysis."' 4' Regarding
this study, Mitchell points out that on average only 60% of the
subjects in studies are impacted by framing effects, 142 but this is more
than enough to have a significant impact in the real world.
143
Mitchell also argues that meta-analyses of hindsight bias
studies demonstrate that the bias has relatively small effects.
144
Indeed, the study he cites looks at 122 studies, then finds that the
hindsight bias clearly exists, 145 but that it is generally of relatively
small magnitude.1 46 The authors go on to point out that "[t]his does
not mean that the bias should be ignored since, depending upon the
costs and benefits of making a correct and incorrect decision, effect
sizes much smaller than this can still be of practical significance."'
147
If a jury in a medical malpractice case is split nearly equally regarding
the foreseeability to the physician-defendant of the plaintiff-patient's
complications, a small amount of hindsight bias could have a
significant effect. 48 More meta-analyses are always a good idea, but
those done so far do little to minimize the standard characterization of
K-T Man.
3. The File Drawer Problem
Mitchell's next point is that journals are reluctant to publish,
and therefore authors are reluctant to submit for publication, studies
141. Anton Kuhberger et al., The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on
Risk Preference in Choice Tasks, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 204,
216 (1999).
142. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1962 n.101.
143. Kuhberger et al., supra note 141, at 219 (arguing that their study found "significant
bidirectional framing effects" (emphasis added)). If, by using framing effects, sellers of products
can impact the decisions of 60% of consumers or political candidates can impact the decisions of
60% of voters, framing can have a major impact on real world decision making.
144. See Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia F. Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-
analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147, 162 (1991) ("Depending
upon the familiarity of the task and type of outcome information presented, anywhere from a
minimum of 0% to a maximum of 7-27% of the population may make different decisions because
of the hindsight bias.").
145. Id. at 154.
146. Id. at 153-54 ("The average weighted effect size of all 122 studies was r = .17 with a 95%
confidence interval ... ").
147. Id. at 162 (going on to qualify this statement with the warning that we should be
careful before issuing warnings about the hindsight bias because "given the small observed effect
size of the hindsight bias, its effect will more likely be washed out by the random error inherent
in the real world than would have occurred had the effect size been larger").
148. See generally id. at 158 (noting that if the threshold probability for choosing a particular
alternative was 80%, "[i]f in foresight a person estimated the event to be 78% and in hindsight
estimated it to be 81%, then even though the effect of the bias on probability assessments was
small, it would still be of practical importance since it resulted in the person making a different
decision").
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that show insignificant results.149 Therefore, many harbor the lurking
suspicion that the published studies showing biased human judgment
may be silently contradicted by unpublished studies showing no such
bias that are sitting in file drawers in psychology professors' offices.
As Rosenthal notes, the fear is that "the journals are filled with the
5% of the studies that show Type I errors, while the file drawers back
at the lab are filled with the 95% of the studies that show
nonsignificant (e.g., p > .05) results.' 50
The file drawer problem is a legitimate concern in disciplines
as diverse as marketing' 5' and oncology.152 Fortunately, there is little
firm evidence that the file drawer problem is significant. 153  As
149. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1966-67.
150. Robert Rosenthal, Cumulating Evidence, in HANDBOOK FOR DATA ANALYSIS, supra note
98, at 519, 535. A Type I error (a false positive) is the rejection of a true null hypothesis, while a
Type II error (a false negative) is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis. See Vincent
Bauchau, Is There a "File Drawer Problem" in Biological Research?, 79 OIKOS 407, 408 (1997)
(finding "no strong evidence so far of the existence of a file drawer problem in biology").
151. Raymond Hubbard & J. Scott Armstrong, Are Null Results Becoming an Endangered
Species in Marketing?, 3 MARKETING LETTERS 127, 134 (1992) (finding in a review of marketing
journals that few studies failing to reject the null hypothesis are published).
152. See Jesse A. Berlin et al., An Assessment of Publication Bias Using a Sample of
Published Clinical Trials, 84 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASS'N 381, 391 (1989) (finding grounds to worry
about publication bias in research on cancer treatment); Robert J. Simes, Publication Bias: The
Case for an International Registry of Clinical Trials, 4 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1529, 1538-39
(1986) (finding that pooled results of published trials showed statistically significant benefits for
a certain treatment, but pooled results of published and unpublished trials together did not). See
also Mathias Egger et al., Bias in Meta-analysis Detected by a Simple, Graphical Test, 315 BRIT.
MED. J. 629 (1997) (addressing potential biases in medical research, including nonpublication of
negative trials).
153. As Rosenthal suggests
[R]ecent research suggests that the magnitude of the file drawer problem may be
somewhat less than had been feared. Although studies published at the time of a
meta-analysis are more likely to yield significant results than are studies unpublished
at the time of the meta-analysis, this bias may well shrink over time because a very
large proportion of the originally unpublished studies may eventually be published.
In a large meta-analysis, therefore, it may be useful to conduct a subanalysis with a
cut-off date for study retrieval approximately 5 years earlier than the date of the
actual meta-analysis. It is likely that the file drawer problem will be lessened
appreciably at least for this subanalysis.
Rosenthal, supra note 150, at 537-38 (citations omitted); see also Jeff Gill & Kenneth J. Meier,
Public Administration Research and Practice: A Methodological Manifesto, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 157, 167 (2000) (noting that data mining is related to the file drawer problem and
that "there is evidence that the file drawer problem is not pervasive"); Nickerson, supra note 129,
at 270-71 (doubting that the file drawer problem leads to an understatement of the probability of
reporting chance effects as real); Harris Cooper, Finding the Missing Science, 30 APA MONITOR
ONLINE (Sept. 1999) (noting that psychology researchers "are smart enough to spend little time
studying pure chance phenomena [so glenerally, the results that appear in our journals are
indices of real, systematic relationships"), at http://www.apa.org/monitor/sep99/scispeak.html.
See generally David Neumark & William Wascher, Is the Time-Series Evidence on Minimum
Wage Effects Contaminated by Publication Bias?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 458 (1998) (using
sophisticated statistical approach to argue that file drawer and related publication biases do not
undermine conclusions of published time-series studies of minimum wage effects).
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Rosenthal, who has studied this problem more than any other scholar,
points out:
In the past there was very little we could do to assess the net effect of studies tucked
away in file drawers that did not make the magic .05 level. Now, however, although no
definitive solution to the problem is available, we can establish reasonable boundaries
on the problem and estimate the degree of damage to any research conclusion that could
be done by the file drawer problem. The fundamental idea in coping with the file
drawer problem is simply to calculate the number of studies averaging null results that
must be in the file drawers before the overall probability of a Type I error can be just
brought to any desired level of significance, say p = .05. This number of filed studies, or
the tolerance for future null results, is then evaluated for whether such a tolerance level
is small enough to threaten the overall conclusion drawn by the reviewer. If the overall
level of significance of the research review will be brought down to the level of just
significant by the addition of just a few more null results, the finding is not resistant to
the file drawer threat. 1
5 4
In a meta-analysis of framing studies, Kuhberger studied 136
papers and calculated that "66,388 studies finding null results would
have to exist [in file drawers] somewhere before the overall results
could reasonably be ascribed to sampling bias. This is not
plausible. '155 Rosenthal found that 65,123 studies averaging null
results would be needed to conclude that the 345 published studies
examining the effects of interpersonal self-fulfilling prophecies were
possibly due to sampling bias.
156
Many of the important heuristics and biases in the Kahneman
and Tverksy tradition have been demonstrated in literally hundreds of
published studies. 157 Gilovich and Griffin recently observed that the
major biases uncovered by Kahneman, Tverksy, and others, such as
the availability bias, anchoring, the conjunction fallacy, and others
"have all been demonstrated in countless contexts and with varied
paradigms and dependent measures, and with domain experts as well
as student volunteers."'
158
154. Rosenthal, supra note 150, at 535-36 (citations omitted).
155. Kuhberger, supra note 136, at 42.
156. Rosenthal, supra note 150, at 537; see also Robert Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin,
Interpersonal Expectancy Effects: The First 345 Studies, 7 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 377, 381 (1978)
(making the same point).
157. See, e.g., Armor & Taylor, supra note 92, at 336 (noting regarding the overoptimism bias
that "[r]esults from hundreds of empirical investigations have shown that, on average, people
tend to view themselves as more likely to experience positive outcomes, and less likely to
experience negative ones, than the average members of the group from which they have been
drawn").
158. Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction-Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now,
in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 1, 12. I have replicated these
experiments and their results in classroom demonstrations, as have hundreds of psychology
professors. It seems unlikely that the file drawer problem is significant for the major tenets of
the heuristics and biases literature.
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Rosenthal's "fail-safe file-drawer" (FSFD) method is
controversial and Scargle recently published an interesting critique.159
Still, there is little more than conjecture to support the notion that
countless debunking studies are sitting in file drawers in psychology
professors' offices. In addition, this seems unlikely in light of the
many, many studies published to support most of the basic heuristics
and biases discovered by Kahneman, Tversky, and their followers.
B. Does Behavioral Decision Theory Have Features That Increase the
Likelihood of Irrational Behavior in Experimental Settings?
Next, Mitchell argues that certain features of psychological
research increase the likelihood that subjects will give non-normative
or "irrational" responses. 160 This argument also has several prongs.
1. Experiments Designed To Elicit Non-normative Responses
Initially Mitchell claims that psychological experiments too
often produce results that have little relevance to the real world. 161 In
other words, they lack "psychological realism," which refers to how
well they capture thinking processes that occur in everyday life.' 62
Psychologists do, of course, worry about achieving psychological
realism, as opposed to "mundane realism" (replicating in the research
setting the events of every day life).1 63 And certainly laboratories are
not the real world, 164 but as Brewer points out:
Laboratory experiments are inherently artificial in the sense that causal variables are
isolated from their normal contextual variation. This isolation and control is the
essence of testing causal hypotheses with a high degree of internal validity....
[I]solation does not necessarily jeopardize external validity if the experimental situation
159. Jeffrey D. Scargle, Publication Bias: The "File-Drawer" Problem in Scientific Inference,
14 J. Sci. EXPLORATION 91, 102 (2000) (criticizing FSFD "because it treats the inherently biased
file drawer as unbiased and gives grossly wrong estimates of the size of the file drawer").
160. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1971-95.
161. Id. at 1971-77.
162. ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53 (2d ed. 1997).
163. See Brewer, supra note 73, at 12 ("An experimental setting may have little mundane
realism but still capture processes that are highly representative of those that underlie events in
the real world.").
164. Note that after criticizing between-subjects tests and calling for more within-subjects
designs, Mitchell asks for ecological validity. Mitchell, Pessismism, supra note 12, at 1985-92.
Obviously, in terms of human decision making, between-subjects tests usually have more
ecological validity, because within-subjects tests involve the subject being asked to make the
same decision over and over again in differing scenarios. See Finkel & Groscup, supra note 103,
at 110 (making this point regarding jury research).
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has psychological realism, that is, if the causal processes being represented in the lab
setting are the same as those that operate in nonlaboratory contexts.
165
The artificial nature of the laboratory setting certainly creates
cause to question the generalizability of such studies' results to the
complex real world, 166 but such generalizability (known as "ecological
validity") is often attainable. 167  Recall that laboratory experiments
are typically motivated by real world phenomena. After psychologists
perform laboratory studies and derive results, they are often then able
to produce hypotheses testable in the real world. Questions of
ecological validity are on the minds of every psychologist who
structures an experiment, and studies that lack it are often
attacked. 68 Therefore, psychologists have tested their hypotheses
165. Brewer, supra note 73, at 14-15. Brewer goes on to illustrate:
The issue here is one of the level[s] of abstraction at which constructs or principles are
defined. Consider, for example, the construct of "threat to self-esteem." No one would
seriously deny that being informed that one had failed a test of creative problem-
solving would have more impact on self-esteem of a Harvard undergraduate than it
would on a 50-year-old mineworker. Thus, if we were interested in the effects of
lowered self-esteem on aggression, we might have to use different techniques to lower
self-esteem in the two populations. Threats to self-esteem based on challenges to
one's academic self-concept are certainly different in many ways from challenges that
threaten one's sense of group belonging or of physical stamina. But if each of these, in
their appropriate context, proves to have an impact on anger or aggressiveness, then
we have gained confidence in a general principle that threats to areas of self-esteem
that are important or central to one's sense of identity increase aggression.
Id. at 15.
Evans makes a similar point:
The distinction between the laboratory and the real world is an odd one. Laboratory
experiments are part of the real-world experience of the subjects and their behaviour
in them must tell us something. No-one suggests in the science of metallurgy, for
example, that the properties of metals studied in the laboratory will have no relevance
when the same substances are used in the "real world", for example, as a component
in a machine or as a structural support on a bridge. The laboratory is part of the
universe in which the laws of physics and chemistry apply. Similarly, subjects of
psychological experiments use the same brain in the laboratory as they do elsewhere.
Psychologists would have to be very clever indeed to succeed constantly in contriving
situations wholly unrepresentative of those outside. If biases, errors, and mistakes
are so easy to produce in laboratory reasoning tasks, it beggars belief to suppose that
these are easily avoided at all other times. Moreover, we are surrounded by evidence
of bias, error, and misjudgment in the real world.
J. St. B.T. Evans, Bias and Rationality, in RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 6, 24-25 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993) [hereinafter RATIONALITY].
166. See Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and
Psycholegal Research, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 107, 126 (1998) (criticizing some of
Kahneman and Tversky's work as lacking ecological validity).
167. See John A. Bargh, Losing Consciousness: Automatic Influences on Consumer Judgment,
Behavior, and Motivation, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 280, 281 (2002) (noting that in many
experiments, "the dependent measure is taken when the participant believes he or she is entirely
outside of an experimental situation-when arriving, when between different studies, or when
leaving the lab").
168. For example, in the legal literature, there has been an intense debate over the ecological
validity of studies involving memory accuracy of children who are alleged victims of child abuse.
See, e.g., Judith L. Alpert et al., Symptomatic Clients and Memories of Childhood Abuse: What
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over and over both in the laboratory and in the field. The following
examples illustrate this point:
" Consider jury research. In the past fifty years,
psychologists have performed literally hundreds of
studies, some in the field and more in the laboratory, of
various aspects of jury decision making. The field
studies are valuable for their ecological validity; the
laboratory studies are valuable because "no other
approach is capable of yielding the same degree of
control over influential extraneous factors, particularly
characteristics of the case."'169 Fortunately, mock jury
research has improved so that there is little or no
difference between the results of studies of mock jurors
in university laboratories and the results of studies of
real jurors in actual courtrooms.
170
* Laboratory experiments regarding "public goods" show
that subjects do not seek to maximize wealth as the
Chicago Man model predicts, but often are willing to
contribute to public goods rather than free ride if they
believe others will contribute as well.171 Studies of real
the Trauma and Child Sexual Abuse Literature Tells Us, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLK & L. 941, 961
(1998) (criticizing some child memory research as lacking ecological validity); Lisa Manshel, The
Child Witness and the Presumption of Authenticity After State v. Michaels, 26 SETON HALL L.
REV. 685, 751-52 (1996) (same).
Scholars have also criticized laboratory studies of "unconscious transference," a memory
difficulty that afflicts eyewitnesses to crimes, on grounds that the tension and fear one feels
during the commission of a crime is not easily reproduced in a laboratory setting and that,
therefore, the results in the laboratory might not be representative of what happens during a
real crime. See, e.g., Francis A. Gilligan et al., The Theory of "Unconscious Transference" The
Latest Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C. L. REV.
107, 123-24 (1996).
169. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 698 (2001).
170. See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury
Still Out?, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999) (concluding, after reviewing the methodological
trends in jury decision-making studies, that different methods of presentation-short case
summaries, written transcripts, audiotaped transcripts, and more realistic videotaped
presentations-produce very similar results, and that there are virtually no significant
differences between results obtained from mock juries composed of college students and those
composed of actual jurors); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom:
How to Make DNA-Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275,
1297 (2001) ("[A] large amount of empirical literature provides little reason to believe that
patterns of data obtained from student-subjects fail to generalize to the jury population.");
Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?,
6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1997) (defending results of mock jury simulations).
171. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic
Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 845, 854-57 (1998) (arguing that
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world behavior confirm the laboratory finding.
"Individuals have been shown, for example, to
reciprocate the disposition of others to give (or not) to
charity, to refrain (or not) from littering, and to wait
their turn (or not) in lines."'17
2
" Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory suggests that,
inconsistent with traditional economic theory, people
expecting a refund after tax withholding are less likely
to try to cheat on their taxes than people who expect to
make an additional payment.1 73  Robben and his
colleagues performed laboratory experiments that bore
out this prediction. 174 Then they examined IRS analyses
of actual taxpayer behavior and found the same effect. 175
• Prospect theory also assumes that reference points are a
key to risk preferences, and predicts that managers of a
company falling short of "target points" will be more
risk seeking than average managers.' 76 Laughhunn and
colleagues confirmed this prediction in laboratory
experiments. 77 Fiegenbaum and Thomas confirmed the
prediction with data from twenty years of corporate
activity.1 7
8
* Griffin and Tversky note that laboratory studies
showing irrational overconfidence have been tentatively
reciprocity is an important social norm that affects a wide range of human behavior, often in
ways that seem inconsistent with utility maximization).
172. KAHAN, supra note 46, at 4 (citing studies).
173. Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1143-44.
174. Henry S.J. Robben et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax
Cheating. An International Experimental Study, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 341, 355 (1990) (finding
that "[nioncompliance was more likely to occur, occurred on more occasions, and involved larger
amounts of money among subjects confronting the prospect of additional tax payment after
withholding").
175. Id. at 345-46.
176. See Mary C. Daly, Panel: Integrity in the Practice of Law: Teaching Integrity in the
Professional Responsibility Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for Change, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
261, 273 (2003) (suggesting that prospect theory may help explain the risks Enron executives
were willing to take).
177. Dan J. Laughhunn et al., Managerial Risk Preferences for Below-Target Returns, 26
MGMT. SC. 1238, 1242, 1248 (1980) (reporting results from survey of executives that "suggest the
need for new positive models of risky choice behavior, such as that developed by Kahneman and
Tversky [in prospect theory], that allow for risk seeking for below target returns" (citation
omitted)).
178. Avi Fiegenbaum & Howard Thomas, Attitudes Toward Risk and the Risk-Return
Paradox: Prospect Theory Explanations, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 85, 97 (1988).
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supported in studies involving the real world
performance of experts. 179
* Use of the availability heuristic (the tendency to answer
hard questions about probability by use of examples
that readily come to mind) has been repeatedly
documented in laboratory studies, 180 and has also been
found in both surveys and actual consumer behavior.
181
* The endowment effect predicts that people will demand
more to sell something they consider in their
endowment than they would be willing to pay to obtain
it in the first place.18 2 Again, studies of real world
behavior confirm laboratory experiments.
18 3
* Theory predicts that the omission bias, which causes
people to regret bad consequences stemming from their
actions more than bad consequences stemming from
their inaction,18 4 will affect people's decisions regarding
vaccinating their children with serums that might carry
side effects. This has been confirmed first in the
laboratory and then in the real world. 1 5
* Derek Koehler and colleagues noted that few studies
had evaluated how well descriptive theories of
probabilistic reasoning captured the behavior of experts
in their natural environments.' 8 6 They took laboratory-
generated theories and applied them to medical
settings, weather forecasting, legal judgments, business
179. Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of
Confidence, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 230, 230; see also Max
Henrion & Baruch Fischhoff, Assessing Uncertainty in Physical Constants, in PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 666, 668 ('The few studies of judgments in such real-
world contexts [such as medicine, toxicology, and nuclear safety] outside the psychologist's
laboratory suggest that the laboratory findings of overconfidence may generalize to situations of
practical importance. However, such evaluations have been rare." (citation omitted)).
180. See generally Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 116, at 11-14.
181. Jacob Gersen, Strategy and Cognition: Regulating Catastrophic Risk (2001)
(unpublished manuscript 2001), cited in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONFORMITY AND DISSENT 39 (Univ.
of Chi. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 164 (2d Series), October 2002) (finding that people
often buy flood and earthquake insurance after such events occur, but as time passes and
memories fade they are much less likely to buy such insurance), http://ssrn.com/abstractid
=341880.
182. JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 289 (3d ed. 2000).
183. See supra note 41.
184. Jonathan Baron, Preferences and Rational Choice: New Perspectives and Legal
Implications: Value Analysis of Political Behavior-Self-Interest: Moralistic:: Altruistic: Moral,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1150-51 (2003) (explaining omission bias).
185. See infra note 467.
186. Derek J. Koehler et al., The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases
Beyond the Laboratory, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 686, 710.
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settings, and sports settings, concluding that "[i]n all
domains of expert judgment surveyed, systematic
miscalibration was observed. In each case, the observed
patterns matched the qualitative predictions of the
heuristics and biases perspective .. ,,l.7
0 In the field of organizational behavior, Locke observes
that "[i]n case after case and topic after topic, basically
the same results were obtained in the field as in the
laboratory.... The evidence indicates that a detailed,
point-by-point similarity with respect to subjects, tasks,
settings, and so forth is not necessarily required in
order to achieve generalizability."' 88 Thus, studies show
very similar results between laboratory experiments
and field studies in such organizational behavior and
organizational psychology areas as goal setting,
18 9
feedback effects,1 90  decision-making participation, 191
financial incentives, 92 and the relationship of job
performance and job satisfaction. 193  All this led
Professor Ilgen to conclude that "[t]ime and again,
results of research conducted in the laboratory were
found to generalize to organizational settings."'
94
187. Id.
188. Edwin A. Locke, Generalizing from Laboratory to Field: Ecological Validity or
Abstraction of Essential Elements?, in GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD SETTINGS 3, 6
(Edwin A. Locke ed., 1986) [hereinafter GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY].
189. See Gary P. Latham & Thomas W. Lee, Goal Setting, in GENERALIZING FROM
LABORATORY, supra note 188, at 101, 108 (noting that laboratory studies of goal setting and its
impact on behavior "readily" generalize to field studies).
190. See Richard E. Kopelman, Feedback, in GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY, supra note
188, at 119, 139-40 (concluding from a survey of thirty laboratory studies and forty-two field
experiments that objective feedback "consistently has a positive effect in both the laboratory and
the field" although its effect in the field is often stronger).
191. See David M. Schweiger & Carrie R. Leana, Participation in Decision Making, in
GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY, supra note 188, at 147, 161 (finding that "research results
obtained in the laboratory generally agree with those obtained in the field" in the context of
experiments regarding whether subordinate participation in decision making improves their goal
acceptance).
192. See G. Douglas Jenkins, Jr., Financial Incentives, in GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY,
supra note 188, at 167, 177 (finding in survey of studies on impact of financial incentives on
behavior that "laboratory findings about financial incentives do generalize to field settings, but
only when certain specified conditions are met").
193. See Philip M. Podsakoff & Larry J. Williams, The Relationship Between Job
Performance and Job Satisfaction, in GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY, supra note 188, at 207,
244 ("[Tlhe pattern of relationships obtained in the laboratory is generally consistent with those
obtained in field research.").
194. See Daniel R. Ilgen, Laboratory Research: A Question of When, Not If, in GENERALIZING
FROM LABORATORY, supra note 188, at 257, 257. Ilgen was summarizing the results of numerous
studies comparing laboratory results with field results contained in GENERALIZING FROM
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* Finally, Markman and Medin noted in 2002 that "[i]n
general, results from laboratory studies have held up
surprisingly well when tested, for example, on the floor
of a casino or at the race track."195
Mitchell's main example of psychology's lack of realism relates
to probabilities and frequencies. 196 As explained elsewhere in this
article, 97 over the last twenty years studies have demonstrated that
humans are often poor statistical reasoners. 198 Subsequent studies
indicate that human performance on some tests can be improved if the
questions are presented in a frequency rather than a probability
format. 199  This is all well and good. Unfortunately, while Mitchell
attempts to characterize the questions in the K-T studies as involving
"unnatural and unfamiliar formats,"200 in the real world people often
have to deal with problems presented as probabilities.
20 1
2. Lack of Feedback and Learning Opportunities
Mitchell points out that social scientists using between-subject
tests that are based on one-shot decision situations and thus fail to
test for feedback, learning, and market interaction effects may not get
an accurate picture when describing decision-making behavior in
repetitive markets. 20 2 This seems a fairly obvious point, but any
implication that subjects are being tricked into giving wrong answers
is inaccurate. 20
3
LABORATORY. Although not every single study found strong generalizability from laboratory
experiments, the strong thrust of most of the studies was consistent with Ilgen's conclusion. See
also Kuhberger, supra note 136, at 45 ("[Flraming research has stepped outside the lab to a
considerable degree ... [demonstrating that] experts are also influenced by framing, but maybe
to a lesser degree than students.").
195. Arthur B. Markman & Douglas L. Medin, Decision Making, in 2 STEVEN'S HANDBOOK
OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 413, 451 (D.L. Medin & H. Pashler eds., 3d ed. 2002).
196. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1988-1992.
197. See infra notes 368-378 and accompanying text.
198. See Evans, supra note 165, at 24-25 (noting that although "man" was formerly regarded
as a good intuitive statistical reasoner, over the past two decades "evidence has accumulated
that the way in which subjective probabilities are formed is apparently subject to a wide variety
of biases").
199. See, e.g., G. Gigerenzer, The Bounded Rationality of Probabilistic Mental Models, in
RATIONALITY, supra note 165, at 284, 293-94.
200. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1992.
201. See infra note 381 and accompanying text.
202. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1977-79.
203. Regarding studies involving statistical reasoning, leading experts recently wrote:
The accusation that psychologists have been devising parlor tricks, which people are
susceptible to in the laboratory context but either do not encounter or could solve in
real world contexts, seems less plausible in view of the research reported here. First,
for each problem we have reported, some of the subjects showed by their answers (and
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The background controversy, which Mitchell explicates, is
interesting. Whereas psychologists in the heuristics and biases school
tend to study one-shot decisions, experimental economists tend to
create markets and allow subjects to play repeatedly to determine
whether eventually their decision making will tend toward the
rational and create efficient markets.20 4  The debate, therefore,
involves comparing apples and oranges, decision making in the one-
shot setting versus decision making in a repeat game setting.
To the extent that many decisions made by individuals are not
repeated frequently (e.g., decisions to buy a house, to buy a car, to
invest an inheritance, to take a new job, to vote as a juror, and so on),
the behavioralists' approach is obviously the more appropriate one.
20 5
Moreover, experience seldom teaches investors to cure their
overconfidence. 20 6 Often, even many trials and large amounts of
feedback do not make Chicago Man out of K-T Man; many
psychological research results "do live through shockingly high levels
of feedback and multiple trials."
20 7
often by the rationales for their answers, subsequently elicited) an appreciation of the
statistical principles that in previous work other subjects failed to appreciate. A more
reasonable explanation of the success of some of our subjects is that they are more
skilled at statistical reasoning than the other subjects rather than that they saw
through the experimenters' tricks. Second, the factors that make statistical reasoning
more or less likely (for example, recognition of heterogeneity and of the role played by
chance) do not sound like factors that make people more or less dupable by
experimenters but rather like factors that make the appropriateness of statistical
reasoning more or less obvious. Third, statistical training markedly influences
answers to the sort of problems we studied. This suggests that it is not problem- or
context-produced illusions that make people unable to solve statistical problems, but
simply lack of statistical knowledge.
Richard E. Nisbett et al., The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 510, 530-3 1.
204. Whereas psychologists may be accused, and are by Mitchell, of manipulating their
experiments to produce quirks in human decision making, Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at
1971, economists are often accused of similar manipulations with opposite goals. See Douglas L.
Medin & Max H. Bazerman, Broadening Behavioral Decision Research: Multiple Levels of
Cognitive Processing, 6 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 533, 536 (1999) (suggesting that "much of
experimental economics consists of contrived experiments created in order to show convergence"
of actual decision making and optimal decision making).
205. See Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the
Illusion of Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REV. 395, 413-14 (1978) (noting that many situations do not
provide feedback in a way that facilitates learning).
206. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 639
(1996) (citing Sheryl B. Ball et al., An Evaluation of Learning in the Bilateral Winner's Curse, 48
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 17-18 (1991), and Berndt Brehmer, In
One Word: Not from Experience, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
READER 705 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1986) (making the point that feedback
is seldom as clear and unambiguous as needed to cure overconfidence)).
207. Medin & Bazerman, supra note 204, at 536.
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Even the repeat games of experimental economist and Nobel
Prize winner Vernon Smith demonstrated that the stock market, the
market most likely of all markets to be efficient, often is not.20 8 Stock
markets are often subject to irrational bubbles 209 and are rife with
inefficiencies well documented by behavioral finance research. 210
Even repeat professional players in the financial markets-players
who have time and incentive to perform well-are subject to many of
the heuristics and biases that have been identified in lay persons by
one-shot laboratory experiments. 21
1
208. See Justin Fox, Is the Market Rational? FORTUNE, Dec. 9, 2002, at 116 (noting that
Vernon Smith's "economic experiements have also shot holes in efficient-markets dogma"); see
also George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make
Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 708, 708 (1985) (giving
examples of situations where small deviations from rationality can have major impact); Kenneth
L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Cognitive Biases in Market Forecasts, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall 2000,
at 72, 72 (arguing that five cognitive biases, including overconfidence, confirmation,
representativeness, anchoring, and hindsight, underlie the illusion of validity that causes
investors to make poor decisions); Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi
Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1071, 1071 (1985) (showing that "the
knee-jerk reaction of some economists that competition will render irrationality irrelevant is apt
only in very special cases, probably rarely observed in the real world").
209. See generally MATHIAS BINSWANGER, SPECULATIVE BUBBLES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE COEVOLUTION OF REAL AND FINANCIAL MARKETS (1999) (accurately
projecting that the 1990s boom was a bubble); EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE
HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SPECULATION (1999) (examining 'Tulipmania" and other
early bubbles); PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF EARLY
MANIAS (2000) (same); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000) (predicting,
accurately as it turned out, that the dot com stock market run-up of the mid- to late-1990s was a
classic bubble).
210. Many books extensively document behavioral anomalies in the operation of supposedly
efficient stock markets. See, e.g., ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed.,
1993); GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY MISTAKES AND
HOW TO CORRECT THEM (1999); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000); ANDRE SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000); RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI
RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991); RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1992); LARS TVEDE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCE (1999); see also
Kent Daniel et al., Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN.
1839, 1865 (1998) (suggesting that investor overconfidence helps account for stock price
behavior); Werner De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J. FIN.
793 (1985) (showing that investors overreact to new information and underweigh older
information when making investment decisions); Terrence Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to
Realize Their Losses?, 53 J. FIN. 1775 (1998) (explaining how investors' susceptibility to loss
aversion affects the stock market); SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & RICHARD H. THALER, BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7948, Oct. 2000) (explaining
that the limits of arbitrage prevent even sophisticated financial markets from eliminating the
effects of psychological decision-making limitations via market forces, learning and evolution),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=245733.
211. Langevoort has explained that because even for professional investors in the stock
markets feedback is seldom prompt and unambiguous, various biases in decision making can be
persistent. See Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 10, at 135; Langevoort, supra
note 206, at 636-41. See generally Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard M. Thaler, Do Security
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3. Conversational Cues and Demand Characteristics
In his litany of potential problems with experimental research,
Mitchell's next complaint addresses two related concepts. First are
conversational cues-the notion that subject responses viewed as
erroneous by experimenters are "actually reasonable responses to
conversational cues contained in the experimental stimuli. 212 Second
are demand characteristics; the notion that subjects, knowing that
they are in an experiment, make surmises regarding the
experimenter's purpose and shape their responses accordingly. 213
Conversational cues and demand characteristics are part of a
family of features of experimental research that can potentially
confound results because "alert, aware participants are actively
seeking cues in the research setting to inform them of what they are
expected to do or what they should do in order to present themselves
in a favorable light."21 4
Analysts Overreact?, AM. ECON. REV., May 1990, at 52, 52 (finding that securities analysts
display the availability heuristic in making forecasts); De Bondt & Thaler, supra note 210, at 793
(noting that there is substantial evidence that stock professionals, like lay people, do not process
new information consistent with Bayes's rule but instead overreact to new information);
Bradford De Long et al., The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64 J. BUS. 1, 5-6
(1991) (noting overconfidence of several types of professionals including CIA analysts,
experienced psychologists, and physicians and explaining how irrational "noise traders" can
survive and even prosper in supposedly efficient financial markets); David Hirshleifer et al.,
Security Analysts and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information Before Others,
49 J. FIN. 1665, 1686 (1994) (noting evidence of overconfidence by professional stock investors);
Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent
Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1622-25 (2000) (surveying evidence that stock professionals are
subject to the self-serving bias); Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock
Prices, 54 J. FIN. 581, 618 (1999) (providing evidence that mutual fund managers are subject to
irrational herding effects); GILLES HILARY & LIOR MENZLY, Do PAST SUCCESS LEAD ANALYSTS TO
BECOME OVERCONFIDENT? 2 (Univ. of Chi., Apr. 2001) (providing evidence of overconfidence by
professional stock analysts), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=261476. But see
Michael B. Mikhail et al., Do Security Analysts Improve Their Performance with Experience?, 35
J. ACCT. RES. 131, 155 (Supp. 1997) (finding evidence that sell-side security analysts following a
specific firm do tend to improve performance with experience).
212. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1981.
213. See CARLSMITH ET AL., supra note 69, at 280-81 (describing demand characteristics);
Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for
Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231, 253 (2000) (noting that demand characteristics occur
when "the subject's responses are distorted by his or her understanding of the investigator's
goals").
214. Brewer, supra note 73, at 8; see also Ara Norenzayan & Norbert Schwartz, Telling What
They Want to Know: Participants Tailor Causal Attributions to Researchers' Interests, 29 EUR. J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1011, 1019 (1999) (finding that subjects responding to a questionnaire tended to
give different answers depending on whether the researcher was identified as a social scientist or
as a personality psychologist); Wayne E. Ormond & Lorne M. Sulsky, Influence of Raters' Self-
Consciousness and Appraisal Purpose on Leniency and Accuracy of Performance Ratings: A




One of Mitchell's main sources on conversational cues is
Professor Schwarz, who points out that according to the tacit rules of
conversation in everyday life, people expect to be given relevant
information. 215 So, if an experimenter gives information to a subject,
the subject will consider that information, because the subject
assumes that there was a reason for the experimenter to include it.216
This means that if subjects in an experiment are told that the usual
assumption that information is relevant does not hold, they will be
less likely to fall prey to various biases and inefficient heuristics
studied in the literature.
217
Fortunately, conversational cues are simply irrelevant to
experiments regarding many of the heuristics and biases in the K-T
tradition. 21 However, they are particularly relevant to the dilution
effect (the tendency for the addition of irrelevant information to cause
decision makers to form less extreme judgments than those based only
on relevant information),219 and have been studied in that regard.
Some studies show that subjects are unable to disregard irrelevant
information when making decisions, even after having several
opportunities to do so. 220 Experiments indicate that decision makers
are worse off with more information than with less, because they
cannot ignore the non-diagnostic information.221 However, Tetlock and
colleagues, like Schwarz, suspected that the subjects persisted in
considering the irrelevant information in part because they assumed,
could be explained primarily by demand characteristics introduced by the experimental
procedure).
215. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1981-82 (quoting Norbert Schwarz, Judgment in
a Social Context: Biases, Shortcomings, and the Logic of Conversation, 26 ADVANCED
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 123, 154-56 (1994)).
216. See Norbert Schwarz, Social Judgment and Attitudes: Warmer, More Social, and Less
Conscious, 30 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 152 (2000); Philip E. Tetlock, Intuitive Politicians,
Theologians, and Prosecutors: Exploring the Empirical Implications of Deviant Functionalist
Metaphors, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 582, 594.
217. See Schwarz, supra note 216, at 152.
218. Conversational cues would have no particular impact, for example, upon studies of the
availability heuristic, anchoring and adjustment, attribution theory, group judgments,
overconfidence, overoptimism, and many other effects.
219. See generally Richard E. Nisbett et al., The Dilution Effect: Nondiagnostic Information
Weakens the Implications of Diagnostic Information, 13 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 248 (1981). Thus,
jurors provided with some relevant evidence indicating defendant's guilt are more likely to find
the defendant guilty than jurors provided with that same evidence and with additional irrelevant
information.
220. See N. John Castellan, Jr., Multiple-Cue Probability Learning with Irrelevant Cues, 9
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 16, 26 (1973) (finding that subjects were unable
to ignore irrelevant information even after a large number of trials).
221. Id. at 26.
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consistent with normal conversational practice, that the
experimenters would not have provided the information if it had no
bearing upon the task. In experiments, they found evidence to
support their hypothesis. 222
This finding scarcely means that the results of the original
studies of the dilution effect are not valuable, however. For example,
auditors have been shown to be subject to the dilution effect. 223
Unfortunately for auditors, a client that floods its outside auditor with
irrelevant information is not going to advertise to the auditor the
irrelevance of the information. Similarly, sellers of products and
promoters of securities can bombard consumers and investors with
irrelevant data and thereby reduce the accuracy of their decision
making. If they intend to manipulate or defraud, they are unlikely to
red flag for special attention the irrelevant information that they
include in their messages. The outside auditors and consumers,
consistent with conversational norms, will likely believe, erroneously,
that the information has been provided because it bears upon the
decisions they must make.224
b. Demand Characteristics
Researchers are well aware of the impact of demand
characteristics (also called demand effects). 225  These occur when
subjects in experiments act to try to please the experimenter. 226
222. Philip E. Tetlock et al., Revising the Value Pluralism Model: Incorporating Social
Content and Context Postulates, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES 25 (Clive Seligman et al. eds.,
1996), cited in Tetlock supra note 216, at 594.
223. See, e.g., Steven M. Glover, The Influence of Time Pressure and Accountability on
Auditors' Processing of Nondiagnostic Information, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 213, 223 (1997) (finding that
accountants are subject to the dilution effect); Karl Hackenbrack, Implications of Seemingly
Irrelevant Evidence in Audit Judgment, 30 J. ACCT. RES. 126 (1992) (same); Vicky B. Hoffman &
James M. Patton, Accountability, the Dilution Effect, and Conservatism in Auditors' Fraud
Judgments, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 227, 233 (1997) (same).
224. See generally Alex Chernev, The Effect of Common Features on Brand Choice:
Moderating Role ofAttribute Importance, 23 J. CONSUMER RES. 304 (1997) (exploring how adding
information affects consumer decision making); Tom Meyvis & Chris Janiszewski, Consumers'
Beliefs About Product Benefits: The Effect of Obviously Irrelevant Product Information, 28 J.
CONSUMER RES. 618 (2002) (same).
225. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Study of Statistical Intuitions, 11
COGNITION 123, 124, 132, 135 (1982) (finding that the results of earlier studies which had
concluded that exposure to the color pink reduced muscle strength primarily reflected demand
characteristics); see also Norbert Schwarz, Self-Reports: How the Questions Shape the Answers,
54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 93, 96 (1999) (reporting that whether survey letterhead said "Institute for
Personality Research" or "Institute for Social Research" affected responses to survey on reasons
for mass murder); Jeffrey M. Smith et al., The Influence of Color and Demand Characteristics on
Muscle Strength and Affective Ratings of the Environment, 113 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 289, 297 (1986).
226. See F.J. McGUIGAN, EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 287-
91 (1960) (explaining demand characteristics).
2003] 1707
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1663
Researchers whose experimental designs create the opportunity for
significant demand characteristics often find their results under
attack.
227
Because psychologists are aware of the effects of demand
characteristics, they are constantly refining experimental procedures
to minimize or eliminate them.228 There are ways of planning and
designing research operations so that the number of potentially
confounding factors associated with the independent variable can be
reduced. 229 One of these methods is to utilize the between-subjects
research design that Mitchell criticizes. 230 Others include (a) using a
coherent and believable cover story;231 (b) keeping experimenters,
confederates, and others who come into contact with the subjects as
unaware as possible of each subject's condition;232 (c) using different
rooms and different experimenters when subjects are asked to do two
separate but related tasks;23 3 (d) using research instruments based on
227. See Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice and Jury Instructions: Instructive and
Reciprocating Connections, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 591, 613-14 (2000) (attacking a related
study for not adequately guarding against demand effects); Ormond & Sulsky, supra note 214, at
32.
228. See, e.g., Olivier Corneille et al., Judgeability Concerns: The Interplay of Information,
Applicability, and Accountability in the Overattribution Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 377, 381 (1999) (designing study of the overattribution bias to eliminate effects of
conversational cues and demand characteristics); Duncan Cramer & Natalie Buckland, Effect of
Rational and Irrational Statements and Demand Characteristics on Task Anxiety, 129 J.
PSYCHOL. 269, 274 (1995) (controlling for demand characteristics); John M. Govern & Lisa A.
Marsch, Inducing Positive Mood Without Demand Characteristics, 81 PSYCHOL. REP. 1027, 1032
(1997) (testing a new technique for altering subjects' mood without demand effects in order to
study the impact of that altered mood); David Wiseman & Irwin P. Levin, A New Laboratory
Method for Altering Positive Affect, 76 PSYCHOL. REP. 1103, 1106 (1995) (developing a new
method for altering positive affect without demand effects in order to study the impact of that
altered affect).
229. Brewer, supra note 73, at 8.
230. See Smith, supra note 74, at 23 ("[Plarticipants in a within-participants design see
more than one condition and are thus in a better position to guess at the experimental
hypotheses."); Finkel, supra note 73, at 923 (noting that within-subjects designs are more likely
to inadvertently create demand characteristics than between-subjects designs).
231. See CARLSMITH ET AL., supra note 69, at 283; Ronald S. Friedman & Jens Forster, The
Effects of Approach and Avoidance Motor Actions on the Elements of Creative Insight, 79 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 477, 481 (2000) (using a cover story to eliminate self-perception
effects); Smith, supra note 74, at 35.
232. See Smith, supra note 74, at 35. For example, in a study of media influence on public
perceptions of air bag safety, Feigenson kept experimenters in the dark regarding the subjects'
condition and the purpose of the study in order to eliminate demand characteristics. See Neil R.
Feigenson, Air Bag Safety: Media Coverage, Popular Conceptions, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 444, 476-77 (2001).
233. See John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Mind in the Middle: A Practical Guide to
Priming and Automaticity Research, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS, supra note 73, at
253, 267.
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the real world;234 and (e) supplementing laboratory results with
unsolicited responses gathered from various sources such as
anecdotes, public testimony, police reports, and the like.
235
As just one specific example, in studying the phenomenon of
anchoring and adjustment, experimenters have often used as anchors
numbers that were obviously uninformative (such as the spin of a
roulette wheel) in order to insure that subjects did not incorporate the
number into their decision process on the assumption that it must be
relevant simply because the experimenter mentioned it.236
The fact, noted earlier, that well designed laboratory
experiments tend to produce the same results as field studies
237
indicates that researchers are doing a reasonably good job of
minimizing distortions caused by conversational cues, demand
characteristics, and related phenomena. Mitchell is certainly correct
in arguing that psychologists must remain highly sensitive to these
problems. Sechrest and Bootzin properly urge psychologists to do
more of their research in real life settings.238 But studies such as
those by Kunreuther and his colleagues, which found irrationality in
real-life decisions that mirrored laboratory results with regard to
insurance policies, should give pause to those who attack the
laboratory.239 Studying how to minimize demand characteristics is
important not just in the laboratory, but also in the real world; real
world jurors' responses to voir dire questions are affected by their
234. See Richard L. Wiener & Dennis P. Stolle, Trial Consulting: Jurors' and Attorneys'
Perceptions of Murder, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 225, 242 (1997) (comparing the predictions of public
defenders with the decisions of jurors who had filled out jury questionnaires to study how
effectively attorneys instinctively gauge whether jurors would or would not be favorable to their
case). To minimize demand characteristics, Wiener and Stolle used a questionnaire based
substantially on a real juror questionnaire commonly used by public defender offices. Id.
235. See Neil M. Malamuth & James V.P. Check, The Effects of Mass Media Exposure on
Acceptance of Violence Against Women: A Field Experiment, 15 J. RES. PERSONALITY 436, 437
(1981) (using such unbiased sources to study effects of media exposure on male acceptance of
rape myths); see also CARLSMITH ET AL., supra note 69, at 283-92 (discussing other means of
reducing demand characteristics).
236. Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in
Judgments of Belief and Value, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 120,
122 (citing J. EDWARD RUSSON & PAUL J.H. SHOEMAKER, DECISION TRAPS 90 (1989)).
237. See supra notes 169-195 and accompanying text.
238. Lee B. Sechrest & Richard R. Bootzin, Psychology and Inferences About Public Policy, 2
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 377, 380 (1996).
239. See HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS 1-4, 237 (1978) (finding, consistent with laboratory experiments, that low probability
events are systematically discounted by individuals); see also Johnson et al., supra note 87, at 50
(finding strong evidence supporting framing effects in real life insurance decisions made by
consumers under two different statutory schemes).
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perceptions of judges' and attorneys' expectations, 240 as are witness
responses to questions from police and lawyers.
241
4. Use of Ecologically Suspect Formats
Mitchell's next argument is that decision-making errors are
often exaggerated by the ecologically suspect format of psychological
experiments, specifically the "decontextualized, abstract, or unnatural
nature of the research setting and research task."242 Aside from an
example of the Wason four-card selection task,243 which tests
conditional reasoning performance, 244 Mitchell points only to the
probability/frequency debate discussed earlier. 245  Because the
evidence is mixed as to whether frequency formats actually improve
performance over probability formats, and because people frequently
confront probability formats in real life, 246 the impact of Mitchell's
argument is limited. More importantly, again consider the substantial
evidence cited above indicating that the same phenomena discovered
in the sterile environment of the laboratory have been replicated
repeatedly in real world decision making. 247
240. See Linda L. Marshall & Althea Smith, The Effects of Demand Characteristics,
Evaluation Anxiety, and Expectancy on Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 120 J. PSYCHOL. 205,
213 (1986) (finding that juror responses were affected most by evaluation anxiety, less by
previous jury duty, and less still by expectancy effects and demand characteristics).
241. See Gary P. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research
and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765, 767 (1995) (noting that "[flactors
that can create interpretation difficulties for an experiment can create similar problems for a
lineup" and giving demand characteristics as an example).
242. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1985.
243. The Wason test is explained infra note 358. It is discussed in some detail there.
244. Mitchell points out that only 10% of some types of subjects can solve abstract forms of
the problem. See Stephen J. Hoch & Judith E. Tschirgi, Logical Knowledge and Cue Redundancy
in Deductive Reasoning, 13 MEMORY & COGNITION 453, 456 (1985) (finding a 48% success rate
with subjects holding a master's degree), cited in Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1986.
That percentage rises substantially when the test is given in a more familiar setting. See Richard
A. Griggs & James R. Cox, The Elusive Thematic-Materials Effect in Wason's Selection Task, 73
BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 407, 414-17 (1982) (noting that only one percent of subjects give the correct
response when the problem is stated abstractly, that 7-9% succeed when given some versions of
the problem with a factual setting, but that the success rate rose to 74% when the problem was
phrased with facts that allowed the subject to recall past experience with the content of the
problem, the relationship expressed, and a counter-example to the rule governing the
relationship); see also Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1987 (giving an example of a more
familiar context for the question).
245. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
246. See infra note 381.
247. See supra notes 169-195 and accompanying text.
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5. Deprivation of Decision Tools
Finally, Mitchell argues that researchers in the K-T tradition
exaggerate non-normative response findings by depriving subjects of
decision aids such as instructional texts, calculators, or computers.
248
Mitchell points out that a behavioral decision theorist has placed a
Bayesian calculator online in order to assist decision makers in
updating odds in conformance with Bayes' theorem.
249
Of course, decision aids are irrelevant to most of the heuristics
and biases identified in the K-T tradition. They could be relevant to
probabilistic reasoning tasks, but it seems unlikely that online
Bayesian calculators are going to be in widespread use in general
society anytime soon, and as Mitchell himself admits "[t]he literature
on decision aids indicates that people may be reluctant to use
mechanical decision tools in place of their own judgment."250 In other
words, the fact that we can all carry calculators around with us in the
real world if we so choose is not going to cure us of overoptimism,
overconfidence, loss aversion, the endowment effect, or most other
heuristics and biases identified in the K-T literature.
C. Does Behavioral Decision Theory Have Features That Limit the
Importance of the Research for the Legal System?
In the final section of his attack on psychology research,
Mitchell makes a multi-faceted argument that it is perilous to
extrapolate the findings of behavioral decision research to the real
legal world.251 The arguments are interesting and worthy of individual
analysis, even though much of the heuristics and biases literature has
already been confirmed in real world decision making, as noted
above. 25
2
248. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1993.
249. Michael H. Birnbaum, Bayesian Calculator, at http://psych.Fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/
bayes/BayesCalc.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
Bayes' Theorem is a rational method for updating probabilities. See generally ROBYN M.
DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 323-26 (1988).
250. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1995 n.175 ("[A] common theme emerging from
recent decision aid research is that decision makers are reluctant to relinquish their judgments
in favor of decision aids." (quoting Steven E. Kaplan et al., The Effects of Predictive Ability
Information, Locus of Control, and Decision Maker Involvement on Decision Aid Reliance, 14 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 35, 47 (2001))); Peter Todd & Izak Benbasat, Inducing Compensatory
Information Processing Through Decision Aids that Facilitate Effort Reduction: An Experimental
Assessment, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 91, 103 (2000) (finding that decision aids will be
avoided unless they minimize the decision maker's overall level of effort expenditure).
251. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1995-2017.
252. See supra notes 169-195 and accompanying text.
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1. Real World Success Versus Normative Coherence
The first facet of Mitchell's argument is that laboratory results
do not necessarily translate to the real world.253 He begins with an
example that is rather easily turned against him. In one of his few
attacks on a specific behavioralist theory, Mitchell notes that Russell
Korobkin has argued that because of cognitive imperfections, "the
party preparing the first contract draft may 'gain a powerful
advantage in negotiations.' 254 In response, Mitchell hazards a totally
unsupported supposition that "[t]he original terms supposedly
accepted with the assistance of cognitive imperfections, could well lead
to a fair and efficient transaction."255
Unfortunately for Mitchell's argument, the form contracts that
consumers and investors sign are, because of the merchants' and
promoters' self-serving bias, relentlessly one-sided, and therefore often
unfair and inefficient. 256 Professor Farnsworth, the reporter for the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, noted that in his own experience
in legal practice "no one in any of the corporations or in the law firm
ever suggested that the forms should be drafted other than as one-
253. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1995-2002.
254. Id. at 1996 (quoting Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation:
The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1627 (1998)).
255. Id.
256. As Slawson has noted:
Forms standardized to achieve economies of mass production and mass
merchandising will also, under the present system, almost certainly be unfair,
because if they were not, their issuers would probably lose money. An unfair form will
not deter sales because the seller can easily arrange his sales so that few if any buyers
will read his forms, whatever their terms, and he risks nothing because the law will
treat his forms as contracts anyway. The user of an unfair form does not even stand
to lose any significant number of future sales because the contingencies against which
his forms provide him protection are normally of a kind which only infrequently occur
(although when they do, the buyer may lose a great deal). When such a contingency
arises the buyer will not usually be in a position to compare the form he bought with
others he might have bought instead. Most buyers probably believe (correctly) that
the forms they could have bought from a competing seller would have been just as bad
anyway. An unfair form thus normally constitutes a costless benefit which a seller
refuses at his peril. If he fails to take advantage of it, his competitors will.
Competitive pressures have worked so long and so thoroughly to make standard forms
unfair that we no longer even notice the unfairness. Standard credit agreements
commonly allow the lender to call the entire unpaid balance, plus costs of collection,
should even a single payment be a moment late, or, not uncommonly, should the
lender just wake up some morning feeling "insecure," but it is rare that either
provision occasions even a judicial comment. A standard agreement recently signed
by a colleague of [Slawson's] contained provisions disclaiming all representations and
warranties of year, model, mileage, price or design-change prior to delivery (!), but he
signed it without thought.
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARv. L. REV. 529, 531-32 (1971).
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sidedly in the interests of the corporate client as possible. 25 7
Behavioral considerations, rather than efficient bargaining, explain
why consumers and investors continue to sign these one-sided
contracts.
258
Mitchell then attacks a study done by Professors Guthrie and
Rachlinski, along with Federal Magistrate Andrew Wistrich.259 They
surveyed 200 magistrate judges attending a federal judicial conference
and found that the judges' responses indicated a susceptibility to
various heuristics and biases (anchoring, framing, hindsight bias,
representativeness heuristic, and the egocentric bias) 260 that was
consistent with laboratory results involving students and others.
Mitchell's attack, and it is one fairly lodged against any
laboratory experiment in this format, is that the judges' answers,
although they appeared irrational when judged against the normative
response, may have been rational if the judges' main goal was simply
to complete the questionnaire as quickly as possible so that they could
get out to the golf course. 261 The problem with Mitchell's argument is
that the judges' responses were not random; they were systematically
biased in a way consistent with other studies done involving other
subjects. Hastie and Viscusi's study involving judges found the same
effect. 262 Because laboratory results have repeatedly been supported
by findings in real world settings,263 it is unlikely that there is any
particular problem in most psychological surveys of subjects having as
their main goal finishing the survey quickly.
264
257. Alan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in
Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 44 (1984); see also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 444 (2002) ("Businesses
often delegate the job of drafting [contract] terms to lawyers, who believe that they can best
serve their client by composing an arsenal of one-sided terms without regard to the business
environment, or for that matter, anything else.").
258. See Robert A. Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 341 (2003); see also infra notes 491-503 and
accompanying text.
259. Guthrie et al., supra note 10, cited in Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1996-97.
260. Id. at 778 ("Judges, it seems, are human. Like the rest of us, their judgment is affected
by cognitive illusions that can produce systematic errors in judgment.").
261. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1999.
262. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 66, at 917 (finding "massive" hindsight bias by jurors and
lesser but still substantial hindsight bias by judges).
263. See supra notes 169-195 and accompanying text.
264. Even college students, who are more likely to be irresponsible in participating in such
an experiment than a federal judge, have generally been found to be "a fairly good proxy for 'real
people."' Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1156 ("[S]everal studies have found that experts display
roughly the same biases as college students or the same biases at somewhat reduced levels."
(citations omitted) (quoting PLOUS, supra note 135, at 258)).
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2. Individual Decision Making Versus Group Decision
Making
Next, Mitchell points out that the individual unit of analysis in
most behavioral studies is the individual, whereas many legal
decisions are made by groups, such as panels of judges and juries.
265
This is true, and many psychologists wish to study these dynamics
and understand when and under what circumstances group
deliberation will change decision making. Unlike psychologists,
economists generally are not interested in studying differences
between individual and group decision making. One of the biggest
flaws of economic reasoning has been its "extraordinary bias towards
individualism. Most economists tend to assume not just that we make
decisions in isolation, but that we nearly always should do so."266
Moreover, the psychology studies done to date "support the conclusion
that group deliberation is unlikely to remedy the effects of a powerful
individual judgment bias, like [for example] the hindsight" bias.267
Many studies find little or no difference between individual and group
deliberations. 268  The anchoring bias, for example, has been
demonstrated in group decision making as well as individual decision
making. 269 The over-optimism and self-efficacy biases have been
265. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 2002-05.
266. Michael Prowse, The Psychology Behind Prizes for a Dismal Science, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
19/20, 2002, at II (comparing psychological and economic approaches); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision Making in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1,
2 (2002) ("Economic analysis tends to focus on the decisions of individuals. This emphasis likely
stems from the underlying model of rational choice, which posits an autonomous individual who
makes rational choices that maximize his satisfactions.").
267. Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damages Awards: Reply
to Richard Lempert, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 987, 992 (2002). See generally Terry Connolly & Edward
W. Bukszar, Hindsight Bias: Self-Flattery or Cognitive Error?, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
205, 205 (1990) (noting that 122 studies of the hindsight bias show that it is "robust to variations
in method, population, and task"); Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 66, at 917 (reporting results of a
study finding "massive" hindsight bias by juries); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment:
Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996) (reviewing the literature and
finding no evidence that juries are less biased than individual jurors); Dagmar Stahlberg et al.,
We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 46, 56 (1995) (finding that "groups are just as prone to hindsight bias as individuals
when making hypothetical predictions" but that groups are better at recalling previous
judgments).
268. See, e.g., William C. Thompson et al., Jurors' Sensitivity to Variations in Statistical
Evidence 15-20 (unpublished manuscript), cited in Rowe, supra note 84, at 547 n.10 (discussing a
base rate experiment that found that group decision process did not lessen subjects' insensitivity
to strength of statistical evidence).
269. Robert W. Rutledge, The Effects of Group Decisions and Group-Shifts on Use of the
Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic, 21 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 215, 224 (1993) (finding
that groups are susceptible to anchoring effects in a manner similar to individuals).
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shown to be even greater in groups than in individuals, 2 0 as has the
overconfidence bias.
271
Sunstein recently summarized the evidence on the
effectiveness of groups at improving decision making:
Are groups able to avoid the judgment errors made by individuals? The evidence is
mixed. In general, groups tend to polarize: they tend [to end up] in a more extreme
position in line with their predeliberation tendencies. At the same time, groups have
been found to make better decisions than individuals with respect to certain statistical
problems. There is some evidence that groups are slightly better at avoiding the
problems created by use of the availability heuristic. On the other hand, some evidence
suggests that the use of the representativeness heuristic is actually amplified. It seems
clear that group processes do not eliminate the use of heuristics, and it remains to be
found whether and when they reduce or increase the resulting errors.
2 7 2
Similarly, in 1996 Kerr and his colleagues reviewed all the studies
they could find regarding differences in individual and group bias, and
concluded that there is little difference between group and individual
bias.273 The differences that did exist did "not show a simple,
consistent pattern of relative bias. ''274 Kerr and colleagues noted the
problem that this poses for Chicago Man advocates who suggest that
collective decision making should cancel out judgmental errors:
Though this may be correct for aggregate public opinion, it is premised on a statistical
analogy-the law of large numbers-that is clearly incompatible with actual interactive
group decision making under some likely social decision schemes. . . . More important,
this argument does not apply to judgment biases ... which are systematic rather than
random. At best, our analyses offer an existence proof that collective rationality can
sometimes be superior to individual rationality, but they also suggest that over a large
and plausible region of relevant parameter space, group decision making actually
exacerbates the biases observed in individual decisions.
27 5
3. Framing Research Confounds and Confuses
In his next point, Mitchell returns to familiar ground, taking
yet another swipe at the phenomenon of framing effects.27 6 Perhaps
270. See, e.g., Chip Heath & Forest J. Jourden, Illusion, Disillusion and the Buffering Effect
of Groups, 69 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 103, 114 (1997) ("[G]roups
do not increase positive evaluations so much as they preserve them.").
271. See Chip Heath & Richard Gonzales, Interaction with Others Increases Decision
Confidence But Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views of
Interactive Decision Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 305, 322
(1995) (finding that when subjects interacted with others, their confidence stayed stable or
increased, but their decision making did not improve).
272. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, HAZARDOUS HEURISTICS 14 (Univ. of Chi., Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 165 (2d Series), Oct. 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=344620.
273. Kerr et al., supra note 267, at 713.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 713-14.
276. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 2002-11. Framing effects occur, for example,
when people's responses, perceptions, or preferences change simply because of a simple
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framing effects are Mitchell's favorite whipping boy because of all of
the heuristics and biases that have been studied in the K-T tradition,
framing effects have proved to be the most complex. Psychologists
have demonstrated that they are indeed an entire family of effects. 277
Mitchell accurately notes that
whereas this research is typically summarized as revealing that people are risk averse
on positively framed problems and risk seeking on negatively framed problems, there
really is no single "framing effect." Within the framing effect research, we find
confounds in the methodology of the studies that make the results difficult to interpret,
and we see that the particular ways in which decisions are "framed" and the substance
of these decisions may make important differences in the results observed. 2 78
Mitchell then proceeds to lay out the complications in fair and
accurate detail, concluding that "there is no universal framing effect
that can be easily translated into legal doctrine. '279  His point is a
strong one and deserves but two responses. First, his own source
clearly demonstrates that although it has a complicated nature, the
framing effect is "a reliable phenomenon,' 28 0 and economists' and legal
commentators' theories will suffer if they ignore it. Second, legal
decision scholars seem to be aware of the complications with framing
theory and none, to my knowledge (and Mitchell points out none) 28'
has offered a policy prescription based on an admittedly faulty
assumption that framing effects are simple, consistent, and
universal.282
refraining of the question, outcome or situation. See Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell,
Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 75, 87
(2003) (noting that "[r]esearch indicates that the surrounding context or 'frame' can be extremely
important in processing or 'coding' an event."); Richard Zeckhauser & W. Kip Viscusi, Risk
Management Strategies: The Risk Management Dilemma, 545 ANNALS 144, 149 n.7 (1996) (noting
that .""[t]he framing of risk problems has a considerable effect on how risks are viewed and what
preferences are expressed.").
277. See, e.g., Irwin P. Levin et al., All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and
Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
149, 181 (1998) (identifying three categories of framing-risky choice framing, attribute framing,
and goal framing-and finding that "[w]ithin each framing type, results show substantial
consistency").
278. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 2005-06.
279. Id. at 2011.
280. Kuhberger, supra note 136, at 23.
281. Every footnote in this section to Mitchell's paper refers to a psychology journal. None
references a law journal containing a policy prescription.
282. Behavioralists virtually always refer to framing effects, accurately, as "systematic"
rather than as universal. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and
Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 705 (1999); Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad
Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1237 (1994).
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4. Neglect of Systematic Information-Processing Modes
In the final section of his methodology article, Mitchell chides
legal decision theorists for not having embraced with due vigor the
latest theories regarding dual processing of information. Mitchell
appropriately calls attention to this exciting research. 28 3 Indeed,
Kahneman's latest book addresses this research in great detail. 28 4 The
key notion, expressed in slightly different ways by competing schools
of thought, is that the human mind has two processing systems that
can operate simultaneously. What is often termed "System 1" is an
intuitive system that works automatically, rapidly, and effortlessly.
We often use this system without even realizing it. System 2 is a
reflective system that is controlled, effortful, deductive, and self-
aware. 28 5 In the anchoring and adjustment phenomenon, it is System
1 that automatically anchors on a number given, and System 2 that
consciously adjusts away from that anchor (but usually not far
enough). 28 6 System 1 automatically believes everything it is told;
System 2 adjusts for known facts that might qualify that belief.
28 7
While Mitchell cannot be faulted for insisting that legal
decision theorists keep up to date with the latest research in
psychology, some have already incorporated this work into their
writings.288 Moreover, he once again offers not a single policy
prescription by any legal decision theorist that he believes is
undermined by an insufficient emphasis on dual processing modes of
decision making. Ultimately, Mitchell suggests that we should "(1)
develop a theory of the conditions under which the rational versus the
arational mode of thought is more likely to be triggered, and in what
283. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 2011-17.
284. See PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8.
285. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 72, at 51. See generally KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHO
Is RATIONAL? STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REASONING 144-47 (1999) (introducing a
dual-processing model); Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., The History of Dual-Process Notions, and the
Future of Preconscious Control, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 12 (Shelly
Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (giving background on these theories); Eliot R. Smith &
Jamie DeCoster, Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual
Integration and Links to Underlying Memory Systems, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 108
(2000) (sketching a summary of dual process models).
286. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 72, at 51.
287. Id. at 57.
288. See, e.g., Paul B. Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damage Clause: A
Practical Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 54-57 (2001) (describing
a prominent dual processing theory); Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The
Influence of Affect on Judgment and Decision-Making, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 167,
182 (2000) (emphasizing the interplay of affect and dual-process theories of information
processing); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE
L.J. 61, 84-85 (2002) (describing "system 1" versus "system 2" thinking).
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legal contexts, and for whom and (2) determine whether active
interventions within the legal setting can trigger the rationale mode of
thought if the benefits of such interventions outweigh their costs.
'289
It is psychologists in the K-T Man tradition, not Chicago Man
economists, who hold the promise of developing these theories and
making these determinations.
D. Final Insights
Empirical psychological research is complex, and Mitchell
rightly calls attention to its limitations. Mitchell's two main points in
the first article appear to be that (a) psychology is a questionable
science whose methods systematically overstate limitations on human
judgment, and (b) legal decision theorists have inexpertly applied its
precepts to legal doctrine. He overstates both points.
Regarding the methods and manners of the psychology
discipline, Mitchell cites Krueger for the proposition that
"[i]nvestigators demonstrate bias by detecting it. They rarely attempt
to detect rational judgment."290  But this is not true. As Mitchell
demonstrates with his articles, in any academic field a good gateway
to publication is to take a contrarian position, to attempt to discredit
an established theory. Psychology professors could make their careers
by discrediting the main themes of K-T research. Economists, 29' game
theorists, 292 philosophers,293 and others have done their level best to
discredit most of the heuristics and biases attributed to K-T Man.
289. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 2017.
290. Id. at 1955 (quoting Joachim Krueger, The Bet on Bias: A Foregone Conclusion?, 9
PSYCOLOQUY 1, 4 (1998), at http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?9.46).
291. For example, after Tversky and Kahneman and Lichtenstein and Slovic demonstrated
the phenomenon of preference reversals, which are inconsistent with the assumption that
Chicago Man's preferences are intransitive, Pommerehne and colleagues and Reilly attempted to
debunk the theory. Compare Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Reversals of Preference Between
Bids and Choices in Gambling Decisions, 89 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 46 (1971), and Tversky
& Kahneman, supra note 135, with Werner Pommerehne et al., Economic Theory of Choice and
the Preference Reversal Phenomenon: A Reexamination, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 569 (1982), and
Robert Reilly, Preference Reversal: Further Evidence and Some Suggested Modifications in
Experimental Design, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 576 (1982). They failed. See generally Paul Slovic &
Sarah Lichtenstein, Preference Reversals: A Broader Perspective, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 596, 597
(1983).
292. See David Grether & Charles Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference
Reversal Phenomenon, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 623, 632 (1979) (discovering that the introduction of
incentives actually strengthened preference reversals, contrary to the authors' original intention
to demonstrate that incentives would make preference reversals disappear).
293. L. Jonathan Cohen, Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?, 4
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCd. 317 (1981).
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Furthermore, prominent and incredibly productive psychologist
Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues in Germany spent a decade
attempting to discredit Kahneman and Tversky's work. They argued
that most of the "defects" identified in human reasoning were actually
"fast and frugal" heuristics that were incredibly efficient.294 After a
decade of critiques that, to Gigerenzer's credit, forced researchers in
the Kahneman and Tversky camp to improve their methodologies,
tweak their theories, and make some concessions, Gigerenzer is now
publishing books featuring his own list of reasoning limitations (such
as "illusory certainty") and emphasizing man's weakness in dealing
with probabilities.
295
Mitchell's own sources emphasize that psychology is a
respected science with research that produces results that are often as
reliable as those of medical science and that uses many of the same
methods as the hard sciences. 296 Research results in psychology are
roughly as consistent as those in physics, 297 and as reliable as many
prominent findings in medical science. 298 Stanovich, one of Mitchell's
294. See generally BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer &
Reinhard Selten eds., 2001); GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL
WORLD (2000); GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999)
[hereinafter GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS].
295. See GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISKS: HOW TO KNOW WHEN NUMBERS DECEIVE
YOU 14, 37 (2002); see also Eldar Shafir, Intuitions About Rationality and Cognition, in
RATIONALITY, supra note 165, at 260, 279 ("Arguments about natural selection and adaptation
notwithstanding, some of our ways of making decisions may be truly 'maladaptive."').
It is fair to say that while Kahneman and Tverksy studied humans' cognitive errors at the
expense of their cognitive successes, Gigerenzer and colleagues did just the opposite, with
considerable success. See GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 294, at 217-18.
296. See STANOVICH, supra note 64, at 114 (arguing that psychology is a respected science);
see also Larry Hedges, How Hard Is Hard Science, How Soft Is Soft Science?, 42 AM. PSYCHOL.
443. 450 (1987) ("There is substantial support for the contention that rigorous reviews of some
kinds of social science research reveal very consistent results.").
297. See Hedges, supra note 296, at 451 (concluding after an examination of groups of
studies in both physical sciences and social sciences that "research results in the physical
sciences are not markedly more consistent than those in the social sciences... [and] [t]he notion
that experiments in the social sciences produce relatively inconsistent (empirically
noncumulative) results is not supported by these data either"); Henrion & Fischhoff, supra note
179, at 666-67 ("The underestimation of uncertainty of physical constants and compilations of
recommended values seems to be pervasive."); Ronald C. Serlin & Daniel K. Lapsley, Rational
Appraisal of Psychological Research and the Good-Enough Principle, in HANDBOOK FOR DATA
ANALYSIS, supra note 98, at 199, 225 (showing that research in psychology and physics share
many strengths and limitations, and concluding that "hypothesis-testing in psychology, when
fortified by the good-enough principle, is not rationally disadvantaged when compared against
hypothesis testing in physics").
298. See Robert Rosenthal, How Are We Doing in Soft Psychology?, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
775, 775-76 (1990) (noting several examples in which medical science has made recommendations
for action based on statistical results no stronger than those typically found in social science
research).
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most frequent sources, notes that "findings in cognitive psychology
have met the basic test of replicability. Many of the fundamental laws
of information processing have been observed in dozens of laboratories
all over the world."
299
As Tetlock, one of Mitchell's favorite sources, notes, research
programs on judgment and choice "have been phenomenally
successful, triggering an avalanche of discoveries of when judgment
and choice deviate from conventional standards of scientific or
economic rationality."30 0 More to the point, Tetlock urges:
It would be curmudgeonly-and, even worse, wrong-to deny that both research
programs pass classic philosophy-of-science tests of knowledge advancement, an all-too-
rare achievement in the behavioral and social sciences. A small set of explanatory
constructs-judgmental heuristics, the framing of outcomes, the psychophysics of gain
and loss functions--organizes a vast array of findings and stimulates falsifiable
hypotheses that hold up in an impressive array of settings.
30 1
In other words, to some extent we are now arguing about
details. Mitchell essentially admits this. He does not argue that the
Chicago Man model in any way approximates how people actually
act. 30 2 He does not reject the psychological analysis of law. 30 3 It is the
details he quibbles over, and the scientific work of nailing down those
details will be ongoing for a long, long time. In the meantime, one can
argue plausibly that current methods understate, rather than
overstate (as Mitchell claims), limitations on human judgment and
decision making. 30 4
Regarding the physical sciences, keep in mind that the scientists doing work in those areas
are subject to the heuristics and biases that affect everyone else, including overconfidence,
anchoring and adjustment, the confirmation bias, and others. Henrion and Fischhoff recently
noted the role that the psychology of human decision making, particularly overconfidence, has
played into disconcertingly large errors made over the years in measurements of physical
quantities, such as the velocity of light, Planck's constant, or the rest mass of the electron. See
Henrion & Fischhoff, supra note 179, at 666.
299. STANOVICH, supra note 64, at 114. Stanovich also notes that even in social psychology,
where some of the basic criticisms of psychology research seem most apt, "evidence has indicated
that the laboratory-derived relationships and theories do in fact predict behavior in a variety of
other situations involving different types of individuals." Id. at 117.
300. Tetlock, supra note 216, at 582.
301. Id.
302. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1936 ("[M]y criticisms of legal decision theory
should not be seen as an argument that human decision makers predominantly act rationally
and only occasionally make computational errors.").
303. Id. at 1937 ("[M]y criticisms also should not be understood as a rejection of the
psychological analysis of law.").
304. ERIC VAN DEN STEEN, SKILL OR LUCK? BIASES OF RATIONAL AGENTS 4, 17 (MIT Sloan
Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4255-02, June 2002) ("[E]xperimental results often
underestimate the true impact of behavioral biases.... [E]xperiments that test for the self-
serving bias typically restrict the actions the subjects can take. In everyday life, people have
much more freedom. This implies that such structured experiments will tend to under-estimate
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Regarding the import of psychological evidence to legal
analysis, Mitchell is unable to credibly undermine a single specific
policy proposal by a legal decision theorist.305 This is not because the
heuristics and biases literature is without faults; it is because legal
decision theorists are generally aware of its faults and take them into
account in making policy prescriptions. Indeed, in his more candid
moments, Mitchell admits that "legal decision theorists generally
express caution about their endeavor and note the preliminary nature
of much of their work.... 0
the practical relevance of these biases." (emphasis added)), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=319972.
Tversky and Kahneman note that
the conjunction error is only a symptom of a more general phenomenon: People tend to
overestimate the probabilities of representative (or available) events and/or
underestimate the probabilities of less-representative events. The violation of the
conjunction rule demonstrates this tendency even when the "true" probabilities are
unknown or unknowable. The basic phenomenon may be considerably more common
than the extreme symptom by which it was illustrated.
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 93, at 45 (emphasis added); see also Guthrie, supra note 1, at
1158 ("[Pleople may be more likely to rely on framing and other cognitive shortcuts when they
are confronted with complicated rather than straight-forward decisions ... suggest[ing] that
framing and other phenomena of this sort might have a greater impact on real-world decision
making than on simplified laboratory decision making.").
305. The closest Mitchell comes to a direct attack on a particular policy prescription in his
Pessimism article is when he challenges the evidence regarding the hindsight bias. Mitchell,
Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1933-35 n.45. While he is correct in concluding that there exists as
yet no conclusive evidence that jurors deliberating as a group are affected by the hindsight bias,
we should recall that (a) the evidence that individual decision makers are infected by the
hindsight bias is overwhelming, Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-
Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1198 n.185 (noting that the hindsight bias is "well-
documented"); (b) most biases infect individual and group decision makers similarly, see supra
notes 267-275 and accompanying text; (c) there is no evidence that the hindsight bias does not
infect group decision makers and some evidence that it does, see supra note 267 and
accompanying text; and (d) one of Mitchell's favorite sources in the area, see Mitchell, Pessimism,
supra note 12, at 1931-32 nn.41-43, admits that "[g]iven the seeming ubiquity of [the hindsight]
bias in human decision making, it is likely [that juries] do [exhibit the hindsight bias]."
Lempert, supra note 66, at 881.
Although I agree with Lempert that we should be hesitant to modify any long-standing policy
based on a single study, the law has long recognized the existence of the hindsight bias and tried
to manage it with doctrines such as the business judgment rule in corporate law, see Arkes &
Schipani, supra note 10, at 587, and the rule against allowing admission of evidence regarding
subsequent repairs in products liability cases. Even Judge Posner admits that part of the reason
for this rule of evidence might be the hindsight bias, although naturally he attempts to present
an economic rationalization. See Posner, Evidence, supra note 34, at 1545 ("The subsequent-
repairs rule may also be justified by concerns with hindsight bias, but these concerns seem
exaggerated and in any event could be dealt with by other measures.").
306. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1933. In another passage, Mitchell argues that
legal decision theorists speak in blanket terms and fail to recognize studies that qualify broad
conclusions about human reasoning. Id. at 1944. He makes particular reference to an article on
base rates, Koehler, supra note 97, at 1, that legal decision theorists such as Guthrie, Rachlinski
and I have cited in our work, rather than ignoring it. See Guthrie et al., supra note 10, at 806
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This certainly does not mean that errors have not crept into the
policy precepts of legal decision theorists, or that they will not do so.
But it is the proponents of K-T Man, rather than those of Chicago
Man, who have a fighting chance of usefully formulating legal doctrine
based on how people actually make decisions. Nowhere in Mitchell's
articles does he indicate that he would disagree with Pouncy's recent
assessment that "[t]he work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
convincingly demonstrated that the rational choice model of human
motivation was at best grossly incomplete, and at worst, simply
wrong." 30
7
IV. How MUCH INDIVIDUAL VARIATION EXISTS IN HUMAN REASONING
AND WHAT ARE ITS IMPLICATIONS?
Mitchell's second article, his Equal Incompetence article, 308
erects and tears down a giant straw man. He claims that while
economists err by assuming that man is always rational, legal decision
theorists err by assuming that man is always irrational. Contrary to
this claim of assumed "equal incompetence" on behalf of all people in
all situations, legal decision theorists recognize individual and
situational variations. Some of Mitchell's own cited sources make this
explicit by stating that the psychological evidence shows that people
"frequently"30 9 or "often"310 think in ways that depart from accepted
norms of rationality.
311
n.135; Prentice, supra note 36, at 159 n.147; Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 10, at
85 n.117.
307. Pouncy, supra note 6, at 302; see also Dailey, supra note 5, at 1603 ("The effort to revise
the economic model of human decisionmaking with findings from cognitive psychology is an
especially important development in law, where much of the behavior under study has already,
almost by definition, failed the traditional test of rationality .... "); Pouncy, supra note 6, at 308
("The fact that rationality, as a decisional heuristic, cannot meaningfully explain much of human
behavior has been recognized by at least two generations of anthropologists and a generation of
psychologists, but has only recently begun to be acknowledged in doctrinal analysis and in law
and economics jurisprudence.").
308. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12.
309. Id. at 2 n.2 ("Psychologists who study human judgment and choice have learned that
people frequently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in judgment."
(emphasis added) (citing Guthrie et al., supra note 10, at 777)).
310. Id. ("Actual judgments show systematic departures from models of unbiased forecasts,
and actual decisions often violate the axioms of expected utility theory." (emphasis added) (citing
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477
(1998))).
311. See, e.g., James A. Fanto, Quasi-rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors
in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1344 (2001) (stating that while applying
behavioral literature in an analysis of takeover activity, "people act quasi-rationally, not
rationally nor irrationally").
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Mitchell cites to one of my articles in which I responded to a
line of decisions stemming from law and economics scholars/judges
who assumed that auditors would not do anything illegal because to
do so would be irrational in light of the damage it would do to their
reputations if uncovered. 31 2 In addition to arguing that it could, in
fact, be arguably rational for auditors to audit recklessly, 313 I made the
general point that people often think heuristically and are often
subject to a catalogue of biases that can lead to conclusions that are
normatively irrational.314 In that article, I was very careful to point
out where there was evidence that trained auditors were less
susceptible to various biases than were the general run of people, 315
and where there was evidence that they were equally or even more
susceptible.
31 6
In another article that dealt with protecting investors from
fraud, I evaluated a proposal that essentially would allow
sophisticated investors to opt out of any governmental protection from
securities fraud.31 7 Again, I examined a number of heuristics and
biases that potentially lead investors away from the rational path
when they make investment decisions. 318 I was very sensitive to the
argument that experienced investors might not be as susceptible to
reasoning errors as inexperienced investors, so I repeatedly cited
312. Prentice, supra note 36, at 133.
313. Id. at 199-217.
314. Id. at 139-81.
315. Id. at 146 (citing studies showing that auditors may not be as subject to the
confirmation bias as other people, although noting contra studies); id. at 151-52 (citing studies
showing that experienced auditors may commit fewer errors of recall than accounting students,
but also noting contrary studies); id. at 161 (citing studies indicating that auditors are generally
better than others at distinguishing between more objective and less objective sources of
information); id. at 167 (citing studies tending to show that auditors' natural conservatism tends
to minimize some of the adverse effects of their behavioral biases).
316. Id. at 145 (citing studies showing that auditors use rule of thumb heuristics like
everyone else and that they often act inconsistently with Bayesian notions of probability); id. at
148-49 (citing studies tentatively indicating that trained auditors are subject to the hindsight
bias just like lay people); id. at 154-55 (citing several studies indicating that auditors are
generally subject to the overconfidence bias, but noting a few contrary findings); id. at 156-57
(citing studies showing that auditors' judgment can be misled by framing effects); id. at 157
(citing studies showing that "[a]uditors ... are not much letter than lay people at calculating
probabilities" and tend to act inconsistently with Bayes' theorum); id. at 165 (citing studies
showing that even expert auditors are subject to the anchoring and adjustment bias); id. at 167
(citing studies showing that auditors, like others, are influenced by the order in which they
process information); id. at 169 (citing several studies showing that accountants are affected by
the self-serving bias).
317. Robert A. Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations
Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002).
318. Id. at 1454-89.
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studies showing that experienced investors are often (not always)
equally susceptible to such biases.
319
After recounting numerous behavioral weaknesses in human
cognition, I made the point that Mitchell insists legal decision
theorists ignore:
Just as a thorough recounting of an ex-spouse's faults ultimately makes him sound
worse than he really was, the totality of the foregoing description of behavioral research
as it applies to investors makes them sound more dunderheaded than they usually are.
Certainly not all heuristics and biases apply at all times and in all settings to all
investors.
32 0
When Thomas Ulen notes that the "central distinguishing contention"
of the legal decision theory movement is that people are "imperfectly
rational,"321 Mitchell seems to read it as a claim that people are
"perfectly irrational," and this simply is not the case. 322 As Tversky
and Kahneman themselves recently wrote, the heuristics and biases
literature "neither assumes nor entails that people are perceptually or
cognitively inept. '323 Because legal decision scholars are necessarily
sensitive to the fact that the complex human reasoning and judgment
processes are anything but universal and uniform, Mitchell is unable
in either of his articles to meaningfully challenge a single policy
prescription by any legal decision scholar.
Nonetheless, Mitchell's discussion advances the debate about
human decision making and he is no doubt correct when he points out
that
319. Id. at 1455 (noting that research shows that even professional securities analysts do not
choose to acquire most information that is available to them and are thus creatures of bounded
rationality); id. at 1460-61 (noting studies showing that educated people, professionals in
general, and stock analysts in specific tend to be victimized by the overconfidence bias); id. at
1464-65 (referring to evidence showing that most people have difficulty telling when they are
being deceived and noting that scams work on all classes of people); id. at 1469 (citing evidence
that even sophisticated investors tend to credit oral communications more than written
communications and therefore pay insufficient attention to legal disclaimers contained in the
fine print); id. at 1470 (citing studies indicating that professional investors are subject to the
availability bias); id. at 1471 (citing studies showing that professional investors use the
representativeness heuristic); id. at 1476 (citing examples indicating that the phenomenon of
social proof affects sophisticated investors as well as lay investors); id. at 1482 (citing study
showing that financial models assembled by sophisticated investors often improperly ignore low
probability events); id. at 1483 (citing studies showing that securities analysts are subject to the
anchoring and adjustment phenomenon).
320. Id. at 1489 (emphasis added).
321. Thomas S. Ulen, Evolution, Human Behavior, and Law: A Response to Owen Jones's
Dunwody Lecture, 53 FLA. L. REV. 931, 933 (2001).
322. Most behavioral decision theorists would agree with Piattelli-Palmarini's statement
that "[i]rrational, and even exaggeratedly so, we frequently are, but not necessarily." PIATTELLI-
PALMARINI, supra note 65, at 40. See generally Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12.
323. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 93, at 47.
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[D]ifferences in education, training, cognitive capacity, thinking dispositions, sex, and
cultural background across individuals appear to be reliably associated with different
levels of cognitive performance. Furthermore, emotional differences, developmental
differences, and different modes of mental processing appear to be associated with
different levels of cognitive performance within individuals. Therefore, depending on
the characteristics of the individual and the system of thought activated in a particular
decision making situation, the behavior of different groups of individuals and the
behavior of the same individual may very considerably, from perfect rationality to
seeming irrationality.
32 4
Still, people are not always rational, 25 and Mitchell does not claim
that they are. He is correct in pointing out that, conversely, people
are not always irrational. The question is whether departures from
rationality are sufficiently systematic to be useful in making legal
policy. 326 When behavioral research was first imported into the
economics literature, many economists argued that the various
departures from rationality that were increasingly being documented
were sufficiently random that they would cancel each other out and
therefore not require any refinement of the rational man
assumption. 327 However, evidence that many of these heuristics and
biases are systematic rather than random is overwhelming.3 28
324. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 87 (emphasis added).
325. For the few scientists who have argued the "Panglossian notion that people's judgments
are hardly ever biased," Gilovich and Griffin point out that they themselves "use a variety of
methodological safeguards such as double-blind experimental designs to make sure their own
observations are not contaminated by bias," and ask, "Are the observations of scientists so much
more prone to bias than the individuals they study?" Gilovich & Griffin, supra note 158, at 9.
326. An analogy may be drawn to the efficient market debate. It has become obvious over
the years that investors are not always rational. Rather, they are subject to all the heuristics
and biases that Tversky, Kahneman, and others have discovered. See SHILLER, supra note 209,
at 135-68 (explaining how investors fall subject to various cognitive fallacies). Nonetheless,
efficient market advocates have argued that the roughly equal prevalence of under- and over-
reactions demonstrated by investors in the empirical research implies that market prices are
informationally efficient. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns and
Behavioural Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283 (1998). However, Bloomfield and others recently
noted that "[t]his claim is correct only if we are unable to predict the situations in which we will
observe under- and overreactions. Our experiments show that we can make such predictions in
the laboratory, simply by knowing the reliability of investors' information." Robert Bloomfield et
al., Underreactions, Overreactions and Moderated Confidence, 3 J. FIN. MARKETS 113, 130 (2000).
327. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 19 (5th ed. 1998)
("Economics is concerned with explaining and predicting tendencies and aggregates rather than
the behavior of each individual person; and in a reasonably large sample, random deviations
from normal rational behavior will cancel out.").
328. One of Mitchell's primary lines of argument is predicated on the work of Stanovich and
West that tends to show that certain types of problems with "irrationality" in the heuristics and
biases literature are not universal in that people with higher cognitive ability (smarter) or with
better cognitive styles will not be as subject to the studied biases. See Mitchell, Incompetence,
supra note 12, at 142-47. It is well to remember that in a recent book summarizing that line of
studies and a huge amount of behavioral decision literature, Stanovich concluded that errors
tended to be systematic rather than random. STANOVICH, supra note 285, at 252; see also id. at
48 ("As an explanation of the repeated failure of subjects in the heuristics and biases literature to
display normatively appropriate behavior, a strong version of the performance error view does
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Mitchell himself does not seem to believe that the heuristics and
biases that limit man's reasoning ability are random. Indeed, in
introducing the above-quoted paragraph, he states that "a growing
body of empirical research demonstrat[es] that individuals vary
widely, and predictably, in their propensities to act rationally."
329 If
these variations are predictable, then there is reason to believe that
behavioral and cognitive research can lead to fruitful policy
prescriptions.
A. Individual Differences in Rational Behavior
1. Differences Across Individuals
a. Education
To examine Mitchell's specific arguments, consider first his
point that education and training can improve people's normative
reasoning performance. Based on that contention, Mitchell states,
"when the legal decision theorists tell their audience that the educated
and uneducated equally fall prey to cognitive illusions, they are
wrong."330 Mitchell cites no legal decision theorist who has told his or
her audience that educated and uneducated people always fall prey to
the same illusions, and I cannot imagine that one has done so. Nor
does Mitchell cite any legal decision scholar who has based a policy
prescription upon such an assumption.
Mitchell could have cited several theorists who have claimed
that educated and uneducated people usually fall prey to the same
illusions at roughly the same rates, and Mitchell would have great
difficulty discrediting such statements. For example, there are studies
indicating:
0 That knowledge can be a cause, rather than a cure, for
bias, as experienced subjects "are prone to 'illusory
correlations'-the perception of patterns in random data
that conform with a priori theories."
331
not seem tenable. The deviations from normative responding have repeatedly been shown to be
systematic."); Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 42 (noting, in regard to the economic argument that
variations from rationality are random and will cancel each other out, that "empirical research
shows this to be unlikely at best, false at worst").
329. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 86 (emphasis added).
330. Id. at 87.
331. Evans, supra note 165, at 26.
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* That statistical experts are sometimes as prone to
committing the conjunction fallacy as lay people.
332
* That increased knowledge often correlates with
increased overconfidence.
333
* That trained physicians are highly subject to framing
effects. 3
34
" That "many physicians still have difficulties drawing
diagnostic inferences from statistics. 335
* That it is very "difficult for even highly educated people
to make inferences on the basis of probabilities." 336
" That "[e]xperienced researchers are also prone to the
same biases [as laymen] when they think intuitively."337
* That "expert auditors do not behave differently from
novice auditors."
338
* That experts often are no better than laypeople at
making predictions. 339
" That judges, although less susceptible than jurors, are
subject to "a strong hindsight bias effect."340
332. PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, supra note 65, at 66 ("What is really surprising is that there is no
great difference in the average responses from the 'uninformed' subject (that is, one who has no
real notion of the laws of probability) and those of statistical experts. There is in fact a slight
difference between the two groups: those who know something about statistics make more errors
than the uninformed and also more than the experts. Even the experts, in fact, err more than
the uninformed."); see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 93, at 26 (noting that the
conjunction fallacy is committed "not only by statistically naive undergraduates, but even by
highly sophisticated respondents").
333. PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, supra note 65, at 119 (noting that in some studies of
overconfidence, "the discrepancy between correctness of response and overconfidence increases as
the respondent is more knowledgeable").
334. Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1262 (1982) (finding that a significant majority of clinical doctors were
subject to the framing effect). For example, if told that there was a mortality rate of 7% within 5
years of an operation, doctors hesitated to recommend it. But if told there was a 93% survival
rate within 5 years of the operation, they were more inclined to recommend it. See id; see also
Kuhberger, supra note 136, at 42 (noting that experts are subject to framing effects, although
perhaps not to as significant a degree as students).
335. GIGERENZER, supra note 295, at 90.
336. Id. at 37.
337. Tverksy & Kahneman, supra note 116, at 18.
338. Jean B6dard, Expertise in Auditing: Myth or Reality?, 14 ACcT. ORGS. & Soc'Y 113, 121
(1989).
339. ROBIN M. HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION 157 (2001) ("[E]xperts are not necessarily
more accurate than novices when making certain types of predictions.").
340. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 267, at 988; see also Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 66, at
901; W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 36-58 (1999)
(reporting evidence of a further study demonstrating cognitive errors by experienced jurists).
Similar to psychology experiments, studies in experimental economics tend to find little
difference between students and market professionals in laboratory experiments. See Sheryl B.
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* That experts are more biased than people with
intermediate levels of experience in predicting how long
it will take novices to learn the basics of their skill.
3 41
* That overconfidence effects have been documented in
physicians, clinical psychologists, lawyers, engineers,
security analysts, and other experts.
342
" That expert auto mechanics typically consider only a
small subset of the possible faults that can occur in a
car and hence underestimate the probability of a
breakdown.
343
* That professional financial analysts are consistently too
optimistic in estimating earnings, 344  consistently
overreact to new information,3 45 and tend not to learn
from experience.
346
• That professional blackjack players tend to be subject to
the omission bias.
347
* That basketball coaches, players, and experienced play-
by-play commentators believe in the "hot hand" even
though the phenomenon has no statistical validity.
348
Ball & Paula-Ann Cech, Subject Pool Choice and Treatment Effects in Economic Laboratory
Research, 6 RES. EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 239, 257 (1996) (finding after survey of many studies that
only one produced much evidence of differences between students and market professionals).
341. Pamela J. Hinds, The Curse of Expertise: The Effects of Expertise and Debiasing
Methods on Prediction of Novice Performance, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 205, 217
(1999).
342. Griffin & Tversky, supra note 179, at 230; see also GEOFFREY FRIESEN & PAUL A.
WELLER, QUANTIFYING COGNITIVE BIASES IN ANALYST EARNINGS FORECASTS 30 (Univ. of Iowa,
Oct. 2002) (finding that both overconfidence and cognitive dissonance affected financial analyst
decisions and that the impact of overconfidence was "substantial"),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=364700.
343. Baruch Fischhoff et al., Fault Trees: Sensitivity of Estimated Failure Probabilities to
Problem Representation, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 330,
342-43 (1978).
344. Thomas G. Calderon, Predictive Properties of Analysts' Forecasts of Corporate Earnings,
29 MID-ATLANTIC J. BUS. 41, 56 (1993) (noting that his study's "finding that analysts' forecasts
reflect an upward bias is consistent with several prior studies in the area").
345. See De Bondt & Thaler, supra note 211, at 57 ("The same pattern of overreaction found
in the predictions of naive undergraduates is replicated in the predictions of stock market
professionals.").
346. John Jacob et al., Expertise in Forecasting Performance of Security Analysts, 28 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 51, 80 (1999) (noting also that their findings are consistent with Kanheman and
Tversky's heuristics and biases literature).
347. Gideon Keren & Willem A. Wagenaar, On the Psychology of Playing Blackjack:
Normative and Descriptive Considerations with Implications for Decision Theory, 114 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 133, 142 (1985) (suggesting regret as a potential explanation for
why blackjack players "stand" with 16 or less even though the odds are better if they take
another card because studies show people regret bad results that stem from action more than
bad results that stem from inaction).
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* That even with extensive experience, people have
difficulty overcoming the winner's curse.
349
Clearly, even experts with worlds of education often find
themselves subject to the same biases as the average person,
Mitchell's protests notwithstanding. That said, experts do sometimes
make decisions differently than lay people, 350 and legal decision
theorists are well aware of this fact.
i. Deductive Reasoning
Of all the heuristics and biases that have been studied,
Mitchell concentrates on only a few, beginning with deductive
reasoning. 351 Mitchell cites my statement regarding the confirmation
bias352 that people "tend to preferentially solicit evidence that confirms
their hypothesis. Disconfirming evidence gets the short end of the
perceptual stick."353 Mitchell implies that my conclusion is wrong,
354
but there is substantial evidence, cited in my article, indicating that
even scientists, trained auditors, and statisticians are subject to the
confirmation bias. Scientists reviewing reports find those reports that
agree with the scientists' preexisting opinions on the subject matter to
be more persuasive than reports taking positions with which the
scientists disagree.355 Experienced auditors are more sensitive to
348. Gilovich et al., supra note 95, at 616; Koehler & Conley, supra note 95.
349. See Yoella Bereby-Meyer & Brit Grosskopf, Overcoming the Winner's Course: An
Adaptive Learning Experience 24-27 (AOM Conflict Mgmt. Div. 2002 Mtgs. No. 13496, Aug.
2002) (finding that it is very difficult to debias the winner's curse which is, of course, the
tendency to overpay in an auction scenario), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=324201.
350. Markman & Medin, supra note 195, at 451-53 (citing studies).
351. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 87-90.
352. Generally speaking, the confirmation bias is the tendency to seek out and process
information that confirms rather than disconfirms our pre-existing opinions. D. Michael
Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002). For example, if exposed to
two contradictory studies regarding the death penalty, death penalty opponents will tend to find
the one that undermines use of the death penalty to be the more convincing and probative,
whereas death penalty supporters will tend to find the one that supports use of the death penalty
to be more convincing and probative. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2108 (1979).
353. Prentice, supra note 36, at 145-46, quoted in Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at
88 n.50.
354. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 88 (suggesting that such a conclusion might
arise if a behavioralist read only a few studies)
355. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of
Evidence Quality, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 47 (1993)
(finding that scientists judge research reports that agree with their previously held views to be of
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information that confirms their initial hypotheses than to information
that disconfirms those hypotheses.35 6 Bazerman surveyed the studies
in the area and concluded that "the tendency to exclude disconfirming
information in the search process is not eliminated by the formal
scientific training that is expected of statisticians."357
Mitchell focuses primarily on just one area of the confirmation
bias-experiments involving the Wason card test.358 Most subjects err
by turning over cards that potentially confirm the rule, rather than
cards that would definitively disconfirm it. Mitchell cites a study
finding that 48% of subjects with a Master's degree or higher
educational attainment correctly answered the problem. 359  Four
observations are in order. First, more than half of the highly educated
subjects in this study erred. Second, other studies have found that
highly educated people did much worse than this on the Wason card
test. 360 Third, the Wason card studies are but a small part of the
evidence supporting the confirmation bias and Mitchell does not
address all of the other studies that show such a bias in many
settings. If Mitchell has any evidence indicating that scientists,
judges, and other highly educated persons do not tend toward
gathering information that supports (rather than rejects) their
higher quality than reports that disagree, and citing several other studies finding similar
results).
356. See E. Michael Bamber et al., An Examination of the Descriptive Validity of the Belief-
Adjustment Model and Alternative Attitudes to Evidence in Auditing, 22 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC'Y
249, 263 (1997) ("[I]n the evaluation of evidence auditors are confirmation prone in that they are
more sensitive to evidence that confirms the initial hypothesis. This tendency holds over
experience levels (staff and advanced senior), and over contexts that do and do not involve
irregularities.").
357. See BAZERMAN, supra note 58, at 35-36 (citing several studies finding a confirmation
bias among lay people and even statisticians).
358. Stephen Hoch and Judith Tschirgi describe this abstract logic test in the following
manner:
The subject is given a rule, "If a card has a vowel on its letter side, then it has an even
number on its number side," and is shown four cards face up: A, K, 18, 5. The subject
has to decide which card(s) must be turned over to prove the truth or falsity of the
rule. This task corresponds to the material-implication rule of the form, "If p then q."
The cards A and K represent antecedents (p and -p, respectively), and the cards 18
and 5 represent the consequents (q and -q). The solution is to turn over A and 5 (p
and -q), because the rule is violated only by cards pairing a vowel with an odd number
[i.e., A,5 (p,-q) and 5,A (-q, p)]. Most studies have found that only about 10% of the
subjects can solve abstract forms of the problem.
Hoch & Tschirgi, supra note 244, at 453 (citing P.C. Wason, Reasoning, in NEW HORIZONS IN
PSYCHOLOGY (B. Foss ed., 1966)).
359. Id., cited in Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 89 n.53.
360. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Beyond Intuition and Instinct Blindness:
Toward an Evolutionarily Rigorous Cognitive Science, 50 COGNITION 41, 62-63 (1994)
(concluding that "even formal training in logical reasoning does little to boost performance" on
the Wason test); Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 205, at 399-400 (finding that a majority of
statisticians "failed to make the appropriate response" in the Wason test).
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opinions and processing that information in a confirming rather than
disconfirming way, he does not cite it.361 Fourth, the fact that people
with Masters' degrees and Doctorates err in their approach to the
Wason card problem "only" slightly more than half the time (as
opposed to 90% for some other groups) 362 does not mean that legal
policy and analysis cannot benefit substantially from information
about the confirmation bias. Many legal rules are aimed at protecting
more vulnerable groups of society. The unconscionability doctrine, for
example, will not be invoked to aid educated, sophisticated
consumers. 363 That does not mean that we do not need such a doctrine
or that behavioral decision experiments cannot inform us as to its
proper boundaries and applications.
364
ii. Inductive Reasoning
Next, Mitchell addresses inductive reasoning, indicting legal
decision scholars for their claim that people are not good "intuitive
statisticians."3 65  He suggests that some people are good statistical
reasoners and that others can benefit from training.366 There is,
however, very strong evidence that while Chicago Man is skilled at
probabilistic reasoning, most flesh-and-blood men and women
resemble K-T Man. 367 Because of the availability heuristic, people
tend to believe that available and salient risks are much more
significant than statistics would indicate.368 When strong emotions
361. The Wason test is one setting in which we can observe whether decision makers tend to
use confirming or disconfirming strategies of hypothesis testing. But it is only one setting, and it
is irrelevant to another important aspect of the confirmation bias-the tendency to interpret new
evidence as confirming rather than disconfirming previously held opinions. See, e.g., John M.
Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 28 (1983) (finding that when subjects witness a child taking an academic
test, "[tihose who believed the child came from a high socioeconomic class reported that her
performance indicated a high ability level, whereas those who believed the child came from a low
socioeconomic class reported that the identical performance indicated a substantially lower level
of ability"); Koehler, supra note 355, at 28 (scientists reviewing reports); Lord et al., supra note
352, at 2098 (subjects studying arguments relating to the death penalty).
362. See supra note 358.
363. See, e.g., Riesett v. W.B. Doner & Co., 293 F.3d 164, 173 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the unconscionability doctrine is irrelevant for contract between sophisticated parties); Stenke v.
Masland Dev. Co., 394 N.W.2d 418, 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (same).
364. See generally Marrow, supra note 288 (using behavioral concepts to analyze
unconscionability issues).
365. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 90-91.
366. Id.
367. GIGERENZER, supra note 295, at 37 (noting that it is "difficult for even highly educated
people to make inferences on the basis of probabilities").
368. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 60-62 (1995) (explaining how the availability heuristic can induce lay people to
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(including hope and fear) are involved in decisions, people often
attempt little assessment of probability at all.3 69 Chicago Man would
attend to base rates in most decision making, but the evidence as to
whether most real people do so is very equivocal.370 Rational decision
makers would incorporate new information consistent with Bayes'
Theorem, but again the evidence is very strong that most decision
makers do not do so. 3 71 Instead, they tend to overreact to small
risks, 372 although at the very far extremes of the probability scale they
tend to ignore probabilities completely.373  They systematically
overestimate the likelihood of conjunctive events and underestimate
the likelihood of disjunctive events.374 They often believe, irrationally,
overestimate certain types of risks and urging policymakers to educate the public). See generally
BAZERMAN, supra note 58, at 7 (noting that when Peter Lynch ran Fidelity's Mutual Fund he
bought securities of bland firms because the more well-known a firm was, the more its stock was
likely to be overvalued); Donald V. Moser, The Effects of Output Interference, Availability, and
Accounting Information on Investors' Predictive Judgments, 64 ACCT. REV. 433, 444 (1989)
(finding availability bias in investors' predictive earnings judgments); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 8, at 164, 178 (concluding that "production of a compelling
scenario is likely to constrain future thinking").
369. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1044
(2003) ("[Wlhen strong emotions are involved.., large-scale variations in probabilities will
matter little-even when those variations unquestionably should matter."). Sunstein relies on
the studies of Rottenstreich & Hsee. See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher Hsee, Money,
Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185 (2001),
cited in Sunstein, supra, at 1044.
370. Koehler makes a strong argument that the "base rate fallacy" is overstated. Koehler,
supra note 97, at 2 ("Not only is there little evidence that base rates are routinely ignored, but a
critical review of the recent literature shows that base rates usually influence judgments and
often do so in reasonable ways."); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Myth, 49
PSYCOLOQUY 1, 1.2 (1993), http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000343 (similar).
However, many psychologists disagree. See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 58, at 19-20; ROBYN M.
DAWES, EVERYDAY IRRATIONALITY: How PSEUDO-SCIENTISTS, LUNATICS, AND THE REST OF US
SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL TO THINK RATIONALLY 91 (2001); REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES,
RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 111-13 (2001); PLOUS, supra note 135, at 115-16.
371. See generally HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 370, at 111-13 (summarizing numerous
studies, some done by Kahneman & Tversky); Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human
Information Processing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 8, at 359, 359 ("It turns
out that opinion change is very orderly, and usually proportional to numbers calculated from
Bayes's theorem-but it is insufficient in amount."); Joseph F. Funaro, An Empirical Analysis of
Five Descriptive Models for Cascaded Inference, 14 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 186, 186 (1975) (noting that most studies find that "intuitive opinion revisions are
conservative in comparison to the optimal revisions specified by Bayes' theorem").
372. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1173 (1992)
(noting that empirical evidence indicates that people tend to "overreact to small risks of which
they are somewhat aware").
373. PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, supra note 65, at 130.
374. HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 370, at 137 (citing studies). Conjunctive events are the
combination of two simple events, say throwing a 1 and a 6 with two dice. Id. at 169. Disjunctive
events are more inclusive, such as throwing a 1 or a 6, or both. Id.
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in the gambler's fallacy 375 and the "hot hand."376 They misunderstand
the concept of regression toward the mean.3 7 7 They suffer from
denominator blindness, in that they are likely to view four accidents
out of 100 products sold as quite similar to four accidents out of 1,000
products sold.
378
Critics of the heuristics and biases literature hang much of
their criticism on studies indicating that when problems framed as
probabilities are reframed as frequencies, people often do much
better.379 However, as Mitchell would admit, there is also substantial
evidence that reframing questions as frequencies often does not
improve problem solving.380  Furthermore, reformatting questions
from probabilities to frequencies does not make the limitation on
human decision making go away, nor does it help much when it is
clear that as people go through life they will often be faced with
375. The gambler's fallacy occurs when someone sees a flipped coin land tails up four times
in a row. PLOUS, supra note 135, at 113. Many people believe that on the next flip it is more
likely than not that the coin will land heads up. Id.
376. The "hot hand" error is the belief that a basketball player who has hit a few shots in a
row now has the "hot hand" and is likely to continue to shoot at an average above his usual rate.
Even professional coaches and players believe in the phenomenon, although it has been
thoroughly debunked. See Gilovich et al., supra note 95, at 601-13; Koehler & Conley, supra note
95.
377. HOGARTH, supra note 339, at 124; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict
Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 46 (Kenneth J.
Arrow et al. eds., 1995). For example, many people believe fervently in the "Sports Illustrted
jinx," the notion that a player or team that appears on the cover of this sports magazine is likely
to suffer bad luck. But the players or team are often chosen for the cover because of some
extraordinary performance, so when they revert to their normal performance it seems like they
have been jinxed. See JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMETICIAN PLAYS THE STOCK MARKET 106
(2003) (explaining the so-called jinx)
378. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Denominator Blindness Effect: Accident
Frequencies and the Misjudgment of Recklessness 22-23 (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper
No. 387, Oct. 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=357160.
379. The most interesting view is based in evolutionary psychology, suggesting that humans
are not well-suited to using probability theory, which was invented only a few hundred years
ago. However, they are arguably better at using frequencies, because this they have been doing
while making decisions for tens of thousands of years. See Gary L. Brase et al., Individuation,
Counting, and Statistical Inference: The Role of Frequency and Whole-Object Representations in
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 127 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3, 4 (1998).
380. See Jonathan St. B.T. Evans et al., Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical
Word Problems, 77 COGNITION 197, 212 (2000) (finding that use of frequencies improves
probabilistic reasoning only if framed in a very specific way that makes the problem easier to
understand, and concluding that "our findings cast serious doubts upon the widely cited claim
that frequency formats facilitate correct statistical reasoning in quantitative word problems");
Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using
Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271, 289 (2000) (finding that use of frequency formats for ratings by
psychologists and psychiatrists for likelihood of future violence and assessed risk of violence does
not necessarily improve decision making by minimizing format effects of response scales).
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problems framed as probabilities. 38 1  The evidence regarding the
difficulties people face in assessing probabilities does point us toward
a useful policy prescription arising from behavioral research-that
required disclosures should be framed as frequencies rather than
probabilities wherever possible or, better yet, presented in both
formats.
Mitchell really does not dispute that people are generally
inadequate statistical reasoners. Rather, his main point is that,
contrary to some studies, there is definitely evidence that a person
trained in statistics has a greater likelihood of using statistical
reasoning and a better quality of reasoning. 3 2 Nothing could better
illustrate the value of legal decision theory. Whereas the rational man
model simply assumes that everyone effectively reasons inductively,
behavioral evidence indicates that people do not, but that they can
381. As Stanovich notes:
I am living in a technological society where I must: decide which HMO to join based
on just such statistics, figure out whether to invest in a Roth IRA, decide what type of
mortgage to purchase, figure out what type of deductible to get on my auto insurance,
decide whether to trade in a car or sell it myself, decide whether to lease or to buy,
think about how to apportion my TIAA/CREF retirement funds, and decide whether I
would save money by joining a book club. And I must make all of these decisions
based on information represented in a manner for which my brain is not adapted (in
none of these cases have I coded individual frequency information from my own
person [sic] experience). In order to reason normatively in all of these domains (in
order to maximize my own personal utility), I am going to have to deal with
probabilistic information represented in nonfrequentist terms-in representations
that the cognitive ecologists have shown are different from my well-adapted
algorithms for dealing with frequency information.
... The problem is that in a symbol-oriented postindustrial society, we are presented
with paper-and-pencil problems all the time, and much of what we know about the
world comes not from the perception of actual events but from abstract information
preprocessed, prepackaged, and condensed into symbolic codes such as probabilities,
percentages, tables, and graphs (the voluminous statistical information routinely
presented in USA Today comes to mind).
STANOVICH, supra note 285, at 206-07.
Koehler and colleagues make the same point, suggesting that we must
accept that subjective probabilities are not only natural, but inescapable. A historical
review of the use of concepts related to "chance" in more than 500 years of English
literature noted that "[w]ith one exception, all quotations found.., are subjective
probabilities. They all are expressions of degrees of belief, at least in a poetic sense,
that an event will happen." Consider the following statement, taken from a recent
financial column: "Three months ago, I might have put the risk of an Asia-wide credit
crunch ... at less than 10%, now I'd say it is approaching 30% to 40%." How can this
statement about a unique, not to say unprecedented, event, be reworded in frequency
terms?
Koehler et al., supra note 186, at 715 (citation omitted).
382. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 37 (citing Richard E. Nisbett et al., The Use of
Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 339, 358 (1983)).
Mitchell is careful not to overstate his claim in this area, for Nisbett, Mitchell's primary source,
admits that "Kahneman and Tversky have shown repeatedly that statistical expertise provides
no such guarantee against errors [in inductive reasoning]." Nisbett et al., supra, at 359 (citation
omitted).
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improve with training. This suggests that judges should be given at
least minimal statistical training to improve their statistical
reasoning. It might further suggest that in certain cases, jurors
should be given such training as well, because Mitchell cites sources
indicating that substantial improvements can be gained with minimal
training when that training is based on psychological principles rather
than on the traditional statistical approach.
38 3
Mitchell's references to behavioral studies showing that
training in economics can improve cost-benefit reasoning38 4 and help
subjects avoid sunk-cost effects 38 5 also point to policy prescriptions,
such as requiring courses in economics in college and perhaps high
school. Mitchell is hoist on his own petard, for the very behavioral
studies that Mitchell himself references provide important insights
into legal policy making that rational man economic analysis does not.
If one can set aside Mitchell's inaccurate claim that legal decision
theorists claim or believe that people are universally, uniformly, and
apparently irreparably irrational, one can gain extremely useful
insights from his excellent discussion of the nuances of the behavioral
literature.
b. Cognitive Capacity
Mitchell next mines the controversial (but, in my view,
substantially accurate) research of Keith Stanovich and Richard West,
383. See Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 92 n. 65 (citing Peter Sedlmeier & Gerd
Gigerenzer, Teaching Bayesian Reasoning in Less Than Two Hours, 130 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: GEN. 380, 396 (2001)). Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer argued that a psychological
approach to teaching Bayesian reasoning can greatly improve upon the traditional statistical
approach to teaching the subject. Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, supra, at 396.
384. No behavioral decision theorist that I know of would claim that people with professional
training in economics could not reason more consistently with economic principles than people
with no such training. Apparently, people with such training do, as expected, reason more
consistently. See Richard Larrick et al., Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in Everyday
Life, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 362, 365-69 (1990).
385. In making decisions, people tend (irrationally, according to economists) to value sunk
costs. See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 124 (1985). The sunk cost phenomenon appears to
affect how NBA teams handle their draft picks. See Barry M. Staw & Ha Hoang, Sunk Costs in
the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time and Survival in Professional Basketball, 40
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 474, 487 (1995) ("Regressions showed that the higher a player was taken in the
college draft, the more time he was given on the court, even after controlling for such other
logical predictors of playing time, such as performance, injury, and trade status."). And it has
been suggested as an influence upon United States decision making during the Viet Nam war.
See MICHAEL HOWARD, THE CAUSES OF WAR 232 (1984) (quoting Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara as writing "[w]e could not simply walk away from an enterprise involving two




who have provided evidence that persons with higher cognitive
capacity are significantly more likely to give normative responses in
most of the heuristics and biases tests commonly used by behavioral
psychologists. 3 6 Generally speaking, Stanovich and West find that
subjects with greater cognitive capacity do better on statistical
reasoning tests, the Wason selection task, tests for framing effects,
tests for the conjunction fallacy, and others. 38 7 They tend not to do
better on tests involving the false consensus effect, the overconfidence
effect, and the influence of noncausal base rates. 388
The results Stanovich and West find are very interesting and
certainly support the uncontroversial point that not all people are
equally subject to all heuristics and biases. These findings do not
undermine traditional notions of K-T Man, however. Note first that
although subjects with greater cognitive capacity often do better on
these tests than subjects who are not as "smart," these "smarter"
subjects nonetheless often err. They are subject to many of the effects
and biases and use many of the heuristics identified by Kahneman
and Tversky, although they are not as affected as people with less
cognitive capacity. Stanovich concludes that cognitive capacity
differences can account for systematic discrepancies between actual
performance and normative models to only a "moderate extent."38 9
After performing some of the most important experiments in the area
and reporting on them in a recent book, Stanovich remains strongly in
the K-T camp, as the ultimate sentence in his book notes that "[i]t
does seem that some human behavior is systematically irrational."
390
Second, the findings of Stanovich and West strongly bolster the
mainstream behavioral psychologists against the attack of some who
have claimed that the results Kahneman, Tversky, and their
collaborators have labeled as their normative benchmark are not
actually normative. These critics argue that it is the subjects who are
getting it right and the psychologists who are getting it wrong. 391
386. See Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 94-95 (citing numerous works by
Stanovich and West).
387. STANOVICH, supra note 285, at 39-40.
388. Id. Stanovich and West found similar differences between groups of people with
different thinking dispositions. Id. at 153.89.
389. Id. at 210.
390. Id. at 252. More recently, Stanovich and West concluded that their findings "support
the notion that the normative/descriptive discrepancies that remain after computational
limitations have been accounted for reflect a systematically suboptimal intentional-level
psychology." Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8,
at 421, 440.
391. Mitchell raises this question himself. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1941-
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However, if smarter people side with the psychologists, the critics are
probably in error.
392
Third, this information that individuals vary in their capacity
to make decisions rationally is very useful information.
"[C]onventional economic theories as exposited do not discriminate
among types of individuals," 393 but psychologists and legal decision
theorists do. The law already often takes into account the fact that
children or the elderly or the mentally infirm may be uniquely
vulnerable. 394 This additional information may allow us to sharpen
the protective focus of the law. More obviously, and as noted earlier,
not all consumers need be equally subject to framing effects or other
reasoning limitations for legal decision makers to take into account
how marketers can use those effects to market tobacco and other
products.395 All consumers need not be equally vulnerable to sharp
practices for the unconscionability doctrine to be enforced to protect
those who are. Not all citizens need be subject to the status quo bias
for a legislature to make a big change in consumer choices by altering
the status quo. Not all jurors need be equally vulnerable to the
hindsight bias for it to be sensible to give an instruction to attempt to
mitigate its effects.
As with the previous section, Mitchell should be congratulated
for advancing the debate about the role of behavioral psychology
research in the legal realm. His articles, contrary to his warnings,
make this body of research appear more, not less, valuable, as it will
392. STANOVICH, supra note 285, at 66 ("Yet despite the normative controversies surrounding
all of these tasks, each one displayed the same type of association with cognitive ability-more
intelligent individuals were more likely to give the response traditionally considered
normative.").
More recently, Stanovich and West noted that "we should resist the conclusion that
individuals with more computational power are systematically computing the nonnormative
response. Such an outcome would be an absolute first in a psychometric field that is 100 years
and thousands of studies old." Stanovich & West, supra note 390, at 427 (citations omitted).
393. David M. Grether, Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic,
95 Q.J. ECON. 537, 555 (1980).
394. Obviously legislatures pass special rules to protect children from exploitative
advertising and pornography. See Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000);
Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children from Joe Camel and His Friends:
A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46
EMORY L.J. 479, 487-89 (1997) (describing a raft of state and local laws aimed at protecting
children from tobacco advertising). Courts use doctrines such as unconscionability and undue
influence to protect the elderly in contract cases. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532,
535 (Tex. App. 1980) (refusing to enforce an unconscionable contract against an elderly widow).
Rules requiring contractual capacity protect the mentally infirm.
395. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 724 (1999) (arguing that manufacturers will be
driven by market forces to exploit consumer weaknesses).
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help identify the specific cases where people are particularly subject to
biases.
2. Differences Within Individuals
Mitchell's next point is that "[i]ndividuals vary over time in
their propensity to engage in rational behavior." 396  He cites
substantial psychological literature to this effect; legal decision
theorists are thus also aware of this fact and take it into account in
their policy prescriptions.
As Mitchell recognizes, "the most-studied factor with regard to
intra-individual changes in rational behavior is affective state."3 97 The
Chicago Man model has no explanation for the effect that emotion has
on decision making, 398 but psychologists are well aware of it, 39 9 and
legal scholars interested in behavioral theory have often taken it into
account. Sunstein, for example, recently cited the work of
Rottenstreich and Hsee, who found in a series of very interesting
studies that when strong emotions are involved, people often attempt
little assessment of probability at all.40 0 The strong fears they have of
a particularly salient risk may lead them to spend large sums of
money to try to avoid it, even though the probability of it occurring is
low. 40 1 The strong hopes they have of winning the lottery may cause
them to spend substantial sums of money on lottery tickets, even
though the chances of winning the lottery are vanishingly thin.
Sunstein explained the implications of this affect heuristic for
environmental regulation, which include the fact that we tend to
overregulate the risks that people respond to emotionally and to
396. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 98.
397. Id. at 99.
398. But see Richard H. McAdams, Accounting for Norms, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 625, 629-30
(noting that some economists are starting to modify the traditional rational man model, infusing
it with such complexities as emotion, altruism, habit, and risk misperception). However,
Blumenthal notes that when scholars begin incorporating the impact of emotions on decision
making into their models they tend to "fundamentally undercut their own arguments and
proposals." Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 25.
399. See Slovic et al., supra note 94, at 398 ("[T]he importance of affect is being recognized
increasingly by decision researchers."); see also ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR:
EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 3-19 (1994) (discussing a landmark study of how
physical brain damage can leave logical reasoning intact but nonetheless impair effective
decision making by injuring centers of the brain controlling emotion).
400. See Sunstein, supra note 369, at 1010, (citing Rottenstreich & Hsee, supra note 369, at
185).
401. See Slovic et al., supra note 94, at 409 (noting that this affect heuristic helps explain
"why societal concerns about hazards such as nuclear power and exposure to extremely small
amounts of toxic chemicals fail to recede in response to information about the very small
probabilities of the feared consequences from such hazards").
[Vol. 56:16631738
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
underregulate greater risks that do not prompt such a strong affective
response.4
02
Studies indicate that when cigarette advertising (by use of the
word "natural" or by featuring scenes of nature) increases the positive
affect associated with smoking, it also reduces potential smokers'
perception of the risk of cigarette smoking.403 Hanson and Kysar have
explained how marketers, especially tobacco marketers, have
manipulated the affect heuristic (and others) in a way that may justify
more legal liability and regulation. 404
Jonathan Koehler and I recently noted how the strong affective
response that arises in situations of counterfactual ("what if. .. ")
thinking may influence judgments. 405 Exploring extensive literature in
counterfactual thinking40 6 and anticipated regret theory,40 7 we noted
that studies have shown that mock jurors will tend to impose stiffer
punishments against muggers who attack a person on her way home
and to return higher damage awards against careless drivers who hit
a person on her way home if the victim is taking an unusual route
home.408 In an unusual setting, it is easy for jurors to imagine "if only
she had been taking her usual route home, this wouldn't have
happened." This counterfactual thinking increases the jurors'
emotional response to the facts of the case and, in turn, affects their
judgments. This is evidence of a normality bias. Other studies show
402. Sunstein, supra note 369, at 1046 ("If probabilities are neglected, especially when
emotions are engaged, then the principle will operate through excessive public concern with
certain low-probability hazards."). One of Kahneman and Tversky's most persistent critics, Gerd
Gigerenzer, agrees with Sunstein that people generally misperceive risks. GIGERENZER, supra
note 295, at 238 ("John Q. Public does not always fear the situations that are actually most likely
to hurt or kill him and other people.").
403. See generally Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and
Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000).
404. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1420, 1467-1565 (1999).
405. See Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 616-21 (2003).
406. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
407. According to Loomes & Sugden:
The essential notion underlying regret theory is that people tend to compare their
actual situations with the ones they would have been in, had they made different
choices in the past. If they realize that a different choice would have led to a better
outcome, people may experience the painful sensation of regret; if the alternative
would have led to a worse outcome, they may experience a pleasurable sensation we
call "rejoicing." when faced with new choice situations, people remember their
previous experiences and form expectations about the rejoicing and regret that the
present alternatives might entail. They then take these expectations into account
when making their decisions.
Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, A Rationale for Preference Reversal, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 428,
428 (1983).
408. See Prentice & Koehler, supra note 405, at 616-21.
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that when intent, injury, and all other factors are held constant, jurors
will punish more severely defendants whose acts were active rather
than passive (for example, the physician who unplugged the life
support machine as opposed to the physician who failed to plug it in
when she had the chance to).40 9 This is evidence of an omission bias.
Koehler and I experimentally tested the effect of these two biases in
an attempt to determine which of the biases (which reinforce one
another in most settings) would trump the other in a factual situation
where they conflicted. 410 We noted the importance of affect to decision
making and most definitely did not assume that all individuals are
equally irrational in all situations, for we sought to determine in
which settings which bias would predominate.
As Mitchell himself notes, other legal decision theorists such as
Chris Guthrie 411 and Russell Korobkin 412 have also studied the
implications of regret theory for legal decision making. Mitchell
concedes that "[b]y bringing regret aversion into the decision calculus,
we complicate the model of litigation behavior but also may gain
descriptive accuracy, for the avoidance and achievement of certain
affective states appears to be an important part of many decisions,
particularly settlement decisions."413  Descriptive accuracy is
indispensable to effective policy making. Because psychologists have a
greater interest in the impact of affect on human decision making
than do economists, their descriptions of how people make decisions
are likely to be more accurate than economic models.
Mitchell concludes the section by arguing that experimental
simulations should be supplemented "with observational research,
archival and case studies, and interviews and surveys of actual
jurors."4 1 4 I agree. Indeed, the behavioral literature is rich with
varied approaches to studying similar problems, and a strength of the
new legal decision theory research is that all of these various types of
methodologies can be tapped to improve descriptive and explanatory
accuracy. 415 Psychologists in general recognize the benefit of tapping
409. See Prentice & Koehler, supra note 405, at 587.
410. Id.
411. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation
Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43.
412. Korobkin, supra note 254, at 1583.
413. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 104.
414. Id. at 104-05.
415. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS, supra note 73. This large tome begins
with a significant section on research design and issues of inference validity. It then explores
numerous types of research methodology, including behavioral observation and coding, small
group research, event-sampling, survey research, content analysis, narrative analysis, and
others. Finally, it discusses various data analysis strategies. This book and numerous others set
forth the wide variety of research designs used by psychologists to develop the literature being
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into many different forms of supporting evidence. 416 Contrary to
Mitchell's implication, so do legal decision theorists.
Consider my article regarding the self-serving bias. 417 My
essential point was that we should be very wary of allowing large
accounting firms to offer all manner of nonaudit services, including
legal services, to audit clients because the self-serving bias would
create a strong danger that the firms would attempt to please their
audit clients in order to preserve the stream of nonaudit revenue.418
In making that point I used several forms of evidence to bolster my
argument in just the manner that Mitchell suggests.
After introducing the concept of the self-serving bias
and noting the debate regarding its origins (cognitive vs.
motivational), I reported a wide range of studies using
various forms of empiricism that found self-serving
behavior by attorneys, physicians, investment bankers,
securities analysts, expert witnesses, scientists, and
judges.419 For example, many studies have documented
that physicians order more tests and longer treatments
when they refer patients to laboratory facilities that
they own than when they refer patients to facilities
owned by others.420
tapped by Guthrie, Korobkin, Langevoort, Rachlinski, Sunstein, and others. See, e.g., RESEARCH
METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY (Glynis M. Breakwell et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); ROBERT ROSENTHAL ET
AL., CONTRASTS AND EFFECT SIZES IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: A CORRELATIONAL APPROACH
(2000); ROBERT ROSENTHAL & RALPH L. ROSNOW, ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH:
METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS (1984); ROBERT ROSENTHAL, JUDGMENT STUDIES: DESIGN,
ANALYSIS, AND META-ANALYSIS (1987); HOI K. SUEN & DONALD ARY, ANALYZING QUANTITATIVE
BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION DATA (1989).
416. STANOVICH, supra note 64, at 119 ("[P]sychologists should always be concerned that
their experimental conclusions not rely too heavily on any one method or particular subject
population.").
417. Prentice, supra note 211, at 1597.
418. Id. at 1668-70.
419. Id. at 1620-29.
420. See Thomas L. Carson, Conflicts of Interest, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 387, 394 (1994) ("[W]hen
physicians are paid according to how much work they do for their patients, many physicians
succumb to the temptation to provide their patients with unnecessary, even dangerous
treatments."); Thomas S. Crane, The Problem of Physician Self-Referral Under the Medicare and
Medicaid Antikickback Statute, 268 JAMA 85, 86 (1992) (citing studies by the Office of the
Inspector General and the Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board showing how physicians
respond to financial incentives in their treatment practices); David Hemenway et al., Physicians'
Responses to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a For-Profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1059, 1062 (1990) (finding that when compensation of physicians changed from a
flat fee to a bonus system where they could earn extra revenue by ordering laboratory tests for
patients on machines owned by employers, physicians increased their orders for lab tests by
23%); Bruce J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office Practice-
Comparison of Self-Referring and Radiologists-Referring Physicians, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1604, 1606 (1990) (finding that self-referring physicians employed diagnostic imaging at least
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* Then I reported the results of several laboratory studies
of accountants doing nonaudit work, such as tax and
consulting, that revealed a self-serving bias. For
example, some of the studies noted that tax
professionals' judgments as to the appropriateness of a
tax treatment varied greatly, depending on whether
they learned that a particular position was favored by
their client.
421
* Turning to auditors specifically, I reported the results of
a number of audit laboratory studies that reflected a
self-serving bias.422  Most of the studies involved
practicing auditors and almost all found a self-serving
bias. For example, one study presented auditors with
an ambiguous situation and "found that the auditors
acted in a manner consistent with the self-serving bias
in that they used aggressive interpretations of
accounting standards to allow their clients to take
aggressive positions when the auditors' engagement risk
(risk of fines, censure, litigation, loss of reputation, etc.)
was moderate, but used conservative interpretations of
the same standards in order to require conservative
positions by their clients when the auditors' engagement
risk was high."4
23
* Noting specifically that laboratory results cannot be
assumed to always reproduce the real world, I examined
several archival and case studies of actual auditor
behavior,424 including Wright and Wright's examination
four times as frequently than their colleagues who referred patients to others); Bruce J. Hillman
et al., Physicians' Utilization and Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic Imaging in a Medicare
Population, 268 JAMA 2050, 2050 (1992) ("[Slelf-referral resulted in 1.7 to 7.7 times more
frequent performance of imaging examinations than radiologist-referral."); Jean M. Mitchell &
Elton Scott, Physician Ownership of Physical Therapy Services, 268 JAMA 2055, 2055 (1992)
(finding that visits per patient were 39% to 45% higher in facilities where referring physicians
were joint venturers and that more revenues were generated from patients with well-paying
insurance).
421. See C. Brian Cloyd & Brian C. Spilker, The Influence of Client Preferences on Tax
Professionals' Search for Judicial Precedents, Subsequent Judgments, and Recommendations, 74
ACCT. REV. 299, 301 (1999) (finding that one-half of subject tax professionals recommended the
client-preferred position even though a panel of experts concluded that there was only a 14%
chance it would be sustained if challenged).
422. Prentice, supra note 211, at 1640-44.
423. Id. at 1642 (citing Karl Hackenbrack & Mark W. Nelson, Auditors' Incentives and Their
Application of Financial Accounting Standards, 71 ACCT. REV. 43 (1996)).
424. Id. at 1644-49.
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of 186 sample audits, 425 Krishnan and Krishnan's study
using data from 1,837 public companies, 426 and Citron
and Taffler's examination of ten years' worth of going
concern qualifications in the United Kingdom.427 These
studies and most of several others that I cited,
performed in a number of settings and in different
countries, found a strong self-serving bias.428  For
example, despite the former Big Five firms' claims to
Congress that litigation risk forced them to resign
accounts, Scholz found that they did so only if the client
was in relatively poor financial condition; if the client
was bringing in a large stream of revenue and was not
in danger of failing, litigation risk was not correlated
with resignation.
429
0 I then examined several studies, some arising from
laboratory experiments and some not, that studied the
psychology of individual auditors in an attempt to
explain why it might be in their self-interest to coddle
an audit client even though it was not in the audit firm's
rational economic interest to do so. 430
In short, I used a variety of types of empirical studies
conducted by a variety of scholars in a variety of settings, including
both the laboratory and the real world, to undermine the simplistic
notion promulgated by law-and-economics judges that courts act
appropriately when they simply assume that auditors placed in an
inherently conflicted situation will, because of the reputational
425. Arnold Wright & Sally Wright, An Examination of Factors Affecting the Decision to
Waive Audit Adjustments, 12 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 15, 33 (1997) (finding a "strong positive
association. . . between the likelihood [that audit firms waived an adjustment] and client size, a
surrogate for audit fees").
426. Jagan Krishnan & Jayanthi Krishnan, The Role of Economic Trade-Offs in the Audit
Opinion Decision: An Empirical Analysis, 11 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 565, 583 (1996) (finding
that an audit firm is more likely to issue a qualified opinion "the higher the litigation risk...
[and] the lower the client's decile position in the auditor's portfolio").
427. David B. Citron & Richard J. Taffler, The Audit Report Under Going Concern
Uncertainties: An Empirical Analysis, 22 ACCT. & Bus. RES. 337, 344 (1992) (finding that
auditors in the UK tended to issue going concern qualifications prior to a client's bankruptcy only
if the company was both in a very weak financial condition and in imminent danger of failing).
428. I located and reported one study which found little evidence of the self-serving bias. See
Timothy J. Louwers, The Relation Between Going-Concern Opinions and the Auditor's Loss
Function, 36 J. ACCT. RES. 143 (1998).
429. Prentice, supra note 211, at 1647 (citing Susan Scholz, Auditor Litigation Risk and
Auditor Resignations: Some Empirical Evidence (1997) (unpublished paper on file with author)).
430. Id. at 1650-53.
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constraint, always act in the manner economists assume is rational. 431
Those of us who argued against allowing audit firms to offer legal
services won the debate, not because of the persuasiveness of my
article, but because Arthur Andersen acted in the manner predicted
by the studies cited in my article and thereby brought about the Enron
debacle,432 which functionally ended any substantial encroachment by
accounting firms into the field of legal representation in this country
for the foreseeable future.
433
Thus, Mitchell has overstated the differences in rationality
across individuals and between individuals. More importantly,
uniformity in this regard is not the basis for behavioralist policy
prescriptions, nor need it be. Psychologists are well aware of these
individual differences. Importantly, legal decision theorists have,
even before Mitchell suggested it, used many different forms of
evidence beyond experimental simulations to reach their conclusions.
B. Situational Differences
Mitchell's next major claim is that legal decision theorists
believe in "universal characteristics of human cognition" 434 and
therefore do not recognize that "all situations do not elicit the same
type of thinking."435  This claim sets up yet another straw man, for
much of the behavioral literature is composed of experiments designed
to determine under what circumstances various biases appear and
431. This point of view had been promulgated by law-and-economics judges and adopted in
many courts. See, e.g., Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994); DiLeo v. Ernst &
Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990); Retsky Family L.P. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, No. 97-
C7694, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17459, at *26 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1998); Stamatio v. Hurco Cos.,
885 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 (S.D. Ind. 1995); In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp.
1489, 1499 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994).
432. In order to preserve a stream of mostly nonaudit revenue that it hoped would soon grow
to $100 million annually, Arthur Andersen looked the other way when it learned of Enron's
financial shenanigans. See Chris Ayres, Enron Memo "Reveals $2bn Smoking Gun," TIMES
(London), Jan. 18, 2002, at 1, 2002 WL 4174798. This is consistent with additional academic
commentary published after my articles. See, e.g., Don A. Moore et al., Auditor Independence,
Conflict of Interest, and the Unconscious Intrusion of Bias 32 (Harvard NOM Working Paper No.
02-40, 2002) (finding that people's private opinions are easily biased in ways that are consistent
with the interests of partisans with whom they are affiliated, and these people tend not to realize
the strength of the bias or to be able to correct for it), http://papers2.ssrn.com/
paper.tafABSTRACTID=324261.
433. Congress responded to the Enron debacle by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). Section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley amends Section 10A of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1 (2000), to add subsections (g) and (h), which
make it unlawful for an accounting firm providing audit services to provide various non-audit
services including "legal services."
434. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 105.
435. Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added).
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under what circumstances they do not. Mitchell cannot, I assert, find
a single legal decision theorist who believes that people think the
same way in all settings.
436
Mitchell's larger goal here is to point out some of the potential
weaknesses of experimental research in the behavioral field and he
raises issues worth exploring. He argues that for various reasons
people will not necessarily make the same decisions in the real world
as they make in the laboratory because of the difference in contextual
factors. Therefore, he asserts, experiments done by behavioral
psychologists are of limited value. 437 Arguably, Mitchell not only
ignores the fact that legal decision theorists (unlike rational man
economists) recognize that context matters and consider it when
making their policy prescriptions, but also overstates his case,




Mitchell's first specific point is that accountability can affect
decision makers. His implication, and it is a fair one, is that
psychological experiments are often conducted in laboratory conditions
where subjects have nothing at stake. If subjects are held accountable
for their decisions in some fashion, that is, if they have to explain their
decision, or are punished for bad decisions or rewarded for good
decisions, they might perform differently. Noting that "any theory of
legal decisionmaking that fails to incorporate accountability effects is
materially incomplete,"' 439 Mitchell argues that
[L]ess careful scholars present accountability effects as either uniformly negative or
positive, apparently as needed to bolster their particular arguments .... For instance,
Professor Prentice, in a recent article arguing that self-serving judgmental biases pose
serious problems in the work of auditors, portrays accountability conditions as
producing uniformly negative effects on cognitive performance (that is, as exacerbating
bias).
44 0
I've been called worse than a "less careful scholar," but because
it bolsters my point that Mitchell is the one who tends toward careless
436. Behavioralists can be accused of setting up straw men as well in the form of Chicago
Man, which is so easy to debunk. However, Chicago Man (or some similar version of homo
economicus) is the "standard model in economics." McFadden, supra note 6, at 75; see also id. at
74. ('The rational consumer model is so deeply entwined in economic analysis, and in broad
terms so plausible, that it is hard for many economists to imagine that failures of rationality
could infect major economic decisions or survive market forces.").
437. See generally Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 105-09.
438. See supra notes 169-195 and accompanying text.
439. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 113.
440. Id. at 112-13.
2003] 1745
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
characterizations, let me set out the full passage in my article to
which Mitchell objected:
Laboratory studies [showing that auditors act in a self-serving manner] are numerous,
but they only go so far. These results may certainly be questioned because subjects are
usually given anonymity [and are therefore shielded from accountability]. Lord has
found evidence indicating that subjects given anonymity are less likely to issue a
qualified opinion than subjects who were held accountable for their decisions. On the
other hand, some studies show that imposing accountability produces few changes in
result; furthermore, these laboratory studies are consistent with the self-serving
behavior accounting firms exhibit in the real world [in studies explored in the next
section] .441
Even a quick reading of my passage clearly demonstrates that I did
not claim that accountability effects are uniformly negative (or
positive). Rather, I cited Lord's study, 442 which produced some
evidence indicating that accountability can minimize the effects of the
self-serving bias, and then noted that other studies have had less
success in using accountability to debias decision making. In other
words, I did just what Mitchell suggests that I should have done but
claims that I did not-I presented evidence showing that the issue is
unresolved.
443
Mitchell criticizes me further for quoting two articles from the
mid- 1980s by Tetlock to support the point that accountability does not
always work to debias decision making. 444 His implication is that
these two articles are dated. This is a fair complaint, but much more
recently, in 1999, Tetlock and a coauthor concluded that "[t]wo
decades of research now reveal that (a) only highly specialized
subtypes of accountability lead to increased cognitive effort; [and] (b)
more cognitive effort is not inherently beneficial; sometimes it makes
matters even worse. . . ."445 Thus, new research strengthens, rather
than weakens, the case I made. 446
441. Prentice, supra note 211, at 1644-45 (citations omitted).
442. Alan T. Lord, Pressure: A Methodological Consideration for Behavioral Research in
Auditing, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Fall 1992, at 89, 103, cited in Prentice, supra note 211,
at 1643-44 & n.232.
443. Mitchell admits that several leading behavioral scholars (Seidenfeld, Langevoort,
Rasmussen) have in their writings carefully noted the effects of accountability on decision
making and tempered their conclusions accordingly. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at
112 n.137.
444. Id. at 113 n.138 (referring to Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected Social
Context of Judgment and Choice, 7 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 297 (1985) and
Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the Dilution Effect, 57
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388 (1989)).
445. Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 270 (1999).
446. Some studies show that requiring people to give reasons for their decisions may actually
cause them to make worse decisions rather than better by inducing the decision makers to focus
on factors that in the long run are not the important ones to them. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson
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Despite his mischaracterizations, Mitchell again does a real
service by pointing out that under some circumstances accountability
can affect decision making, sometimes improving it and sometimes
exacerbating problems. Psychologists and legal decision theorists
continue to work to learn how and under what circumstances decision
making can be debiased.447  This is important work, for if
& Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of
Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185 (1991) (finding that
analyzing reasons can lead to preferences and decisions that correspond less with expert
conclusions); see also Oswald Huber & Gabriele Seiser, Accounting and Convincing: The Effect of
Two Types of Justification on the Decision Process, 14 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 69, 70 (2001)
("Several studies have found that the continuous commitment to a failing course of action (sunk
cost effect) is stronger when decision makers know they have to justify their choice." (emphasis
added)); Itamar Simonson & Peter Nye, The Effect of Accountability on Susceptibility to Decision
Errors, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 416, 440 (1992) (reporting
studies finding that accountability did not reduce irrational reliance on sunk costs, did not
reduce preference reversals, but did reduce escalation of commitment).
Still, it must be emphasized that there are some situations in which some heuristics seem to
be moderated by accountability. As Tetlock has also noted, "[a]ccountability manipulations are
much more effective in attenuating certain cognitive biases-primacy, overattribution,
overconfidence-when participants learn of being accountable prior to (as opposed to after)
exposure to the evidence on which they are basing their judgments." Tetlock, supra note 216, at
589. On the other hand, Tetlock notes, accountability has had no effect regarding "insensitivity
to base-rate information, giving more predictive weight to causal as opposed to merely statistical
relationships between variables, preference reversals as a function of choice-versus-matching
elicitation procedures, insensitivity to sample size, and the conjunction fallacy." Id. at 592.
Finally, we cannot forget that accountability sometimes exacerbates bias. Tetlock reasons that
in such cases, "efforts by subjects to put on the cognitive equivalent of their 'Sunday's best'-to
become more thoughtful and to have a 'neat justification package' readily available-lead to
judgments that depart ever more markedly from those that expert observers deem rational." Id.
See generally Robert de Hoog & Godfried van der Wittenboer, Decision Justification,
Information Structure and the Choice of Decision Rules, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH ON
DECISION MAKING 191, 202 (Berndt Brehmer et al. eds., 1986) (finding experimentally that "the
necessity to justify one's decision vis a vis others has no effect on the kind of decision rules
selected for arriving at a decision"); Huber & Seiser, supra, at 80 (finding that although
accountability in the form of requiring subjects to justify their decision led to an increase in the
amount of information used and to a more elaborate choice process, the decision heuristics did
not change).
447. See generally Chapman & Johnson, supra note 236, at 125 (reviewing results of studies
indicating that making subjects aware of the effects of an anchor did not decrease the anchor's
affect on their judgments); Nisbett et al., supra note 203, at 526 (providing evidence for the
argument that "statistical reasoning about everyday events should be highly trainable"); Norbert
Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content
of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note
8, at 103, 112-14 (reporting studies finding that forcing subjects in studies of the hindsight bias
to argue against the inevitability of the reported outcome sometimes slightly attenuates the bias,
but other times exacerbates it); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 93, at 27 (finding that
attempting to induce a reflective attitude by respondents did not reduce their susceptibility to
the representativeness heuristic); Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal
Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note
8, at 313, 322-23 (reporting results of experiments showing that various techniques for debiasing
the overoptimism bias in regard to familiar health problems tended to be ineffective or to
actually exacerbate the bias); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing
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improvements could be made, say to jury decision making in light of
the hindsight bias, it would be all to the good. That is what legal
decision theorists are attempting to accomplish.
2. Hypothetical Consequences
Mitchell's next point, which is related to his previous point, is
the notion that laboratory experiments do not model real decision-
making processes because they involve only hypothetical
consequences. Here, at least, Mitchell admits that legal scholars
applying behavioral principles have recognized this concern with
behavioral research and have often designed their studies and
qualified their conclusions so as to take it into account. 448 Once he
recognizes that point, there is not much punch left in his argument
because studies generally show that there is not much difference
between laboratory decision making and real world decision
making.449
Mitchell relies heavily on an excellent article by Hertwig and
Ortmann that challenges psychologists to conform their research more
closely to the conventions of experimental economics. 450 While there is
no doubt much that psychologists can learn about research from
experimental economists (and vice versa), 451 let us focus on Mitchell's
specific point-that economists usually provide financial incentives to
experimental subjects, while psychologists typically do not.
Problem, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 185, 192 (noting that efforts
to debias judgments often lead to unnecessary correction or overcorrection, creating judgments
that are no more accurate than the original debiased judgment).
448. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 114 n.141 (noting Garvin, Guthrie, and
Korobkin).
449. See supra notes 161-201 and accompanying text. There certainly are studies showing
differences in some contexts when incentives are introduced. See, e.g., Vernon L. Smith & James
M. Walker, Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics, 31 ECON. INQUIRY
245, 259 (1993) [hereinafter Smith & Walker, Monetary Rewards] (surveying thirty-one
experimental studies showing the effects of monetary rewards and opportunity cost, finding some
irrationality even in the presence of rewards but that several studies show improvement in the
presence of rewards and in virtually all cases rewards reduced the variance of the data around
the predicted outcome); Vernon L. Smith & James M. Walker, Rewards, Experience and Decision
Costs in First Price Auctions, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 237, 244 (1993) [hereinafter Smith & Walker,
Experience] (finding that increases in payoffs improved but did not eliminate nonoptimal
bidding).
450. Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann, Experimental Practices in Economics: A
Methodological Challenge for Psychologists?, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 383 (2001).
451. See Smith & Walker, Monetary Rewards, supra note 449, at 246 ("Our fundamental
view [as experimental economists] is that the experimentalist has as much to learn from
experimental subjects about subjective rationality, as human decision makers have to learn from
the models that we call 'rational."').
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Why is "[t]he idea that preferences are only revealed by real
incentives.., deeply embedded in economists' worldview"?45 2  A
primary reason why economists usually use financial incentives in
their experiments relates to the conventions of their field-
"experimental economists who do not use [financial incentives] at all
can count on not getting their results published."4 3 Another reason is
simply that "economic theory lends itself to straightforward
translations into experiments employing financial incentives." 45 4
Psychology, on the other hand, often studies the many
decisions and behaviors that occur in the real world to which
monetary incentives have little relevance. 455 To study these decisions
using financial incentives is often "inappropriate, and not valid."45 6
Health decisions, for example, are often made within parameters
completely different than decisions involving money, so use of
financial incentives in studies of such decisions would be
counterproductive. 457 "Payoffs are useless when there is no right
answer. This is typically true in studies of judgment, as opposed to
decision making."458 Indeed, psychologists often study the effects of
various reward systems and values that stimulate behavior and to
study them solely through a financial lens would not be viable. 459
452. John K. Horowitz & K.E. McConnell, Values Elicited From Open-Ended Real
Experiments, 41 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 221, 222 (2000).
453. Hertwig & Ortmann, supra note 450, at 390.
454. Id.
455. See Hasker P. Davis & Robert L. Durham, Economic and Psychological Experimental
Methodology: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 405, 406 (2001) ("[I1n
the 'real world' people engage in all sorts of behaviors that are not monetarily relevant (e.g.,
memory tasks, problem solving, social interactions, child rearing, jury decision making, etc.).").
456. Id.
457. Tim Rakow has noted:
[E]conomic theories of utility maximization are frequently applied to health care
decisions. However, people readily recognize scenarios involving life expectancy and
money as distinct classes of decision, and how they categorize decisions is seen to be
related to their preferences. The parameters of decisions involving health (such as
temporal discount rates) can be quite different from those involving money.
Furthermore, contrary to predictions that might be made on the basis of experiments
with financial incentives, people can be reluctant to trade or gamble life expectancy
for improved quality of life. Thus, there is the possibility that an understanding of
some classes of decisions are best served by experiments involving non-financial
incentives.
Tim Rakow, Theorize It Both Ways?, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 425, 426 (2001) (citations omitted).
458. Jonathan Baron, Purposes and Methods, 24 BEHAv. & BRAIN SCO. 403, 403 (2001).
459. Davis & Durham, supra note 455, at 406 ("[S]ocial psychologists and personality
theorists have already investigated the differential effects of different reward systems and values
(intrinsic vs. extrinsic) on various behaviors or traits in order to determine their differential
effects. They do, in fact, exist under some circumstances and not in others. To suggest that the
study of the myriad of human activities is best exemplified by a single reward system is not a
viable approach." (citations omitted)).
As Alvin Roth has noted:
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Not only do many decisions not involve financial issues, but
also all decisions are in a sense hypothetical. As Kuhberger notes:
Why do psychologists believe that the study of reactions in imagined situations is a
legitimate means of studying real decision behavior? To be sure, in other areas of
psychology (for instance, in psychophysics), such methods would be considered
extremely questionable if not absurd. The reason is that decision making-rather than,
for example, perception-is hypothetical at its very core. When making a decision, we
anticipate hypothetical states of the world, we consider events that could or could not
obtain, we consider feelings we do not have yet. At the time of decision, none of these
outcomes, events, or feelings, is real, but all are hypothetical. That is, in essence,
decision making consists of the manipulation of hypothetical mental contents. Thus,
decision researchers have some justification in assuming that people's real decisions can
profitably be investigated by asking them to make hypothetical decisions.
460
[R]elying exclusively on purely monetary incentives would miss some important
phenomena. Kahneman and Thaler, for example, showed that subjects who were
given a coffee mug valued it more highly than subjects who had not been given one.
To the extent that people treat possessions differently from money, this would have
been a hard effect to observe if the only payoffs available to subjects had been
monetary.
Alvin E. Roth, Form and Function in Experimental Design, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 427, 427
(2001).
460. Anton Kuhberger, Why Use Real and Hypothetical Payoffs?, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI.
419, 420 (2001); see also David B. Wiseman & Irwin P. Levin, Comparing Risky Decision Making
Under Conditions of Real and Hypothetical Consequences, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 241, 243, 248-49 (1996) (noting that "past research has largely supported
the position that the decision a person makes under hypothetical circumstances is a reasonably
valid predictor of the decision that person would make in the same context with real
consequences" and finding in their experiments that "subjects did not differ in their indicated
preference ... as a function of whether the consequence of their choice would or would not be
incurred").
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Financial incentives create their own problems in research design,
461
but the most important point is that, as a general rule, "real world"
behavior is very similar to laboratory behavior. Numerous studies
have found nonrational behavior even in the presence of financial
incentives. 462 Camerer and Hogarth reviewed seventy-four studies
and found that "[t]he most common result is that incentives did not
461. Goodie notes:
[T]he question is not as simple as 'financial incentives versus no incentives.' In some
settings, a financial incentive might be no incentive, and other incentives might be
real incentives. More generally, choices motivated by points, tokens, the approval of
the experimenter or the (learned or unlearned) rewards of correct answers per se are
actual choices, not hypothetical ones. Such choices may or may not be as strongly
motivated as those that earn money, but they are not less real.
Adam S. Goodie, Are Scripts or Deception Necessary When Repeated Trials Are Used? On the
Social Context of Psychological Experiments, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 412, 412 (2001).
Harrison and Rutstrom note additionally:
Consider, for example, the popular use of "lab dollars." These are a lab currency used
in the experiment itself, and then converted to some local currency at the end of the
experiment. Invariably, these lab dollars have lots of zeroes after them, so that
instead of bidding $30, one might observe a subject bidding 30,000 "lab pesos." The
purported reason for using this device is to give the subjects greater incentive to
report monetary responses at a finer level of detail than if a field currency were used.
The problem is that this will occur only if the subject suffers from some illusion with
respect to the exchange rate between lab currency and field currency. Because such
illusion is bound to vary across subjects, one has lost control over incentives. At the
very least, the incentives will be much lower than intended, reducing saliency and
increasing noise in the data. In the worst case, payoff dominance problems may cause
results to be biased.
Glenn W. Harrison & E. Elisabet Rutstr6m, Doing It Both Ways-Experimental Practice and
Heuristic Context, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 413, 414 (2001).
462. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM.
ECON. REV. 1337 (1995) (finding a self-serving bias even when subjects were given a cash bonus
for coming closest to view of objective third party); Jane Beattie & Graham Loomes, The Impact
of Incentives upon Risky Choice Experiments, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 155, 165 (1997)
(concluding that the issue merited further research but finding that "the overwhelming weight of
the evidence in this article supports Camerer's view that the absence (or presence) of financial
incentives is not a crucial factor in encouraging (or discouraging) violations of standard axioms in
pairwise choice problems"); Adam S. Goodie & Edmund Fantino, An Experientially-Derived Base-
Rate Error in Humans, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 101, 105 (1995) (finding that adding financial incentives
led to no significant improvement in subjects' base-rate neglect); Grether, supra note 393, at 555
(finding little evidence of reduction in the impact of the representativeness heuristic in the
presence of incentives); Grether & Plott, supra note 292, at 632 (finding that incentives created
stronger, not weaker, preference reversals); Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 452, at 235-36
(finding that even in the presence of financial incentives subjects ignored opportunity costs in
conflict with economic logic); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 315 (1992) (finding, in
study of choices between risky prospects, not "much difference between subjects who were paid a
flat fee and subjects whose payoffs were contingent on their decisions"); Daniel J. Zizzo et al., A
Violation of the Monotonicity Axiom: Experimental Evidence on the Conjunction Fallacy, 41 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 263, 273 (2000) (finding that monetary incentives and dynamic feedback
did not reduce subjects' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy).
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affect mean performance." 463  In some judgment and decision tasks,
incentives often hurt performance. 464  In some areas where
concentration and attention are important, financial incentives often
do improve decision making by increasing the subject's motivation
and/or attention,465 but Stone and Ziebart note that "financial
incentives are no panacea for eliminating decision biases. Instead,
incentives appear to increase the extent of attention given to a task,
but also to increase potentially distracting emotions."466  Kuhberger
and colleagues list several examples of important areas where no
significant differences were found between hypothetical and real
decisions, and conclude "the general consensus among psychologists
seems to be that hypothetical choices give a reasonable, qualitatively
correct picture of real choices."467 They then pursued their own study
and found that similar preference reversals regarding framing were
obtained using both hypothetical and real decisions for both small and
large payoffs. 468 These results are supported by the numerous studies
cited above where laboratory results were confirmed in the field.469
Interestingly, several studies have been done of decision
making on television game shows where large financial incentives are
involved; the results tend to mirror those found in laboratory
463. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7,
22 (1999). In many of these studies, the incentives did reduce variation, although the mean was
unaffected. Id. at 23.
464. Id. at 21.
465. Kahneman and Tversky recognized this long ago when they wrote, "[ilncentives do not
operate by magic. They work by focusing attention and by prolonging deliberation.
Consequently they are more likely to prevent errors that arise from insufficient attention and
effort than errors that arise from misperception or faulty intuition." Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES,
supra note 8, at 209, 222.
466. Dan N. Stone & David A. Ziebart, A Model of Financial Incentive Effects in Decision
Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 250, 259 (1995). The authors
conclude that "after controlling for these mediating variables financial incentives had no effect
on choice accuracy." Id. at 258. In other words, in their experiment the authors found that
financial incentives increased the amount of information processed, improved the sequence, and
improved the variability. On the other hand, the incentive also increased the negative effects
and the negative consequences of the latter canceled out the positive benefits of the former.
467. Kuhberger et al., supra note 17, at 1164; see also David A. Asch et al., Omission Bias
and Petussis Vaccination, 14 MED. DECISION MAKING 118, 121 (1994) (discussing a similar study
in the real world regarding parents' decisions to vaccinate their children with DPT and finding a
similar bias); Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and
Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 275 (1990) (finding a strong omission bias in
decision to vaccinate).
468. Kuhberger et al., supra note 17, at 1167-70.
469. See supra notes 169-195 and accompanying text.
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experiments with small or no financial incentives. 470  Similarly,
psychologists and others have performed studies in third world
nations where they could afford to offer monetary incentives that were
meaningful to the subjects being studied; again, the subjects' decision
making tended to be subject to the same heuristics and biases as the
decision making of subjects in United States laboratory
experiments. 471 Camerer and Hogarth have done the most extensive
study, which Mitchell quotes extensively and fairly.472 They tell us:
Critics and referees very commonly assert that if the stakes were just high enough the
rationality rejection would disappear. While several studies have tried to make
rationality violations disappear-in utility theory paradoxes, ultimatum bargaining, and
voting experiments-none have succeeded in clearly overturning anomalies .... [S]ince
all established anomalies have survived these kinds of hostile attacks, uninformed
critics should quit talking as if simply raising the stakes would make the effects
disappear. So far, that hasn't proved true; and nothing in any sensible understanding of
human psychology suggests it would.
4 73
470. See e.g., Roel M.W.J. Beetsma & Peter C. Schotman, Measuring Risk Attitudes in a
Natural Experiment: Data from the Television Game Show Lingo, 111 ECON. J. 821, 846-47 (2001)
(finding risk aversion and overconfidence in Dutch television game show); Randall W. Bennett &
Kent A. Hickman, Rationality and the "Price Is Right," 21 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 99, 105 (1993)
("Evidence from 'The Price Is Right' game show documents persistent decision-making errors
despite the penalties associated with the sub-optimal behavior and the ample opportunity for
contestants to formulate strategy before-hand."); Jonathan Berk et al., The Price Is Right, But
Are the Bids? An Investigation of Rational Decision Theory, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 954, 965-66 (1996)
(reporting results "consistent with the hypothesis that behavior on The Price Is Right is
explained by bounded rationality" rather than by rational decision theory); Robert Gertner,
Game Shows and Economic Behavior: Risk-Taking on "Card Sharks," 108 Q.J. ECON. 507, 507
(1993) (finding that contestants on "Card Sharks" game show "do not act in a manner consistent
with expected-utility maximization"); Andrew Metrick, A Natural Experiment in 'Jeopardy!; 85
AM. ECON. REV. 240, 252 (1995) (reporting that a study of performances on the "Jeopardy" game
show demonstrated that "[sluboptimal choice can persist despite the three mitigating factors of
high stakes, an identifiable market mechanism, and an opportunity for players to learn"); MARCO
HAAN ET AL., THE WEAKEST LINK: A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN RATIONAL DECISION MAKING 31 (Univ.
of Groningen, Mimeo Working Paper, Feb. 2002) (finding that contestants on "The Weakest
Link" act in a boundedly rational manner and exhibit fairness concerns inconsistent with the
rational man model), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=303163.
471. Steven J. Kachelmeier & Mohamed Shehata, Examining Risk Preferences Under High
Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People's Republic of China, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 1120, 1137 (1992) (finding a systematic difference between low- and high-prize lotteries in
some respects, but reporting that "even at the highest prize level used in this study, we still find
a pattern of strongly risk-seeking preferences for low-probability gain prospects, consistent with
the predictions of Tversky and Kahneman"). Binswanger, in less sophisticated experiments, did
find that Indian peasants became more risk-averse in high prize conditions. See Hans P.
Binswanger, Attitudes Toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India, 62 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 395 (1980); Hans P. Binswanger, Attitudes Toward Risk: Theoretical Implications of an
Experiment in Rural India, 91 ECON. J. 867, 888 (1981).
472. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 117-19.
473. Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 463, at 33-34. Summarizing both the Hertwig and
Ortmann study and the Camerer and Hogarth study, Hilton recently noted:
Experimental incentives do sometimes have an effect of improving rationality, but not
always (only in 23 out of the 43 studies created by combining the Hertwig-Ortmann
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1663
If Mitchell is simply reminding us that for some mental tasks,
incentives can reduce departures from the norm, that psychologists
would do well to study phenomena with financial incentives as well as
those without, and that we should pay attention to which types of
behavior are affected by financial incentives and which are not, then
he is doing a fine service. 474 If he purports to undermine in any
substantial way the validity of behavioral research, including the
Kahneman-Tversky line, he fails. 475 As Sunstein recently noted, "the
heuristics operate even when the stakes are large."476
and Camerer-Hogarth reviews) .... In seven others there was no effect of incentives,
and in a remarkable 13 cases they had negative effects. Indeed, given that Wall
Street bond traders dealing day after day in millions of dollars show irrationalities
predicted by prospect theory it would be surprising if small experimental learning and
incentives eliminated irrationality.
Denis J. Hilton, Is the Challenge for Psychologists to Return to Behaviorism?, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN
SCI. 415, 415 (2001) (citing Z. Shapira, Aspiration Levels and Risk Taking: A Theoretical Model
an Empirical Study on the Behavior of Government Bond Traders (2000) (unpublished
manuscript, New York University).
474. One of the most interesting aspects of the impact of financial incentives was recently
explored by Sunstein in connection with Professor Solomon Asch's famous experiment on
conformity. SUNSTEIN, supra note 181, at 13-15. Asch found that large percentages of subjects
could be induced to say that one line was longer than an obviously shorter line if a number of the
experimenter's confederates first stated the same erroneous conclusion. See SOLOMON E. AsCH,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A
Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS No. 416 (1956).
Studies of incentives show that the rate of conformity is decreased when monetary incentives are
added if the task is easy, but increased if the task is hard. See Robert Baron et al., The Forgotten
Variable in Conformity Research: Impact of Task Importance on Social Influence, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 915, 924 (1996) (reporting studies indicating that "heightening
incentives for accuracy actually heightened participants' susceptibility to an inaccurate group
consensus"); SUNSTEIN, supra note 181, at 13-15 (discussing these and related studies).
475. See also Maya Bar-Hillel and Efrat Neter, How Alike Is It? Versus How Likely Is It?: A
Disjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgments, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 8, at 82, 96 (finding disjunction fallacy committed by 74% of those studied in a hypothetical
betting condition and by 72%, a small and insignificant difference, of those studied in a real
betting condition where it was in the subjects' best interests to find the right answer rather than
the answer they believed the experimenters desired); Roger Buehler et al., Inside the Planning
Fallacy: The Causes and Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions, in PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 250, 261-62 (reviewing substantial evidence indicating
that incentives actually exacerbate the "planning fallacy," the tendency to be overoptimistic in
prediction of completion times for future events); Chapman & Johnson, supra note 236, at 125
("[T]he evidence about the influence of incentives on anchoring is mostly negative."); David M.
Grether, Testing Bayes Rule and the Representativeness Heuristic: Some Experimental Evidence,
17 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 54, 56 (1992) (finding that financial incentives had little effect on
base rate neglect, concluding that "modeling and understanding behavior under uncertainty is a
more demanding and difficult task than many economists have thought"); Schwarz & Vaughn,
supra note 447, at 117 (reviewing the results of several studies showing that "incentives rarely
attenuated reliance on the availability heuristic"); Slovic & Lichtenstein, supra note 291, at 596
(noting that incentives do little to diminish preference reversals); Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 93, at 33 (reporting study finding that a conjunction error was made by 65% of subjects
playing an experimental game with real payoffs and by 62% of subjects playing the same game
with only hypothetical payoffs); J. Frank Yates et al., Probability Judgment Across Cultures, in
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Addressing accountability, incentives, and other forms of
debiasing, Tetlock, one of Mitchell's favorite sources, warned skeptics
such as Michell in 2002 that
[E]fforts at debiasing have thus far had mixed success. Kahneman and Tversky
anticipated these results when they wrote 15 years ago: "Incentives do not operate by
magic. They work by focusing attention and by prolonging deliberation. Consequently
they are more likely to prevent errors that arise from insufficient attention and effort
than errors that arise from misperceptions or faulty intuition." In this view, motivating
people to think harder will often backfire, amplifying biases rather than attenuating
them. Effective learning takes place only under difficult-to-satisfy conditions: It
requires accurate and timely feedback about the relations between antecedent
conditions and appropriate responses. Skeptics (and we have some sympathy with this
camp) have an uphill battle.
47 7
C. Implications for Legal Theory
In the final section of his Equal Incompetence article, Mitchell
assesses the implications that his arguments have for application of
legal decision theory to important legal issues.478
1. The Realism Versus Parsimony Trade-Off
Mitchell quotes Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler who proclaim the
goal of many behavioralists: "We believe that a behavioral approach
imposes discipline on economic theorizing because assumptions cannot
be imported at will. In a behavioral approach, assumptions about
behavior should accord with empirically validated descriptions of
actual behavior."479
In other words, legal decision theorists seek to make policy
prescriptions based on psychology's best understanding of how people
actually make decisions, rather than based upon a stylized model that
few people believe represents how people actually make decisions.
Mitchell argues that this cannot be done because the variations in
individual reasoning that he highlights undermine the "equal
incompetence" view that he imputes to legal decision theorists. 48 0 Not
to beat a dead horse, but legal decision theorists do not believe in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 8, at 271, 274 (reviewing study indicating that
financial bonuses did not affect patterns of cross-cultural overconfidence bias).
476. SUNSTEIN, supra note 272, at 6; see also Kuhberger et al., supra note 17, at 1170 ("Our
data pose a problem [for economists] because the framing effect is an economic anomaly, but it
does not disappear with larger payoffs-if anything, it becomes stronger.").
477. Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI.
94, 97 (2002) (citations omitted).
478. See Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 119-39.
479. Jolls et al., supra note 310, at 1489, quoted in Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at
120.
480. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 83-88.
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equal incompetence. If they did, it would seem that Mitchell would be
able to point to an erroneous policy prescription based on such a belief,
but he cannot.4
81
Mitchell does make the point that because behavioral and
cognitive research on human judgment and decision making proves
that we live in a very complicated world, there are limitations on how
far psychological research on behavior can take us. He argues that in
the complexity/parsimony tradeoff, legal decision theorists will, by
basing their policy prescriptions on greater realism, forfeit
predictability. 48 2  But it is not necessarily true that the most
parsimonious account of the facts leads to the best policy prescription.
We do not and cannot predict that all people will in all
circumstances act in a self-interested fashion, but we can predict that
the bigger the audit client, the more likely the audit firm will cave in
481. Content to launch broadsides against unspecified behavioralist policy prescriptions,
Mitchell is unable to land a blow against any particular prescription and, indeed, mentions only
a few even in passing. He does note that Sunstein suggests that employment and labor law
issues be reexamined in light of behavioral research, Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the
Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205 (2001), cited in Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 86, and
that Hanson and Kysar urge that all legal concepts that are premised on the assumption of a
rational decision maker be reevaluated. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 395, at 634, cited in
Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 86. Mitchell provides absolutely no specific argument
that would indicate these are not good ideas. He works hard to qualify assumptions of perfect
irrationality that he (falsely, in my view) imputes to Sunstein and Hanson and Kysar, but he
does not in any way show that these authors are wrong. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12,
at 86 nn.44-45.
Mitchell notes that Chris Guthrie has noted that regret aversion theory can help us to
understand litigation behavior. Guthrie, supra note 411, at 43. Again, Mitchell has no critique
of Guthrie's analysis or policy suggestions; he simply observes that "[b]y bringing regret aversion
into the decision calculus, we complicate the model of litigation behavior but also may gain
descriptive accuracy, for the avoidance and achievement of certain affective states appears to be
an important part of many decisions, particularly settlement decisions." Mitchell, Incompetence,
supra note 12, at 103-04. Believing that descriptive accuracy is a necessary predicate for useful
policy prescriptions, this is a major goal of most legal decision theorists. Again, Mitchell can
offer no substantive critique.
In an appendix to his article, Mitchell returns to Hanson and Kysar, mentioning that
research regarding "[t]he potential ability of older adults to resist market manipulation bears
directly on the claims of legal decision theorists Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar, who call for an
enterprise liability law based on the claim that companies successfully manipulate consumer
preferences and spending by exploiting prevalent cognitive biases and errors in consumers."
Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, app. A at 158 (citing Hanson & Kysar, supra note 404).
Again, Mitchell does not directly challenge Hanson and Kysar's well-supported argument, which
was recently bolstered by one of Kahneman and Tversky's leading critics, Gerd Gigerenzer. See
GIGERENZER, supra note 295, at 29-30 (explaining how the tobacco industry successfully misled
the public regarding the dangers of smoking). This is not to say that the policy prescriptions of
legal decision theorists cannot be challenged; they can. The point is that Mitchell apparently
cannot challenge them on grounds that they do not take into account the variability of human
thinking.
482. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 83.
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when the client resists a suggested audit adjustment; 483 that the more
important the client and the less the litigation risk, the less likely the
audit firm will issue a qualified opinion;48 4 that the more the auditor is
worried about losing the client, the less likely it will issue a going
concern qualification; 4 5 and that litigation risk does not tend to
induce auditors to resign accounts unless the client is in poor financial
shape. 486 Ultimately, behavioral research shows us that auditors'
professional skepticism tends to be "counteracted when the client [is]
important to the audit firm's practice development." 48 7 Universality
and uniformity of action are not prerequisites to helpful policy
insights. Every auditor need not act the same in every circumstance
for us to realize that in cases of major audit failure, judicial
presumptions that auditors are rational and would not endanger their
reputations by stretching professional rules are questionable, and that
restrictions upon non-audit services offered by audit firms are worthy
of serious consideration.
Furthermore, we can predict that most consumers approaching
a rental car counter will sign the form contract placed in front of them
rather than bargain for their preferred level of risk or for an optimally
efficient state as assumed by economists. Consider, for example, my
arguments regarding contract-based defenses in securities fraud
litigation.488  In response to case law emanat;.ng from law and
economics judges holding that investors should be allowed to
contractually waive their right to sue for fraud,48 9 I sought to use
behavioral literature to undermine the economists' assumption that
the reason investors or consumers sign such contracts is that they are
voluntarily contracting for their desired level of risk. 490 I argued that
483. See Wright & Wright, supra note 425, at 22 ("Of concern was that a number of
adjustments greater than planning materiality were subsequently waived (47.5%), suggesting
the potential for financial reporting risk.").
484. See Krishnan & Krishnan, supra note 426, at 583.
485. See Paul Barnes & Hooi Den Huan, The Auditor's Going Concern Decision: Some UK
Evidence Concerning Independence and Competence, 20 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 213, 226 (1993)
(concluding that economic pressures cause auditor reluctance to issue justified going concern
qualifications); Thomas Kida, An Investigation into Auditors' Continuity and Related
Qualification Judgments, 18 J. ACCT. RES. 506, 516 (1980) (finding that auditors can usually tell
when a going concern qualification is justified).
486. See Scholz, supra note 429.
487. Michael K. Shaub & Janice E. Lawrence, Ethics, Experience and Professional
Skepticism: A Situational Analysis, 8 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 124, 155 (Supp. 1996).
488. Prentice, supra note 258.
489. See, e.g., Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 2000); Carr v. CIGNA Sec.,
Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1996).
490. See, e.g., Session Three: Discussion of Paper by George L. Priest, Yale University, 10
CARDOzo L. REV. 2329, 2339 (1989) (quoting the statement of Peter Huber), cited in Prentice,
supra note 258, at 342.
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there are many more plausible explanations for why people sign form
contracts that waive their right to sue for fraud,491 including:
* Rational Ignorance. Much evidence suggests that people
rationally believe that it will not be cost effective for
them to read most form contracts before they sign them.
The forms are time-consuming to read, hard to
understand, and the seller's agent probably has no
authority to alter them anyway.492
* Overoptimism, Overconfidence, and the Illusion of
Control. People tend toward irrational optimism and
overconfidence, including when they act as investors or
consumers. Therefore they underestimate the extent to
which they are at risk of being defrauded. This
phenomenon is exacerbated by the illusion of control,
people's belief that they can exert control over purely
random events. Empirical studies show that people
tend to believe that the terms of the contracts they sign
are more favorable than they truly are.
493
* Probabilities and Future Events. The behavioral
literature also indicates that people are not good at
calculating probabilities in general and specifically tend
to ignore low probability risks, such as the risk of being
defrauded. 494
* False Consensus Effect and Personal Positivity Bias.
Much psychological evidence indicates that people tend
to believe that others see the world as they do (false
consensus effect) and generally perceive other people in
a positive light, often naively. Therefore, people who
are honest tend to believe that others are treating them
honestly. When the concept of cognitive dissonance (the
tendency to suppress information inconsistent with
positions taken in order to preserve psychological
consistency) 495 is factored in, people are especially
reluctant to reach the conclusion that they have made a
mistake in deciding to trust a promoter or stock broker
491. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality and Unconscionability: A Behavioral Theory
of Policing Form Contracts (UCLA Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-02, Jan. 2003) (exploring
through a behavioral lens why people sign form contracts that waive their right to sue for fraud),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=367172.
492. Prentice, supra note 258, at 358-62.
493. Id. at 362-63.
494. Id. at 363-64.
495. See, e.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); PLOUS, supra
note 135, at 22-30 (explaining concept generally).
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who has sold them stock or a developer who has sold
them a house.4
96
" Inability to Detect Deception. Again, there is
substantial empirical evidence that people are unable to
detect when they are being deceived, but, worse still,
inaccurately believe that they can do so. This leaves
investors and consumers particularly prone to being
defrauded when they run into real crooks. 497
* Insensitivity to Source. Psychological evidence shows
that one of the reasons that people are poor lie detectors
is that they have trouble disregarding information even
when they learn that its source is questionable. Once
they decide to trust a stockbroker, they tend to continue
to trust long after suspicious facts arise.498
" Salience of Oral Communications. Because people's
minds are more attuned to oral communications than
written communications, the oral promises made by
stockbrokers or car salesmen have more impact than the
written contract provisions that disclaim those
promises. 49
9
* Status Quo Bias. Because people prefer the status quo,
when form givers (merchants/stockbrokers) offer
adhesion contracts to form takers (consumers/investors),
the form takers will be reluctant to attempt to alter
what they view as the status quo, particularly because a
dense form contract has an "authoritative legality"
about it.500
" Social Proof. Social proof is the notion that people tend
to take their cues for proper behavior from the actions of
those around them, and therefore they will be hesitant
to reject a form contract that they know most people in
their situation typically sign without even reading. 501
* Anchoring and Adjustment. Related to the status quo
bias is the anchoring and adjustment heuristic-the
tendency to be heavily influenced by initial information
and then to fail to adjust sufficiently to account for new
496. Prentice, supra note 258, at 364-65.
497. Id. at 366-67.
498. Id. at 367-69.
499. Id. at 369-71.
500. Id. at 371-73 (quoting G. Richard Shell, Fair Play, Consent and Securities Arbitration: A
Comment on Speidel, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1996)).
501. Id. at 373.
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information. Thus, when investors or consumers have
their expectations set by oral representations made by
sellers, their views will likely not sufficiently adjust
toward the reality spelled out in the fine print of the
written contracts they are presented.
50 2
* Regret Theory. Because substantial psychological
evidence shows that (a) regret is an unpleasant
emotion, (b) people desire to avoid regret, (c) people
factor that desire into their decision making, and (d)
people suffer more regret when bad consequences result
from their active decisions than from passive decisions
and from abnormal situations than from normal
situations, anticipated regret inclines decision makers
to passively accept the normal situation which is
embodied in the typical form contract they are
presented.
503
Certainly there is variation from person to person and
situation to situation in the impact of these behavioral inclinations
and cognitive illusions. My argument simply does not depend on all of
them affecting all people equally in all situations. These behavioral
and cognitive considerations combine, I believe, to provide a much
more compelling explanation of why most people sign form contracts
that waive their right to sue for fraud than the economic explanation,
which assumes that they are rationally bargaining for their desired
level of risk. Ultimately, the proof is in the pudding. I demonstrated
my point that these problems are systematic by showing that
contracts for the sale of new automobiles (before the courts began
applying the strict liability theory)50 4 essentially disclaimed all
meaningful liability. The same was true of contracts for the sale of
securities (before Congress intervened by passing the federal
securities laws).50 5 No matter what people's risk profiles were, they
tended to sign such waivers.
Consider that it is much safer and minimally inconvenient to
wear a seat belt. Chicago Man would buckle up every time. 506 Yet, for
502. Id. at 373-74.
503. Id. at 374-78.
504. Id. at 388.
505. Id. at 388-89.
506. See Carol M. Ostrom, The Risk Takers-In Search of the Next Thrill: Bravery and
Biochemistry, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at 20 ("If fear of risks were rational,... [w]e'd
never, ever lapse on buckling our seatbelts."), 1996 WL 3687564; National Press Club Luncheon
with Cynthia Trudell, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 18, 1999 (quoting Ms. Trudell, Chair and
President of Saturn Corporation, as saying that wearing seatbelts is so "logical and rational," yet
when they first came out it was difficult to induce people to wear them).
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behavioral reasons, most people did not wear seatbelts until the law
required them to do so. 50 7  The behavioral factors (overconfidence,
overoptimism, illusion of control, and the like) do not have to act
equally upon all decision makers in all circumstances for behavioral
insights to be helpful and for rules requiring the wearing of seatbelts
to be well justified.
508
Simply put, universal and uniform use of decisional heuristics
and vulnerability to cognitive biases are not required for research in
judgment and decision making to lend valuable insights to legal policy
questions.
2. Mitchell's Suggestions
Apparently Mitchell is not ready to completely give up on legal
decision theorists, for he proceeds to suggest ways that they can
improve their application of behavioral decision theory to legal
issues.50 9  All are unobjectionable "best practices" sort of
suggestions. 510 Mitchell builds to the conclusion that:
507. Don Colburn, Seat Belts, Survival and the Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1985, at Z07
(noting that before seatbelt laws were passed, "[d]espite all the grim evidence and multimillion
dollar safety campaigns with slogans like 'Buck up for safety' and 'Lock it to me,' seat belt use
nationally ... hovered below 15 percent").
508. See Serfdom and Seat Belts, NEW REPUBLIC, June 3, 1985, at 4, 42 ("[F]ew people who
choose not to buckle up have made a rational calculation that the added risk to them is not worth
the inconvenience.").
509. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 125-132 (instructing legal decision theorists
to: (1) consult original sources and avoid overreaching in your characterization of results from
this work; (2) follow American Psychological Association guidelines for reporting methods and
results of empirical work; (3) if not trained in the social sciences, avoid unaided application of
behavioral theory to the law; and (4) use multiple methodologies as much as possible when doing
empirical research).
510. One of Mitchell's suggestions hits close to home. He argues that although law
professors may be "wonderful autodidacts," those untrained in the social sciences should "refrain
from behavioral decision theory's unaided application to the law" but may be encouraged to
engage in interdisciplinary research projects. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 127. As
an autodidact, I have taken Mitchell's suggestion to do interdisciplinary research with those who
are trained in the social sciences. See, e.g., Prentice & Koehler, supra note 405. However, in my
other articles cited throughout this article, I have not refrained from attempting to apply
behavioral decision theory to the law. I have no doubt that I am not as qualified to examine this
area as is Mitchell, and I am certain that my lack of formal training has led or will lead me to
make mistakes that those better trained would avoid (although the only mistake Mitchell
accuses me of so far is his rather than mine, see supra notes 440-446).
Just as psychologists can prevent lawyers from making errors regarding matters of
psychology, lawyers' understanding of legal issues and institutions enables them to offer
contributions that those trained only in psychology cannot. See Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 35
(suggesting that "social scientists are often equally ignorant about fundamental legal issues that
render their research if not irrelevant, then difficult for the law to apply"). Still, I admit that the
contributions will likely be of a higher quality when made by academics trained in the area, such
as my occasional co-author Jonathan Koehler at Texas, Jeff Rachlinski at Cornell, and, yes,
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Given the applied nature of legal decision theory, the primary goal should arguably be to
explain and predict behavior in discrete situations to the greatest extent possible rather
than seek to build an overarching theory of legal behavior whose variables explain a
small percentage of variability in many situations but a large percentage in none. For
instance, rather than being concerned about how the hindsight bias may operate across
legal cases in general, we should focus on identifying what particular legal judgments
and what legal actors are most prone to the hindsight bias in what types of cases.
5 11
This is the trajectory that legal decision theory has taken since Jolls,
Sunstein and Thaler wrote their initial survey article, 512 and it is the
course that I expect we shall continue to see in the future.
3. First, Do No Harm
Mitchell implies that cognitive psychologists and legal decision
theorists should not make any public policy suggestions unless they
are certain that their programs will not be counterproductive. 513 The
"first do no harm" principle is generally good advice for physicians in
light of the self-healing properties of the body, but it is questionable in
the public policy context unless one holds the dubious belief that the
law has similar self-correcting properties.5 14
Mitchell goes on to make a surprising concession-that some
modest improvements in the law might well be made based on
behavioral insights. For example, Mitchell suggests that we might (1)
train judges and bureaucrats in statistics, because research from
psychology demonstrates that often a relatively small amount of
training can dramatically improve probabilistic reasoning; 515 (2)
require that questions and evidence be presented to judges in the form
of frequencies rather than probabilities, because evidence from
psychological experiments shows that humans often handle
frequencies better than probabilities;516 (3) ask legal decision makers
to explicitly consider alternative or opposing evidence and arguments,
because psychologists' studies show that this process can help debias
some of the prominent K-T shortcomings in human reason; 517 and (4)
ask legal actors to explain their choices, because requiring subjects in
Gregory Mitchell at Florida State. Just as law schools began hiring more faculty trained in
economics as the law and economics movement bloomed, so they will likely hire more faculty
with psychology training in the near future.
511. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 130.
512. Jolls et al., supra note 310, at 1471.
513. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 132.
514. I thank Jeffrey Rachlinski for pointing this out to me.
515. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 132.
516. Id. at 133.
517. Id. at 133-34.
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psychology experiments to provide such rationales has been shown to
reduce framing effects.
518
Mitchell is completely right that all of these suggestions are
worth exploring. He is, on the other hand, unduly timid in failing to
embrace numerous other policy prescriptions offered by legal decision
theorists. Mitchell's stated basis for his reticence is reasonable
enough. In his mind, the battle between Chicago Man and K-T Man
breaks down to an "unavoidable ideological debate."519  On the one
hand, law and economics represents a conservative, free market point
of view. Behavioralists represent a more liberal, paternalistic/activist
government approach. 520 Only raw politics can break the deadlock,
Mitchell implies.
This dichotomy is arguably unfair to both the Chicago Man
advocates and those in the K-T Man camp. Admittedly, the policy
ramifications of a law and economics approach tend to counsel against
government involvement in the affairs of men, but academics of all
political stripes find some versions of economic analysis appealing.
521
Even less than law and economics, legal decision theory seems to
belong to no particular political camp. As Jolls and her coauthors
pointed out, their view is that behavioral analysis is not so much
paternalistic as it is simply "anti-antipaternalism." 522  Behavioral
analysis refutes the arguments that economists have used to challenge
existing governmental paternalism. At this stage in its development,
518. Id. at 134-35.
519. Id. at 137.
520. Id. Mitchell cites Tetlock who recently noted, regarding the fundamental attribution
error (which is "the tendency to attribute behavior to the actor's dispositions and to ignore
powerful situational determinants of the behavior." RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 31 (1980)) that:
Authoritarian conservatives deem it prudent managerial practice to communicate to
subordinates a low tolerance for justifications and excuses that invoke situational
causes for conduct that falls short of organizational expectations. People will be more
motivated to behave properly if they believe that improper behavior will almost
automatically tarnish their reputations-a social variant of the doctrine of strict
liability. From an authoritarian-conservative perspective, failing to hold people
responsible for outcomes that they could have controlled is arguably a more serious
error than holding people responsible for outcomes that they could not control. By
contrast, the anti-authoritarian egalitarians see the fundamental attribution error as
punitive, not prudent. They disagree with conservatives about both the frequency
with which subordinates will invent specious justifications and fictitious excuses for
substandard performance and the relative importance of avoiding Type I errors
(condemning the innocent) versus Type II errors (acquitting the guilty), deploring the
former error to a greater degree).
Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure
Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293, 320-21 (2000).
521. See Wetlaufer, supra note 26, at 38 (comparing conservative versus liberal views of the
use of economic analysis).
522. Jolls et al., supra note 310, at 1545.
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it may seem to be paternalistic and to support politically liberal points
of view, but only because thus far it has been used primarily in
reaction to Chicago School teachings. As it becomes less reactive and
more constructive, 523 as I think it will, legal decision theory will seem
less ideological. For example, Kahneman and Sunstein, with others,
recently made a persuasive psychology-based case for punitive
damages reform, 524 an agenda item clearly dearer to conservatives
than liberals. And Camerer and his colleagues presented an
"asymmetric paternalism" rationale designed to tailor behavioralism's
application in such a way as to appeal even to conservatives. 525
Indeed, after several years of writing conservative policy prescriptions
in the securities field, some of which suffered from a lack of insight
into the psychology of human decision making, 526 Stephen Choi and
Adam Pritchard recently published a stinging critique of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, reasonably pointing out that
governmental decision makers are likely to suffer from the same
limitations as private decision makers.527  Perhaps we're all
behavioralists now.
D. Final Insights
There are many useful insights in Mitchell's second article, but
legal decision theorists do not hold the belief that he imputes to
them-that people are universally and uniformly irrational. Nor do
their policy prescriptions reflect such a belief. Nor need such be the
state of the world for psychological research to usefully inform legal
analysis.
523. Cunningham admits that if behavioral theory simply settles for refuting law-and-
economics arguments, it will not fulfill its promise; he uses behavioral finance theory to furnish a
positive theory of market behavior with important implications for corporate and securities law.
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 767, 837 (2002).
524. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002).
525. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for 'Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212-13 (2003) ("A regulation is
asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while
imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.").
526. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CAL. L. REV. 279, 333-34 (2000) (suggesting that securities professionals be virtually totally
deregulated and that investors be regulated instead); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A
Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV.
925 (1999) (suggesting that the stock exchanges could be efficient regulators of securities fraud).
527. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1(2003).
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If legal decision theorists do, as Mitchell charge, "proceed[ ] on
the basis of inaccurate understandings of judgment and choice, '"528
then their policy prescriptions should be bogus and easily debunked.
However, while Mitchell is quick to cherry pick random claims of legal
decision theorists that he thinks are overblown, he does very little in
either of his articles to persuade readers that any particular position
or policy prescription suggested by the legal decision theorists is ill-
founded.
V. LEGAL DECISION THEORY: AN ASSESSMENT
This article is already far too long for me to insert a lengthy
projection of the future of legal decision theory. Because psychology
and economics tend to focus on different aspects of behavior and to use
different sources of data,529 both have a role to play in policy analysis.
In 1986, Harrison argued that "the current application of economic
analysis to law should be regarded as an interim step toward the
integration of law with the behavioral, natural, and social sciences."530
Introduction of cognitive and behavioral literature from the
psychology field is another, and a positive, step toward that
integration. Generally, legal decision theorists seek "not to displace
law and economics but rather to supplement it so that it serves as a
more useful analytic and predictive tool. ... "531
Given the ubiquity of law and economics in legal scholarship,
the goal of improving economic analysis is hardly an unimportant one,
but it remains relatively modest.532 Although Mitchell criticizes me
for a relatively ambitious statement that I made in one article-a
claim that "behavioral research can improve upon standard law and
economics analysis almost across the board"533-I think that the
statement is accurate in the context in which it was made. My
argument there, and here, is that whenever it is important to know
why people do what they do and how they make decisions, behavioral
528. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 73 (quoting Sunstein, Behavior Analysis,
supra note 10, at 1194)).
529. See Mikhail Myagkov & Charles R. Plott, Exchange Economies and Loss Exposure:
Experiments Exploring Prospect Theory and Competitive Equilibria in Market Environments, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 801, 802 (1997).
530. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and
Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1314 (1986).
531. Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 571 (2003).
532. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1165, 1173-74 (2003) (noting that "psychologists studying judgment and choice have been
particularly well aware of their competition with economics" and therefore their work has
emphasized "errors in judgment more so than the psychologists studying perception or memory").
533. Prentice, supra note 36, at 135, quoted in Mitchell, supra note 12, at 71 n. 7.
20031 1765
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1663
analysis can improve upon a simple assumption of homo
economicus. 534 The premise of a rational actor that is fundamental to
much law and economics theory is simply wrong, 535 meaning that this
scholarship often generates explanations that are unpersuasive, 536
conclusions that are unverifiable, 537 predictions that are unreliable, 538
and policy prescriptions that are unsatisfying. 
539
Unlike law and economics in its more extreme forms, legal
decision theory does not purport to explain why the law is as it is or to
provide a universal normative standard. 540 It does not purport to offer
534. See Fanto, supra note 311, at 1341, 1342 (noting that the Chicago Man model does not
describe how people actually act and arguing that the more realistic behavioral account of
human behavior "is critical for legal studies because laws and legal rules are often designed to
affect and modify behavior, and this goal can hardly be achieved without the best available
understanding of the behavior itself").
535. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text; see also Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter,
Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1517 (2001) (noting that
most versions of the Chicago Man model are "relatively poor predictors of behavior").
536. See, e.g., KAUSHIK BAsu, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKER RIGHTS AND LABOR STANDARDS POLICY (MIT, Dep't of
Econ., Working Paper No. 02-11, Feb. 2002) (using more than a little creativity means in order to
justify on economic grounds rules against sexual harassment in the workplace),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-id=303184.
537. See, e.g., Paul Hirsch et al., "Dirty Hands" Versus "Clean Models" Is Sociology in
Danger of Being Seduced by Economics?, 16 THEORY & SOC'Y 317, 331-32 (1987) ("On the micro
level, economists' assumption of rationality can be restated as psychological hedonism, at which
point the proposition becomes irrefutable. If a person chooses a job with lower pay, the
economist will add that his or her utility function must include variables besides pay-you just
have to include them in formulas to show that utility was maximized."); Wendel, supra note 5, at
54 ("[A]s many critics, even those who are generally sympathetic with economic analysis, have
observed, claims of empirical verifiability have largely not been borne out." (citations omitted)).
538. See infra notes 545-553 and accompanying text.
539. See Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and
Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75, 103-04 (1998) (noting that
"experiments in economics, sociology, and psychology have raised serious doubts about the
behavioral accuracy of the minimalist conception of homo economicus" and that "economics pays
a heavy price for its self-imposed isolation from the other behavioral sciences"); Hirsch et al.,
supra note 537, at 320 ("By precluding attention to non-rational elements of human behavior,
economists leave themselves no mechanism for learning about the crude and messy empirical
world that so defies their models. Economists pay a heavy price for the very simplicity and
elegance of their models: empirical ignorance, misunderstanding, and, relatedly, unrealistic and
bizarre policy recommendations.").
Two examples of law and economics-generated reform proposals that are questionable
include Stephen Choi's suggestion that professionals in the financial markets should be totally
deregulated and investors, on the other hand, should be regulated, Choi, supra note 526, at 333-
34, and proposals that insider trading laws be gutted. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 253-75 (1991). I have explained by
disagreements with Choi's proposal. See Prentice, supra note 317, at 1399.
540. See Nussbaum, supra note 15, at 1198 (Law and economics typically "presents itself as
explanatory/predictive; but through a certain characteristic use of the concept of rationality, it
ends up making normative judgments as well. Thus Richard Posner, for example, both
characterizes (most) human behavior as rational in the precise descriptive sense he gives to that
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an entirely new paradigm.541 In this sense, legal decision theory has
aspirations much more realistic than Mitchell ascribes to it.
Although in an ideal world the psychological literature would
produce a persuasive, all-encompassing theory of human behavior
comparable to that which some economists have erroneously claimed
for law and economics, this seems unlikely to occur in the near
future.542 Legal decision theory has been termed a form of legal
pragmatism because of its atheoretical focus. 543 One reason that legal
decision theorists generally do not pretend to have the one right
answer to all legal issues is that psychology itself, similar to biology
and geology, "does not have large-scale unifying theories of the
Einsteinian type .... [M]ost psychologists view the possibility of a
theory that would unify the entire discipline as highly unlikely.
544
Milton Friedman famously argued that it is unimportant that
economic reasoning is based on assumptions that do not reflect the
real world so long as those assumptions produce predictable results.
545
Whereas economics generates predictions from its broad, simplified
assumptions, psychology generates predictions from its empirical
findings in experiments conducted in the laboratory and in the field.
The charge that legal decision theory lacks a unified, overarching
theory "is not fatal [because] [n]eeded support for predictions about
behavioral responses to legal rules can come indirectly, from
term, and then, shifting over to a normative use of the same term, blames certain other agents
for not conforming their behavior to those standards."); Wendel, supra note 5, at 4 ("Posner and
others in the law and economics camp recommend ... that economic efficiency should be used as
the sole extra-legal ... criterion for justifying legal judgments.").
541. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1747, 1748 (1998) ("Behavioral law and economics does not attempt to undo any of the
remarkable accomplishments of law and economics. Rather it is an attempt to refine.").
542. Thus, Mitchell sketches the future of legal decision theory as I see it when he suggests
that "[a]n alternative future for legal decision theory lies in placing a greater emphasis on
careful research into discrete problems or in incrementally trying to improve the predictive
power of law and economics by identifying those irrational tendencies that seems strongest and
most prevalent across similar legal settings," so that "the rational actor assumption can be
relaxed or supplemented in specific, manageable ways." Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at
87.
543. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 10, at 1057.
544. STANOVICH, supra note 64, at 127; see also Donald G. MacKay, The Theoretical
Epistemology: A New Perspective on Some Long-Standing Methodological Issues in Psychology, in
HANDBOOK FOR DATA ANALYSIS, supra note 98, at 229, 229 (noting that the failure of psychology
"to develop general and plausible theories [is the discipline's] greatest shortcoming").
545. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 14-16 (1953). In other words, Friedman is claiming that it is okay to be right for
the wrong reasons. Hirsch et al., supra note 537, at 324.
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defensible inferences from experimental results."546  Theories that
come after observation, as they tend to in psychology, can be much
more reliable than theories that economics produces ex ante, for in
economics the theorists have a much stronger incentive to interpret
the facts to fit the theory, whether they comfortably do so or not.547
Therefore, Judge Posner overstates the case with his claim that
legal decision theory's lack of an all-encompassing theory means that
"it is profoundly unclear what 'behavioral man' would do in any given
situation." 54  As noted earlier, 549 economic theory predicts that
Chicago Man will approach a rental car counter and actively bargain
for his desired level of risk. Legal decision theory predicts that K-T
Man will sign whatever contract is put in front of him. 550 Neither view
is universally correct, but which more accurately describes the typical
transaction?
Chicago Man purchases insurance coverage that best fits his
needs. K-T Man tends to purchase whatever is the default coverage
even when he has other choices available. Empirical evidence of
actual consumer decisions confirms that many people act more like K-
T Man than like Chicago Man. 55'
Economist judges predict that an audit failure will not be due
to an auditor's reckless auditing, because it would be irrationally
injurious to his or her reputation for an auditor to act recklessly. 552
Legal decision theorists predict that a plausible cause of an audit
failure is reckless auditing because auditors, like everyone else, are
subject to bounded rationality, rational ignorance, the confirmation
bias, the self-serving bias, and a host of other cognitive limitations and
behavioral predispositions. 553 Ask the Enron shareholders whether it
is better to simply accept the economists' absolute assumption, or to
examine evidence to determine whether the auditors might have been
reckless.
546. STEVEN D. WALT, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AFrER BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 20
(Univ. of Va. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 01-18, Dec. 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=353260.
547. See Neel P. Parekh, Note, Theorizing Behavioral Law and Economics: A Defense of
Evolutionary Analysis and the Law, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 209, 211-12 (2002) ("While
searching for information consistent with a theory, researchers often skew the data they
obtain.").
548. Posner, supra note 11, at 1559.
549. See supra note 489 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 490-503 and accompanying text.
551. See supra note 87.
552. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990).
553. See Prentice, supra note 36, at 152-81.
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Furthermore, it appears that Kahneman and Tversky's
prospect theory554 does have the potential to unite a broad number of
psychological concepts. Prospect theory assumes that people making
decisions are trying to maximize outcomes (not necessarily wealth
maximization), but often fail to do so in predictable and systematic
ways. In making decisions under uncertainty, for example, people
tend to deviate from the Chicago Man model in at least four respects:
First, people evaluate decision options relative to some reference point, generally the
status quo. When choosing between options that appear to be gains relative to that
reference point, people tend to make risk-averse choices; when choosing between options
that appear to be losses, people tend to make risk-seeking choices....
Second, individuals' risk preferences tend to reverse when they are faced with low-
probability gains and losses. Individuals tend to make risk-seeking choices when
selecting between options that appear to be low-probability gains and risk-averse
choices when selecting between options that appear to be low-probability losses....
Third, individuals tend to value losses more heavily than gains of the same
magnitude....
Fourth, and finally, individuals tend to overvalue certainty.
555
In a recent paper, Guthrie summarized the legal decision
theory scholarship applying prospect theory. He makes a persuasive
case that the new literature has added valuable insights into
questions as diverse as why litigation is settled, why legal penalties
sometimes do not deter negligence, whether consent in medical
treatment cases is truly informed, how consumers are vulnerable to
being manipulated by the sellers of products, why people frequently do
not act as Chicago Man in negotiating contracts, why lawyers often
get caught up in the criminal activities of their clients, why people pay
taxes even though it is unlikely they will be audited, when corporate
managers will be excessively risk seeking, when stockbrokers will be
likely to take advantage of their customers, and when companies will
attempt to engage in predatory pricing.5 56
554. Prospect theory has many facets, but it stresses importantly that expected utility theory
does not adequately describe decision making under uncertainty in part because it does not take
into account the fact that people's decision making is heavily influenced by reference points. For
example, people are risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability, yet risk
seeking for gains and risk averse for losses of low probability. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979);
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 462, at 297.
555. Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1118-19 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the four
key aspects to prospect theory are framing of ordinary gains and losses, framing of low-
probability gains and losses, loss aversion, and the certainty effect. Id.
556. Id. at 1134-36, 1139-55.
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Thus, prospect theory has the potential to add valuable
insights to legal policy across a wide range of issues.557 However, even
its strongest proponents do not envision for it the type of grand,
overarching role that many law and economics scholars once aspired
to for their work.5 5 8 This is okay, for as Allen and Rosenberg have
recently pointed out, vast areas of the law, including tort theory, do
not seem suitable for all-encompassing "top down" theories. 559 Yet, for
the last two decades, many economists have been trying to fit messy
facts into their simple overarching theory. 560 Their success has been
spotty. Furthermore, Gigerenzer has observed that "the
comparatively recent arrival of experimental economics and game
theory... [has] compelled economists to examine the demands their
models place on the people whose behavior they are trying to
describe."561  Those economists who have incorporated psychological
evidence about how people actually make decisions into their models
have produced more satisfying insights than those who have not.562
For those who resist adding this element of realism to their analysis,
such as Judge Posner in his recent examination of the rules of
evidence, 563 Allen and Leiter note that "[r]ather plainly, what matters
is how people and the system behave in fact, not how they are
predicted to behave by the application of formal tools, no matter how
557. See ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 44 (1988) ("Prospect
theory is a successful descriptor, however, not just because it incorporates irrationality, but
because it predicts the direction of irrationality when it occurs."); PLOUS, supra note 135, at 95
(observing that prospect theory is the most widely accepted alternative proposed to replace
expected utility theory).
558. See Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1163 ("Prospect theory's central insight, not unlike the
central insight of rational choice theory, is a rather blunt tool of analysis. As such, it cannot
explain the way all actors make decisions in all contexts. Nonetheless, it represents a valuable
refinement to the maximization assumption and should inform law teaching, legal scholarship,
and policymaking.").
559. Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 683.
560. See Hirsch et al., supra note 537, at 331 (noting that for economists, "[tihe question
becomes not whether the data fit their assumptions, but how they can be made to fit the model").
561. GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 294, at 347.
562. For example, in the field of criminal law David Dana's recent examination of the
"puzzle" of escalating penalties (the fact that deterrent effect does not necessarily escalate along
with an increase in penalties) included behavioral analysis to supplement his primarily economic
point of view, and his conclusions were more satisfactory than they would have been otherwise.
See Dana, supra note 34, at 733. Dana looked at the influence of the availability heuristic and
overoptimism on criminal behavior. Id. at 759-63. In another recent article, contractarian
Richard Painter clearly recognized that the status quo bias could lead parties to accept default
rules that are not optimal, and his proposals for the proper rules governing the lawyer-client
relationship became more realistic than they would have been without behavioral input. See
Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 687 (2001).
563. Posner, Evidence, supra note 34.
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elegant, for which there is substantial discomfiting, if not
disconfirming, data. 564
Policy prescriptions based on complicated but very real facts
have more promise than those based on elegant but very wrong
theory. Imitating economists, some legal decision theorists will, no
doubt, attempt to find a simple overarching theory to fit psychology's
messy facts. 565  I predict only partial success. The world is just too
complicated. Mitchell says that "while empirical research can provide
better answers than we currently have, it will not provide
incontestable or simple answers about legal rationality for prescriptive
use."56 6  I agree. The policy prescriptions offered by legal decision
theorists will never be incontestable. 567 They will seldom be simple.
However, for K-T Man to have more descriptive, explanatory,
predictive, and prescriptive power than Chicago Man, people need
only be systematically (not universally and uniformly) subject to the
various heuristics and biases discussed in the literature. And they
are.
Despite its limitations, legal decision theory carries the
promise of significant impact. In light of Cass Sunstein's writings,
568
future discussions of risk regulation cannot comfortably proceed
without taking into account how people actually feel about risk.569 In
564. Allen & Leiter, supra note 535, at 1518.
565. For example, Owen Jones's time-shifted rationality, which seeks to explain modern
behavioral scholarship through principles of evolutionary psychology, has broad theoretical
implications, but seems unlikely in the near term to uncover principles that are sufficiently
specific to generate much predictive power across a broad range of issues. See Owen D. Jones,
Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral
Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001); see also Parekh, supra note 547, at 221-27 (offering other
evolution-based theories to bolster behavioral law and economics).
566. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 14.
567. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 404, at 1560 (using behavioral insights to argue
that because consumers are prone to misperceive risks and manufacturers will inevitably take
advantage of them, the legal system should impose enterprise liability on manufacturers). But
see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases:
The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213 (2000) (disagreeing
with Hanson and Kysar regarding their conclusion as to the appropriate policy response).
568. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2002).
569. As noted, this article is already too long for me to undertake an extensive discussion of
my vision of the future of legal decision theory, but a common theme will likely be how
lawmakers, educated as to the heuristics and biases literature, can improve upon decision
making, often overcoming the errors of the uneducated, lay public. Sunstein's work in risk
regulation may well be a prototype. He has explained in detail how the heuristics and biases
lead the citizenry to overestimate many environmental and similar risks and underestimate
others. For example, the availability heuristic induces citizens to overestimate vivid, headline-
grabbing risks and to underestimate more serious but less publicized risks. Unless we are
careful, this leads to anecdote-driven "pollutant of the month" legislation. See Jolls et al., supra
note 310, at 1518; Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation,
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light of the work of Russell Korobkin, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Chris
Guthrie, future discussions of contract law cannot cavalierly omit
evidence regarding how real people actually think when signing
contracts. 570 In light of Donald Langevoort's substantial scholarship,
571
future policy prescriptions regarding corporate governance or
stockbroker regulation cannot safely ignore behavioral and cognitive
evidence regarding how people actually respond to incentives. In light
of my own work 572 and, much more importantly, the Enron debacle,
573
I suspect fewer courts in cases of audit failure will admit in writing to
a presumption that the auditors in an inherently conflicted situation
must have acted rationally to preserve their long-term reputational
capital.574 After this article was accepted for publication, Mitchell
himself made public an article suggesting a roadmap for properly
bringing a behavioral research agenda to the field of evidence law.
57
5
For my money, Mitchell's agenda holds more promise for bringing
insight to the field of evidence law than we are likely to gain from
even the best economic analyses, 576 but we are probably better off
gaining the benefit of both. When looking for dimes, it is better to
have an economic street lamp and a behavioral street lamp shining in
the area, although if I must settle for one I will take the latter.
That does not mean that behavioral analysis will always get it
right, or that legal decision theorists will always agree on the proper
51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 698 (1999). Legislators and regulators schooled in psychology literature
have the potential to provide more rational risk regulation than public outcry would demand.
570. See supra note 10.
571. See supra note 10.
572. See Prentice, supra note 36; Prentice, supra note 211.
573. The conflicts between audit work and consulting work have become increasingly
apparent as the Enron saga unfolds. At this writing, evidence of conflicts between audit work
and tax work is coming to the fore. See, e.g., Ken Brown & John D. McKinnon, IRS Later
Opposed Tax Strategies Sold by Auditor, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2003, at A3 (noting that controversy
over aggressive tax shelters "is certain to revive the controversy over whether accounting firms
should be permitted to provide both auditing and consulting services to big customers"), 2003
WL-WSJ 3958684; Jeremy Kahn, Do Accountants Have a Future?, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2003, at 115
(noting that the accounting industry's potential liability for bogus tax shelters "is likely to run
into the billions"), 2003 WL 8253597.
574. Indeed, the last case to cite DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990),
for the proposition to which I objected-that courts should not assume auditors would act
irrationally by doing anything to endanger their reputation for honesty-was Reiger v. Price
Waterhouse Coopers, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (S.D. Cal. 2000), back in October of 2000. Since then,
courts are more likely to say that when auditors violate GAAP, they forfeit the presumption that
it is "irrational" for them to risk their reputations. See In re SCB Computer Tech., Inc., 149 F.
Supp. 2d 334 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
575. GREGORY MITCHELL, MAPPING EVIDENCE LAW (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law
& Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 75, Mar. 2003), http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=386860.
576. See Posner, Evidence, supra note 34.
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resolution of an issue any more than economists always so agree.
577
Nor, of course, does it ensure that, even if the legal decision theorists
have it right, courts and legislatures will readily embrace this new
scholarship. 578
VI. CONCLUSION
Clifford Geertz observed that
[C]ertain ideas burst upon the intellectual landscape with tremendous force. They
resolve so many fundamental problems at once that they seem also to promise that they
will resolve all fundamental problems, clarify all obscure issues....
After we have become familiar with the new idea, however, after it has become part of
our general stock of theoretical concepts, our expectations are brought more into balance
with its actual uses, and its excessive popularity is ended. A few zealots persist in the
old key-to-the-universe view of it; but less driven thinkers settle down after a while to
the problems the idea has really generated. They try to apply it and extend it where it
applies and where it is capable of extension; and they desist where it does not apply or
cannot be extended .... [Ilt still explains something; and our attention shifts to
isolating just what that something is .... 579
This statement well fits the trajectory of the law and economics
movement, and may also describe the eventual track of legal decision
theory. Ardent supporters of legal decision theory have no doubt
painted an enthusiastic picture of the potential that it has for
577. See John C. Moorehouse et al., Law & Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly
Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 670 (1998) (reporting that a survey of law and economics scholars
found no consensus as to the efficiency of common law rules in general, a bedrock principle for
many leaders in the field).
578. I do not expect courts and legislatures to jump eagerly on board the legal decision
theory train, no matter how valuable its potential contributions appear to be. Blumenthal notes
that "it takes prodigious effort and confidence for a judge to overturn precedent based on
empirical findings." Blumenthal, supra note 1, at 72. The good news is that he has also noted
that "[ciourts' receptivity to social science knowledge may be increasing ...." Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, The Reasonable Woman Standard: A Meta-analytic Review of Gender Differences in
Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 33, 51 n.6 (1998).
However, legal decision scholars should not be overly optimistic. Given the prominent
judicial position of law and economics scholars, Circuit Judges Easterbrook, Posner, and
(formerly) Bork, and the number of judges who were processed by Henry Manne's economics boot
camps, see Henry N. Butler, The Manne Programs in Economics for Federal Judges, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 351, 352 (1999) ("By 1990, approximately forty percent of the sitting federal judges
had completed Manne's flagship program-the Economics Institute for Federal Judges."), it is
surprising that law and economics has found so little purchase in judicial opinions. It is also
chastening for advocates of legal decision theory, who are unlikely to have three leaders in their
field appointed to such prominent judicial positions and are similarly unlikely to find
corporations and conservative foundations that will fund psychology camps for judges. See Anita
Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1998)
(noting the failure of law and economics to have much impact on the law in spite of Henry
Manne's efforts, and arguing that "[1]ife-tenured, politically vetted federal judges have little
incentive to work at revising what they know" (citation omitted)).
579. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-4 (1973).
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informing legal analysis, and some may have fallen into the
overadvocacy trap.58 0 Articles such as those Gregory Mitchell has
recently published 581 are valuable to bring perspective to the area.
Legal decision theory's attempts to inject into legal scholarship the
concepts of behavioral psychology, cognitive science, and related fields
must be able to survive challenges such as Mitchell's in order to
prosper in the long run. His articles, then, are a welcome addition to
the debate about the usefulness of this new research. They deserve
and demand a response that I have attempted to provide.
Mitchell claims that psychological research "does not prove
that experimental subjects-much less real-world legal decision
makers-systematically violate norms of rationality when forming
judgments and making decisions."58 2 Despite the limitations of social
science research that Mitchell explores in detail, the debate over
whether the economists' Chicago Man or the psychologists' K-T Man
better describes reality is over; the psychologists won.58 3 As Nobel
Prize-winning economist Daniel McFadden recently said:
When one looks at the whole body of experimental studies of cognition and choice over
the past twenty-five years, what stands out is that humans fail to retrieve and process
information consistently, and this generates a variety of cognitive anomalies, including
behavior that makes consumers vulnerable to exploitation in markets. Available,
salient information looms too large, and beliefs are distorted because attention to new
information is selective. These failures may be fundamental, the result of the way
human memory is wired. I conclude that perception-rationality fails, and that the
failures are systematic, persistent, pervasive, and large in magnitude.
584
580. Lee Sechrest and Richard Bootzin argue that
There are many pitfalls for psychologists who attempt to influence the content of
public policy. One of the major problems is what Campbell (1969) called the
overadvocacy trap. The task of getting new policies adopted is so difficult that the
psychologist, as a policy advisor, is almost certain to make exaggerated claims about
the degree and likelihood of a policy's effectiveness. As Campbell (1972) stated, social
scientists who attempt to help develop policy too often "speak with a certainty
unjustified by the validity of their science."
Sechrest & Bootzin, supra note 238, at 388 (citing Donald T. Campbell, Reforms as Experiments,
24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 409 (1969) and Donald T. Campbell, Comments on the Comment by Shaver
and Staines, 27 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 164 (1972)).
Mitchell says that legal decision theorists "tend to ignore or discount research findings
contrary to their view of legal decision makers as afflicted by numerous judgmental biases and
decision-making errors, while simultaneously interpreting ambiguous research findings as
supportive of their pessimistic view of human rationality." Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12,
at 1911. I suspect he is right; it is certainly consistent with the behavioral research that
behaviorists, along with everyone else, would have a tendency to do this.
581. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12; Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12.
582. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 12, at 1912.
583. Markman & Medin, supra note 195, at 414; see also Shafir, supra note 295, at 277
(noting that the evidence from the K-T tradition "point[s] to the fact that the normative theory is
irreconcilable with the ways in which people make choices").
584. McFadden, supra note 6, at 96 (emphasis added).
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Any sting caused by Mitchell's attacks on Daniel Kahneman's
heuristics and biases work will perhaps be eased somewhat by the
Nobel Prize in economics that Kahneman was awarded in the fall of
2002.585
Mitchell's second main point, that legal decision theory "cannot
lay claim to empirical validity superior to that of the perfect
rationality assumption,"586 is true only if one accepts Mitchell's
inaccurate characterization of legal decision theory's position as one of
"equal incompetence." Rather than believing that all people are
universally and uniformly irrational in all settings, legal decision
theorists simply hold to the view, expressed by McFadden, that
various heuristics and biases limit human decision making in a
systematic way. If one looks instead at how legal decision theorists
actually apply the empirical evidence from psychology and related
fields, it becomes clear that useful policy insights can be gained to a
wide variety of legal issues even if decision makers are not universally
and uniformly irrational in all settings.
Attempts to paint the heuristics and biases literature as the
product of parlor tricks arising only from psychology laboratory
experiments involving college sophomores will become less and less
persuasive as studies of the brain demonstrate physically these
phenomena. Neuroscientists using CAT scans, PET scans, MRIs,
MRAs, and other techniques can now view brain functions without
invading the skull.58 7 Using such techniques, scientists have seen
displayed in brain wave recordings direct evidence of loss aversion
588
585. See Jon E. Hilsenrath, Nobel Winners for Economics Are New Breed, WALL ST. J., Oct.
10, 2002, at B1 (noting that Kahneman was awarded the Prize "for research showing how quirks
in human behavior, such as a tendency to avoid risk or to be over-confident, lead people to
behave in ways economists would consider irrational or that don't always bring positive
outcomes"), 2002 WL-WSJ 3408400.
Mitchell's reservations to the contrary, the heuristics and biases literature is receiving more
and more acceptance, and even acclaim, in the economics field. The American Economic
Association recently awarded its prestigious John Bates Clark medal for leading economists
under 40 to behavioralist Matthew Rabin, and the MacArthur Foundation recently gave a genius
award to MIT behavioral economist Sendhil Mullainathan. Id. at B3.
Coincidentally, Kahneman shared that Nobel Prize with Vernon Smith who won for his work
in experimental economics, work which has repeatedly demonstrated that markets do not
operate as traditional economics assumes. See Chris Giles, Economists Get the Idea, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2002, at 13 (noting that Professor Smith's work showed that in both simple markets and
complicated markets such as auctions, people do not behave in accordance with rational man
theory), 2002 WL 101374225.
586. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 12, at 72.
587. See RICHARD RESTAK, THE NEW BRAIN 3 (2003).
588. See William J. Gehring & Adrian R. Willoughby, The Medial Frontal Cortex and the
Rapid Processing of Monetary Gains and Losses, 295 Sci. 2279, 2279-81 (2002).
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and the gambler's fallacy. 58 9 They have direct evidence that every
time people make decisions that affect their own lives, the portions of
the brain that produce emotions are involved, even though the
decision would seem to call for straight forward rationality. 590 Other
brain work indicates that "the brain has special sectors for emotions,
and that some types of emotions, including some fear-type reactions,
can be triggered before the more cognitive sectors become involved at
all."59'
Still other experiments using an FMRI (Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging) provided direct evidence from brain functions 592
to support the existence of the omission bias that Koehler and I
discussed in a recent article. 593 And neuroimaging studies support the
existence of time-delay traps 594 that I have discussed in connection
with the causes of crime.595 Still other experiments eliminate doubts
some have had that when experimental subjects trust more than
Chicago Man it is because they do not understand the game correctly.
FMRI scans of trusters find activity in parts of the brain called
Brodman's areas 8 and 10 that have been associated with mental
thinking about the motivations of others and delayed gratification. 596
Nobel Prize winning economist Vernon Smith and his coauthors
recently reported these and similar results, calling for a new research
push in this field they term neuroeconomics so that we may produce
"better models of human behavior and consequently a better
understanding of legal problems."597
Mitchell does a valuable service by reminding us that legal
decision theory holds no magic key, and that easy answers will remain
elusive. 598 Just as in the physical sciences where what we "know"
589. Id.
590. See RESTAK, supra note 587, at 111-12 (citing the work of Professor Dean Shibata).
591. SUNSTEIN, supra note 568, at 44-45 (citing JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN:
THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996)).
592. See RESTAK, supra note 587, at 113-14 (citing the work of Professor Joshua Greene).
593. See Prentice & Koehler, supra note 405.
594. See RESTAK, supra note 587, at 117-18 (citing the work of psychologist Laura L. People).
595. See Prentice, supra note 36, at 177-78.
596. Tim Harford, In Search of the Inside Story of Economics, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2003, at
12 (noting that such brain activity is not present in nontrusters or in those who know that they
are playing a game with a machine rather than with another human), 2003 WL 63746636.
597. TERRENCE CHORVAT ET AL., LAW AND NEUROECONOMICS 45 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of
Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-07, 2004), http//ssrn.com/abstract= 501063. See
generally PAUL GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNDERCERTAINTY, AND THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF
NEUROECONOMICS (2003).
598. Ultimately, behavioral theory will likely be only a part of the ultimate picture,
explaining how man makes decisions. That picture will include institutional economics, positive
economics, experimental economics, organizational theory, cognitive science, psychoanalytic
theory, perhaps memetics. See generally ROBERT AUNGER, THE ELECTRIC MEME: A NEW THEORY
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today about the origins of the universe 599 and the behavior of black
holes 600 is different that what we "knew" two decades ago, our
knowledge of the cognitive functions of humans and their decision
making behavior in society will continue to evolve. Psychology's
understanding of K-T Man will be different ten years from now than it
is today, but legal decision theorists will follow the research where it
leads. We do not now have final answers to the most difficult
questions regarding human judgment and decision making. Likely we
never will. Nonetheless, "at any one time we have available a body of
research bearing on the nature and determinants of behavior, and we
ought to make of it the best we can. Policy may be better formed out
of the best evidence available than out of the prejudices of individual
decision makers or out of thin air."60 1 Or, I suggest, out of the false
premise that man is a rational maximizer of his utilities.
OF How WE THINK (2002) (describing the new field of memetics-a complex theory about how all
information is transmitted). Ultimate answers will be complex and, as Mitchell valuably points
out, context specific.
599. See, e.g., Faye Flam, One Big Universe Deserves Another; 2 Experts Say Replacement
Due in a Trillion Years, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 28, 2002, at A3 (describing new theory regarding
the origin of the universe proposed by physicists at Princeton and Cambridge).
600. See Michael Alicea, Scientists Pulled in By Mystery of Black Hole, PALM BEACH POST,
June 9, 2002, at 7D (describing physicists' new theories regarding black holes); Ann Schrader,
Scientists Reverse Black Hole Theory: CU 'Hunter' Helps Find Energy Leaving Object, DENVER
POST, Oct. 23, 2001, at B2 (same).




Levels of Generality in Behavioral
Law and Economics
Gregory Mitchell 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1781 (2003)
In this reply to Professor Prentice's article, Professor Mitchell of-
fers some additional thoughts in favor of a modest approach to revising
the law's assumption of rationality, as compared to the bolder ap-
proach argued for by Professor Prentice. After discussing how much of
the evidence on human rationality can be used both to attack and de-
fend the rational actor assumption due to ambiguities in this evidence,
Professor Mitchell turns to the larger question of whether legal decision
theorists describe behavior at too general a level to be useful in the for-
mulation of legal policy. Professor Mitchell argues that legal decision
theorists have placed too great an emphasis on finding and describing
behavioral tendencies toward irrationality, without due regard for the
boundary conditions on these supposed tendencies. As a result, much
of the interesting and important information about the constraints on
rational versus irrational behavior is consigned to ceteris paribus
clauses and treated as "noise" that should be controlled and ignored
rather than elucidated and understood.

